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ABSTRACT    
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the economic and political dynamics of 
health legislation in Chile throughout the 20th century. Law is understood 
as a process, in which legislation is the consequence of the political 
interaction between different stakeholders within a specific socio-
economic and political reality. Law thus performs as a function of its 
political dynamics. This case study discusses lawmaking in its 
multifaceted character fulfilling different roles, understanding health 
legislation in Chile as the expression of how society articulates and 
represents different interests and how health reforms are determined by 
the influence and capabilities of interest groups. The legal framework is 
situated within a broader national social, economic and political context, 
mediated by international influences and the strategic role assumed by 
the state. 
Empirically, the dissertation analyzes how economic and political 
variables have shaped different legal transformations in a country that 
has experienced significant, paradigmatic changes in health law, moving 
from a basically charitable system, inherited from the Spanish colonial 
power, to a strong and profoundly European welfare system—the second 
oldest national health service in the world—to a radical neo/liberal market 
model introduced in the late 1970s, and finally, towards a mixed public-
private system, still present.  
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The dissertation examines how economic and political variables have 
shaped different legal transformations in a country that has experienced 
significant and paradigmatic changes in health legislation. I will provide accounts 
of health legislation and health reforms with respect to the various interests they 
uphold, seeing people not as autonomous individuals but as actors in specific 
social locations and relationships. I am interested in law as a process, as a 
movement that occurs in the context of the historical development of Chilean 
society, where the Rule of law, based on the liberal tradition, is tied to the 
modernizations of the 20th century. I will explore how the law and the legal 
system are embedded in the transformations of the health sphere and the 
different models of health care applied in Chile. 
In these chapters, law is understood as a system of rules; namely, 
legislation, decrees-laws and government regulations. My research also includes 
governmental policies, as these offer useful insight into the legislation under 
examination. For the purpose of this study, I do not consider any jurisprudence or 
court decisions. Health reform is defined as a process that introduces regulatory 
changes in the health field; it is a product of the interplay of interests. It is 
ultimately reflected in the resulting discourse, policy implementation and 
legislation.   
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I intend to apprehend law in “its transformational state through a focus on 
actors, norms, and processes”1 and analyze legislation as the result of the 
interaction between different stakeholders in the political, ideological and 
economic process of lawmaking. I will pay attention to how power is distributed 
and how conflicts are resolved. Through this case study, I study if and how 
lawmaking and the Rule of law can be multifaceted and fulfill different roles. The 
Rule of law,2 as an expression of politics in its broad sense, and lawmaking, as 
the outcome of processes of negotiation, can both maintain the social and 
political order and be instrumental in promoting social change. 
In this dissertation I will argue that law is the expression of politics. I intend 
to capture law in what I consider are its temporal and spatial contradictions. I 
hold that law, in both its creation and its representation, is simultaneously 
situated in different times and spaces, with a plurality of identities and different 
roles. In its temporal dimension, law is synchronic and diachronic. In its creation, 
I consider that law undergoes contradictions between its essence and its 
appearance; that is, between how it is created and how it is presented. This is 
where the conflict-consensus duality is made manifest, which then becomes 
                                            
1 See Peer Zumbansen, “Lochner Disembedded: The anxieties of Law in a global context”, (2012) 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies at 1  
2 Rule Law as “ … a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfilment of which jurists are 
primarily responsible and which should be employed not only to safeguard and advance the civil 
and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, 
educational and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be 
realized”, International Commission of Jurists, The Dynamic Aspects of the in Modern Age, 
Geneva (1965), 15 in Vilhelm Aubert, “The Rule of law and the Promotional Function of Law in 
the Welfare State”, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, (Berlin & 
New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986) at 30 
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formalized and makes the law appear to have its own identity, and even 
autonomy.  If the liberal state was founded upon compromise, that has crucial 
implications for the law,3 consensus on a law is only a transitional compromise, 
produced in a given space and time and an undetermined period, whose limits 
are defined by the political dynamics.   
This is because consensus is the pursuit of consent. Consensus by no 
means expresses unanimity, nor a majority agreement, but rather an agreed 
upon way to seek agreement. Consensus minimizes the level of conflict, 
postponing it, temporarily neutralizing it, but it cannot eliminate or destroy an 
opinion or minority point of view. From the point of view of negotiation and 
conflict management, consensus does not require the active consent of those 
involved. It is enough for those who oppose a decision to attenuate their 
disapproval and tolerate dissidence. In this sense, a decision by consensus is an 
acceptance of non-refusal.  This reasoning, which is part of the origin of Greek 
democracy, of which we are heirs, means that in processes of conflict-consensus 
negotiation, it is fundamental to agree on the fact that we must not disagree. 
Consensus is not on content but on form. In other words, we do not need to 
agree on a decision, we only agree on the fact that we have to reach a solution: 
we agree to not disagree. 
                                            
3 Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1976), Law in Modern Society. Toward a Criticism of Social 
Theory, (New York, The Free Press, 1976) at 75 
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This is why I believe it is necessary not only to uncover how this conflict-
consensus dialectic develops, but also to clearly differentiate between statutory 
or enacted law (lex) and the principles of law (jus). This is where the concept of 
hegemony is fundamental. Throughout this dissertation I seek to articulate the 
notion of hegemony as the dynamic produced between coercion and consensus; 
that is, where consent to not prevent the possibility of reaching an agreement 
culminates in a consensual compromise, which is ultimately achieved or 
promoted through non-coercive domination. Although domination does not 
disappear, it coexists with a form of acceptance of the power of those who 
exercise it. The ideological and cultural acceptance of the tacit or explicit 
exercise of power shapes and sustains the political and social system in order to 
maintain and perpetuate a state of homogeneity and the status quo, which is 
historically temporal and is reproduced or modified in the same way as the 
conflict-consensus dialectic. Finally, in its rational dimension and its roles, I hold 
that the law can both maintain and reproduce the relations of power and create 
or facilitate social change.  
Therefore this research is guided by the theoretical assumption that legal 
changes are the normative outcome of the political process expressed in 
negotiations between a web of economic, political and social actors. Most of 
these changes are rooted in legislative reforms of one form or another and have 
been obviously affected by these major transitions. I intend to explain how health 
legislation is achieved through negotiations infused with political dynamics, 
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involving agents not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to 
economic and political structures. Thus, to understand health legislation reforms 
in Chile, I situate the legal framework within a broader political context, in which 
specific changes to the health care system must be considered in light of broader 
social, economic and political factors. It is in this context that I analyze and 
discuss the endogenous and exogenous factors that historically influenced health 
legislation; namely, the influences of the various political actors (stakeholders, 
political parties, civil society, unions and professional associations); the political 
process itself and its dynamics; the state and its role as an agent of 
transformation in the context of a national project; and finally, the impact of 
international influences throughout the historical time period of this work.  
Chile has moved from a basically charitable system, inherited from the 
Spanish colonial regime, to a strong and profoundly European welfare system 
with the second oldest national health service in the world, to a radical neo/liberal 
market model, introduced in the late 1970s, and finally, towards the current 
mixed public-private system. The time periods that characterize these different 
health models are as follows: the beginnings of the welfare state model (1924-
1938); towards the National Health Service (1939-1952); the welfare state during 
three different political administrations (1952-1973) and the market model (1973-
1989). 
My research is guided by the following questions: How has Chilean socio-
economic development influenced and shaped the different health models and 
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reforms? What have been the political economic purposes of these reforms, and 
how have they translated into health legislation during the different models under 
study? What were the ideological, economic and socio-political factors behind 
health legislation reforms? How have political dynamics and the roles of different 
actors been expressed in health legislation? Does law collaborate in supporting 
the status quo, or can also generate social change? What can we learn about the 
role of legislation reforms in social change from studying the Chilean health care 
system over decades? 
This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one introduces a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of law within a specific political and 
economic reality. Chapters two and three, the corpus of the dissertation, contain 
the qualitative empirical content, its analysis, and discussions of health legislation 
in 20th-century Chile. Chapter four “Overall analysis and conclusion” 
Chapter one, “The legal theoretical framework and health 
legislation”, analyzes legal theory, how legal processes are embedded in 
political transitions, and how the law evolves and is transformed. I discuss the 
legal system as an “ongoing process” and the law as a system that entails an 
understanding not only of its nature, but also of how it is processed, dictated and 
legitimized. Thus, I theoretically explore how the law behaves as a function of its 
own dynamics, and, in particular, its political dynamics. Lastly, I am interested in 
identifying how health legislation is framed by development policies, international 
influences and the strategic role assumed by the state.    
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Chapter two, “Health legislation and legal changes during the welfare 
state model”, investigates the beginnings of the welfare state model (1924-
1938), the development of the National Health Service (1939-1952), the 
incremental reforms leading to the National Health System and the welfare state 
during three different political administrations (1952-1973). It discusses health 
legislation in Chile as the outcome of an incremental process of health reform 
negotiated over the course of the century.  
 
Chapter three, “Legal and institutional changes in the establishment 
of a market model of health: 1973-1989”, discusses health legislation within 
the process of creating a neoliberal market approach, which represented a 
rupture to the welfare state and the introduction of a new rationality. Following 
this new logic, social consciousness around health issues was being neutralized, 
making health concerns an individual problem, which facilitated the atomization 
of society and stimulated the business of health care. This chapter analyses the 
principles, doctrine, legislation and regulations that permitted and promoted the 
establishment of a market model for health care in Chile after the 1973 coup 
d’état and demonstrates how the legal changes were aimed at the following 
objectives: the partial withdrawal of the state from the health sector, the creation 
of a market favourable to the flourishing of the private sector, and finally, the 
growth and development of the operational structure of the private health sector. 
This section covers the period from 1973 to 1989.  
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Chapter four, “The rise and fall of welfare health legislation over decades: 
overall analysis”, discusses how legal processes are embedded in political 
transitions and how law evolves and is transformed. I examine legislation as an 
“ongoing process” that reflects not only the nature of the legal system, but also 
how the law is processed, dictated and legitimized. My analysis of the legal 
transformations of the health sector in Chile is grounded in my understanding of 
law as a process of transformation. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK   
AND HEALTH  LEGISLATION   
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INTRODUCTION 
 I will argue that law is the expression of politics. In its multivalent 
character, law is the result of its own dynamics1 and the outcome of negotiations 
mediated by unequal actors in a political scenario of power relations. When the 
impersonality, neutrality and uniformity of the law is discussed, it is only a 
representation and an illusion, because at its essence is the creative process, 
which is not homogeneous and contains both authoritarian and liberating 
elements,2 as the very legal system reveals the contradictory nature of social 
life.3 
 The law disguises its internal contradictions and develops a dialectical and 
fetishist identity, taking on a life of its own, independent of how, when and in what 
context it was created. The negotiations and mediations that influence the 
creation of law are not independent from the relationship between the different 
interests at play in each historical and political context. They make the process of 
law creation possible and/or feasible.  
To analyze legal changes in the health sector, I discuss law as a process. 
I will argue that law and legality have different dimensions and different 
moments. Their dimensions of value and their ideological, political and rational 
dimensions would seem to exclude one another, but they do not. In this process, 
the individual is present and absent from different moments of the law and the 
                                            
1 Refers to actions that take place at the moment they are needed rather than in advance. 
2 Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1974) in Peters, “Law as a 
Critical Discussion”, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, (Berlin & 
New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986) at 261. 
3 Lelio Basso, Geseelschaftsformation und Staatsform, (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1975) in Peters, Id. 
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legal system makes the individual both appear and disappear. The individual 
appears in the content of the law, but disappears in its formality, when jus 
becomes lex. That is, the individual is an active part of the creation of the law and 
is yet passive in the face of legal formality.  
From a theoretical perspective, I explore the relation between law and 
politics, understanding lawmaking as the outcome of processes of struggle that 
either maintain the social and political order or promote change. Analyzing the 
dynamics of legal processes is essential for comprehending how the law has 
been embedded in the political sphere (via conflict and consensus) and in 
ideological debates. It is in this sense I will claim that law is both an expression of 
politics and the result of its own dynamics. 
The law is finally the result of interaction between different individuals in 
the political, as well as in the cultural-ideological and the economic level, but the 
law ultimately makes them equal: “we are all equal before the law.” In other 
words, the law denies individuals their autonomy and transforms them, making 
them all equal even when they are not, but at the same time it gives them 
autonomy and presence by making them subjects of law endowed with rights, 
epitomized in the doctrine of the Rule of law. This is very important in processes 
of lawmaking in general and health legislation in particular, as the impersonality 
of the law thus formalizes the equality of the unequal and suggests that any 
particular law cannot embody the interests of specific people or any particular 
group. 
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The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section: Law and its 
identity, examines the law and the legal system as a “process in motion”, with 
references to the German, French and Spanish traditions, which have two 
notions of the law (German: Gesetz and Recht; French: loi and droit; and 
Spanish: ley and derecho). Recht, droit and derecho refer to a whole body of 
laws, principles, and institutions in the sense of Roman law (jus) and therefore 
explain the law in its abstract and foundational meaning, which involves the 
principles that determine positive law, as opposed to statutory or enacted law, or 
lex, when law becomes law. In the second section of this chapter: Law and 
political dynamics, I undertake a theoretical examination of how the law follows 
its own dynamics, particularly its own political dynamics. That is, I explore how 
the law behaves according to the articulation of interests between classes, social 
sectors and pressure groups, in processes that both shape and modify health 
legislation. I also present the need to analyze the concept of hegemony and its 
impact on the legal system at the institutional, political and ideological levels. In 
the third section of this chapter:  Law and the welfare state, I examine how health 
law and health legislation are part of development policies. I examine the role 
historically exercised by the state, and its ties to the international variables and 
influences that had an impact on development policies and social and health 
legislation. 
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1. THE LAW AND ITS IDENTITY   
“One knows that one does not know why the law 
functions; but one also knows that one can act 
precisely because it functions”.4  
 
A.  The law: to be or not to be 
All societies have their own mythology and evolve and invent themselves 
in accord with their own beliefs. Durkheim identified law as a factor of social 
integration; Weber as a mechanism in the exercise of power; Parsons as a social 
subsystem and Marx as an element of the superstructure of society.5 Law, with 
its multifaceted nature, moves from conceptualization to implementation and is 
validated as a regulatory mechanism. As Jenkins writes, “Law is now intervening 
in areas that it has hitherto steered clear of; it is imposing its opinions and 
principles upon other social bodies, it is settling questions that were formerly 
thought of as being political economic, or moral, rather than legal, in nature; and 
it is issuing detailed directives about the ordering of various aspects of society 
and social life.”6 
Zumbansen indicates that the law has several definitions or 
interpretations. It can be an institutionalized system of rule enforcement, a means 
of stabilizing expectations, a means of oppression, a hope and also an empty 
                                            
4 Christian Joerges, “Die Uberarbeitung des BGB-Schuldrechts, die Sonderprivaterechte und die 
Unbestimmtheit des Rechts” 20, Kritische Justiz, 1987, 166-82 in Gunther Teubner, Law as an 
Autopoietic System, (Oxford & Cambridge, Blackwell, 1993) at 7.  
5 Csaba Varga, Law and Philosophy: Selected Papers in Legal Theory, (Budapest, Faculty of Law 
of Loránd Eötvös University, 1994) at 44-45. 
6 Iredel Jenkins, Social Order and the limits of Law, (Princeton, Princeton University Pres, 1980) 
in Jan M. Broekman, “Legal Subjetivity as a Precondition for the Intertwinement of Law and the 
Welfare State”, in Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, supra note 2 at 76 & 77. 
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parasite. “Law, legal analysis, legal argumentation altogether constitute society’s 
self-reflection and as such contribute to the formation of society.” 7 He writes that 
the first definition (law as an institutionalized system of rule enforcement) is likely 
to overburden the legitimacy promises of the state, and the second definition (law 
as a means of stabilizing expectations) runs the risk of everything becoming law. 
The third and fourth definitions (law as a means of oppression, and law as a 
means of hope) focus on the anxiety surrounding the “why” of law, its purpose 
and function.8  Finally, in his fifth definition, the law as an “empty parasite” 
operates and proliferates, but it does not acquire proper content. It remains open, 
and this is why it is recognized in a very pluralistic way. “It is through the lens of 
the fifth definition that the preceding four definitions reveal the deeply political, 
sociological and cultural dimension of law.”9 Zumbansen specifies that, “Law’s 
extreme functionalization is a necessity and as such is an inevitable by-product 
of an increasingly differentiated, complex and pluralistic society”.10   
Law exists in itself, but it has no value until it is inserted or interpreted in 
its own history. It is primarily economic factors, along with social factors, that 
determine (or at least influence) legal strategies and how the law is 
conceptualized in a given society. It has the ability to be and to exercise a 
function and a role, but it is not self-sufficient, neither in its genesis nor in its 
reason to exist. As argued by Csaba Varga, “law is also the imprint of the whole 
                                            
7 Peer Zumbansen, “The Future of Legal Theory”, (2010) 06 Research paper Osgoode Hall Law 
School 38  at 4. 
8 Id. at 5.  
9 Id. at 8.   
10Id. at 9.   
 16 
history and culture of the nation. The norms are only signs which by themselves 
mean nothing: they become alive only in the living practice of society.” 11 “The 
result of this process is that the concept of law becomes burdened with 
sociological content (a socialized concept of law) and it is also formulated in 
rather general terms.” 12 
Law is thus an element of power, but it is also a formal and rational reality, 
an expression of will, which in principle represents or purports to represent 
everyone. Unger indicates that the law imposes a particular and historical form of 
social order upon human groups and reflects the profound social structure of 
society.13 Buchanan would argue that law creates the society from which it draws 
its authority, but that society also brings law into reality.14 This is why law cannot 
be understood in isolation from other social phenomena and processes, but only 
through its connections to these phenomena.15 
According to Unger, the law continues to be a forum for political and 
ideological debate. 16  It is therefore important to determine how law, using 
normative systems, filters social problems and social reality. Commaille specifies 
                                            
11 Varga, Law and Philosophy, supra note 5 at 54. 
12 Broekman, “Legal Subjetivity as a Precondition”, supra note 6 at 77. 
13 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1986) in John J. A. Burke, “The Political Foundation on Law and the Need for 
Theory with Practical Value: The Theories of Ronald Dworkin and Roberto Unger” (San 
Francisco, Thesis, Faculty on Law, University of Fribourg, 1992) at 43. 
14 Ruth Buchanan, “Reconceptualizing Law and Politics in the Transnational: Constitutional and 
Legal Pluralist Approaches”, (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 654. 
15 Alan Hunt, “Exploration in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive Theory of Law”, in P. 
Barrios, Liberal Environmentalism and the International Law of Hazardous Chemicals, Thesis, 
Ph.D. Philosophy, (University of British Columbia, 2007). 
16 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1986), supra note 13 at 163. 
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this in reference to Jean Carbonnier’s statements when he argues that politics is 
the direction and law is what allows it to float,17 recognizing the role and the 
function of ideology. The ideological role of law is, then, to disguise its process of 
creation.  
 This is why once the law is made law, once it is resolved, it validates itself, 
from within. This, as Teubner says, is in line with the Luhmannian interpretation 
that there is no law outside the law and, therefore, positive law is a self-produced 
law. 18  However, Luhmann’s autopoietic law, as a structuralist functionalist 
approach framed in postmodernist currents, has the problem of being a system 
that is closed “and loosely integrated with the other social institutions.”19 As his 
interpretation is self-referential, only the law can change the law. This is both true 
and false.  That is, while it is true in the formal sense, it doesn't fully capture the 
social embeddeness of law's context. This does not prevent the legal system 
from reproducing. In other words, the law may seem self-referential and circular, 
but in its essence it is not. The internal organization of the law may be circular, 
but it is in a causal relationship with external influences, which are much more 
complex.  In particular the law understood as process and dynamics. 
 From an approach that looks at law as process, the neutrality of the law is 
also fictitious, as the procedure is inseparable from the result. That the process 
of lawmaking necessarily embodies values and incorporates ideas and notions 
                                            
17 J. Commaille, L’esprit sociologique des lois, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994) at 
23. 
18 Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, supra note 4 at 2 & 3. 
19 Max Travers, Understanding Law and Society, (Oxon, Routledge, 2010) at 51. 
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about how power is distributed and how conflicts are resolved. It is probably 
correct to say that without circularity, the perspective with which the Rule of law 
was founded cannot be justified,20 but laws’ justification and its legitimation are 
different concepts. 
 Law’s distinctive feature is its transmutation, only once it has been 
formalized and not before. This transformation phenomenon of identity that law 
undergoes is important, because the different “moments” of the law’s own 
process are contradictory. On one hand, it confers it autonomy and, as discussed 
above, it makes it seem self-produced, while on the other hand, it denies the 
dynamics (or it seems to be denying the dynamics) of its own creation. We may 
ask, then: Can law occupy an autonomous mode, with its own internal structure? 
Is law eminently political; a primary outcome of disputes for self-interest? 
  
B.  Law, legitimation and autonomy 
 The problem of legitimacy for liberal law is legal rationality and not its 
specific content that lends the law its legitimacy. From the liberal tradition legal 
legitimacy derives from its rationality, its internal logic, more than from its moral 
or ideological value. Faced with liberal society’s predicament of ensuring the 
impersonality of power, the Rule of law is based on two assumptions: that the 
most important powers are concentrated in the government and that power can 
                                            
20 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Society. Toward a Criticism of Social Theory, (New 
York, The Free Press, 1976) at 180. 
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be constrained by norms,21 as well as by the role exercised by the state. As 
Bobbio points out: “It is true that law…consists of a set of rules of conduct which, 
whether directly or indirectly, are formulated and validated by the state.”22 Bobbio 
opposes a minimal state (liberal) to a maximal state (absolutist), and indicates 
that democracy is not possible without a legal framework and invalid if it is not 
accompanied by political pluralism. 23   The question of legitimacy becomes 
crucial, challenging the foundations of liberal legal rationality. Autonomy and the 
Rule of law are parts of this identity process, as law is politics, or it is a form of 
politics. For Marxist theory, the law has direct ties to the state, but it displays 
autonomy with respect to the state and reflects economic relations. It has the 
potential to be coercive, manifests the interests of the dominant classes both 
directly and indirectly and legitimates the system in which it is produced and 
reproduced. The law thus fulfills the role of legitimating the product and the result 
of its own creation and the values of the hegemonic classes and powers.24 
Critical structural Marxists25 suggest that the law has its own history (the concept 
of the “relative autonomy” of the law). The law is understood as independent of 
                                            
21 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Societ, id. at 17. 
22 N. Bobbio, “Sur le positivisme juridique”, in Mélanges Paul Roubier, (Paris, Dalloz, 1961), Vol I, 
53-73, 61-62, 67-68 in Jacques Lenoble & Marc Maesschalck, Democracy, Law and Governance, 
(Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) at 32. 
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/6/2792/14.pdf 
23 Luis Antonio Córdoba Gómez, “Liberalism and democracy from Norberto Bobbio’ perspective”, 
(2008) 48 Convergencia at 19-38. 
24 Alan Hunt, “Marxist theory of law”, in Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, “Legal Positivism”, in 
Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, (Cambridge, 
Blackwell, 2010) at 355 & 361. 
25 Louis Althusser, “The object of Capital”, in L. Althusser & E. Balibar (eds.), Reading Capital 
(New York, Pantheon, 1970) in Steven Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, 
(1983) 9 Annu. Rev. Sociol. by York University 103-124 at 107. 
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the economic system, but dependent in a sense.26 It is precisely this “sense” that 
has kept alive the debate to ultimately determine the degree of autonomy. 
Poulantzas, for example, arguing with Althusser, proposes that the law is not 
necessarily the “state’s ideological apparatus”, but rather organizes and 
sanctions the real rights of the dominated classes, despite the fact that these 
rights are invested in the dominant ideology and that these rights therefore are or 
can be illusory.27 
 In relation to legitimation and according to Unger, modern liberal law has 
three essential properties: 1) Rule of law; 2) legal justice and 3) formalist 
adjudication.28 In addition, law at the legislative and judicial level must profess 
the properties of generality, uniformity and impersonality.29 The law is legitimated 
in its standardization and is applied to all, independently of their class condition 
or power. This allows the law to validate itself without privileging one interest over 
another and consolidates or ensures the functioning of the Rule of law in the 
modern liberal state.30 This is why the Rule of law has also been described as an 
“accepted measure ... of governmental legitimacy”31 and an essential pillar upon 
which any high-quality democracy must rest.32 
                                            
26 Id. 
27 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, (Londres, New Left Books, 1973) in 
Steven Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, (1983) 9 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 103-
124 at 108. 
28 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, in Burke, “The Political Foundation on Law and 
the Need for Theory with Practical Value” supra note 13 at 32. 
29 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 13 at 33 
30 Id. at 164 & 31-32. 
31 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 3 in Mohsen Al Attar, “Third world approaches to international law and 
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 The law thus develops its relative autonomy, upheld by the legal system, 
which is to say, by its formality. In other words, the Rule of law and the legal 
system both bring the law to life and make it autonomous. The law is formalized 
and made “objective”, and the Rule of law guarantees the neutrality of the state 
with respect to its citizens. In this sense, the law is politics in its historical liberal 
form,33 despite its contradictory principles (content and form) that also reflect the 
inconsistencies characteristic of liberal society. 34  This is why it is not the 
autonomy of the law “per se” or its capacity to reproduce itself that is important, 
as Luhmann35 suggests with his legal thesis.36 That the law can be autopoietic, 
that it can reproduce itself, is not ultimately decisive, as the law is both essence 
and presence. Tuebner positions the law in a “hypercycle”, writing that it is 
“…only when the system has created the necessary conditions for hypercyclical 
linking by describing and producing its own components that the actual 
autopoiesis of law can begin.”37  Cycles link together to form a hypercycle of self-
referential systems.38 He refers to legal procedure, the legal act, the positivity of 
law, the legal norm and legal doctrine as the components of a higher cycle of 
links that precede the possibility of self-reproduction of the law. Yet it is my view 
that as the law takes on a life of its own in the formal sense, it does not cease to 
                                                                                                                                  
of Graduate Studies, York University, 2012) at 205. 
32 Guillermo A O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of law Matters”, (2004) 15 Journal of Democracy 4 at 32 
in Mohsen Al Attar, Id. 
33 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, supra note 13 at 43. 
34 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics, (New York, The Free Press, 1975) 
35 Niklas Luhmann, “The Self-Reproduction of Law and its Limits”, in Teubner, Dilemmas of Law 
in the Welfare State, supra note 2 at 25. 
36 Alberto Febrajo, “The rules of the Game in the Welfare State”, in Teubner, Id. at 131. 
37 Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, supra note 4 at 42. 
38 Michael King, “The 'Truth' About Autopoiesis” (1993) 2 Journal of Law and Society 20 at 460. 
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be a reflection of society. “Law is part of [society], everywhere exposed to and in 
communication with it.” 39  For Teubner autonomy and autopoiesis are best 
understood as a matter of degree, by examining the extent to whlch that system 
manages to 'constitute its own components, action, norm, process, identlty - into 
self-referential cycles'. When these cycles link together to form a hypercycle of 
self-referential systems, the legal system can be said to be totally closed or 
autoppoietic.40 
 
C.  Law and its dual identity: status quo and change  
 Hobbesian rationale understands law to be at the centre of the relationship 
between humans confronted by conflicts of interest. However is law by its nature 
conservative or progressive? Are there structural social changes that can 
“determine” legal change?41 Can the Rule of law be multifaceted; that is, can it 
fulfill different roles as a function of the different historical moments of law and 
legality? Can the law’s autonomy and the Rule of law maintain the social and 
political order at certain historical moments and protect citizens from arbitrariness 
or even be instrumental in promoting social change at other moments? According 
to Spitzer, “Law is thus always structure and praxis,” but he asks, “How we do 
                                            
39 Peer Zumbansen, “Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn 
to Reflexive Law”, (2008) 04 CLPE Research Paper 03 at 39. 
40 King, “The 'Truth' About Autopoiesis”, supra note 46 at 459/460 and Teubner, Law as an 
Autopoietic System, supra note 5 at 5.  
41 Teubner, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, supra note 2 at 5. 
 23 
decide whether that practice is expressive, repressive or both?” “How can law 
both support and inhibit the transformation of (class) societies?” 42 
 From an orthodox Marxist perspective, the structuralist theses were 
criticized for the relative autonomy they attributed to the legal, political and 
ideological superstructure, considered to be a form of sociological pluralism that 
blocked an understanding of power relations.43 However, the law has a large 
degree of indeterminacy, in addition to its dual role, being able to be both an 
agent of the status quo and an instrument for change. In asking about the 
indeterminacy of law in its process and dynamism, there is certainly a factor of 
uncertainty, tied to the very dynamics of historical and political contexts and the 
relationship of the actors defending their interests, negotiating, maintaining 
conflicts and generating consensus. 
 Habermas indicates that development toward a social and democratic 
constitutional state can be understood as a form of constitutionalizing relations of 
power. Changes in social legislation linked to working hours, union organization, 
wage improvements, layoff protection, social security and other benefits are 
instances of the juridification of the balance of power within legal action.44 The 
distinctive characteristic of a legal system is not the confirmation of the status 
                                            
42 Steven Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, supra note 27 at 109. 
43 Roberto Fine & Sol Picciotto, “Law Marxist Critique of Law”, in Grigg-Spall, Ian & Ireland, 
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quo, but rather the recognition that things can change. In fact, legal theorists 
have called attention to the relationship between law and social change,45 
questioning such matters as the role of law as a stimulant for progressive social 
change and the methodology of legal tactics used by social movements in 
promoting social justice.  Some authors argue that legal tactics are futile for 
bringing about social change.46 Others point out that legal tactics can empower 
social movements, offering them a venue for greater mobilization capacity.47 
Those that identify with the Critical Legal Studies48 movement adopt a rather 
pessimistic stance, arguing that legal doctrines partially support the status quo.49  
In this sense, I believe liberal legalism embodies the belief that social 
reality is defective, but that it may be reformed.50 As is argued by Thomson, 
“critical legal theorists assert that law is far from obvious primarily because its 
                                            
45 I. Kostiner, “Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social 
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relation to power is not obvious.”51 The law can be used as an element of 
change, as a possibility for gradual reform, to the extent that it can be understood 
as a dynamic process for extending or modifying rights and not only as a self-
referential mechanism with which it reproduces itself. Social changes imply 
cultural changes (outlooks, perspectives, attitudes) that entail new demands and 
their corresponding legal transformations.52  
That the law can be an agent of change does not deny or refute that 
ultimately, it is embedded in the economic and political structure of society and 
reflects economic relations, particulary class interests, and is ideologically 
transformed to appear neutral. As indicated by Zumbansen: “Law has and 
obviously does in many cases serve as a weapon of hope and emancipation – 
but also the opposite is possible and frequently the case: with reference to 
existing laws, great deeds of injustice are committed, a tight grip of oppression 
over society maintained and law deprived of all its sense of political 
inconclusiveness, openness and critique.”53 
 “For the legal system in particular the notion of self-reproduction seems 
difficult to reconcile with the fact that law is determined to a considerable extent 
by political influences, economic structures, and social factors.”54 The legal order 
thus reflects the social order, a product of social and class conflicts. In any case, 
                                            
51 Alan Thomson, “Critical Approaches to Law Who Needs Legal Theory” in Alan Thomson, 
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Zumbansen,55 citing Wechsler56 and Lobel,57 indicates that the disenchantment 
with the extension of “rights” to address issues related to social injustice and the 
neutrality of legal processes are also reasons for dissatisfaction with the law as 
an instrument for social change. As a product of human activity, the law reflects 
the uncertainties of social existence58 and is therefore contradictory and can be 
an agent of change and of oppression. Yet particularly with respect to health 
care, it is interesting to note that the law invites us to discuss how to reconcile 
interests, how to correct injustices, but it does not invite us to question basic 
principles of transforming health into a right, like the right to property or to 
freedom of expression. Constitutional and universal access to health care 
services is not enshrined as a right, but private property and market economy 
appears to be.59 Perhaps, “like religion in previous historical periods, the law 
becomes an object of belief which shapes popular consciousness toward a 
passive acquiescence or obedience to the status quo.”60 
The law does not only play a role as itself and as an institutional relation 
with and with respect to the state. The law is also embedded in the social and 
articulates the interests of political dynamics. As mentioned above, it can be used 
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by powerful interests to preserve inequalities and status quo, and it can be used 
by less powerful groups as a mechanism for avoiding manipulation by private or 
government power.61 That is, “by juxtaposing ‘arbitrary power’ and the ‘Rule of 
law’ it may be argued that law can operate against the state as well as in its 
service.”62 It is the historical contexts and political dynamics that articulate the 
conflicts and consensus that also forge the identity of the law.   
 
2. THE LAW AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS  
A.  The political nature of the legal process and the law as praxis.  
Every society creates its own legal system and legal rationality, and it 
becomes difficult to disassociate law from the culture from which it emerges 
specifically. Law as a product of negotiation processes between several 
stakeholders defending their interests is embedded in the social fabric and the 
political and economic structures of society. It is the expression of how society 
organizes itself and articulates and represents different interests and worldviews 
in a given historical context. 
Law and the state, from the Hobbesian philosophy of the social contract to 
the present, are connected – directly or indirectly, only formally or overtly – to a 
                                            
61 Unger, Law in Modern Society, supra note 20 in Hamilton, “Toward a Critical Legal Theory”, 
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62 See E. P.Thomson, Whigs and Hunters: The origins of the Black Act, (New York, Pantheon, 
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discourse of power.63 Using a reflexive interpretation that sees a role for the law 
in the resolution of conflicts in certain contexts and that makes the law receptive 
to a range of rationalities, one can study the law as it is materialized at different 
points in time as a dynamic ungoing process. The legal system interacts in a 
large public arena in which as part of different contending interests intervene and 
are reflected and the social order is legitimized: “…the law is never monolithic 
(....) Its function differs, deepening on the relative strength of the social forces 
which struggle around and within it, and on the balance between these forces. 
The law is not a thing but a relation. Its formal rules can be given a different 
social and economic content in different historical moments and at different 
periods of struggle.”64    
Althusser, in his structural Marxist paradigm, proposed law as a part of the 
ideological apparatus of the dominant classes,65 but Poulantzas, much closer to 
Gramsci, saw the law in broader and more dynamic terms, in that it also 
“organizes and sanctions certain real rights of the dominated classes (even, of 
course, these rights are invested in the dominant ideology and are far from 
corresponding in practice to their juridical form).”66 While neither Gramsci nor 
Althusser focused their studies on the law, they did not minimize its role. They 
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understood it as a cultural institution that exercised strength and power through 
the police and the courts. This means that discovering the hidden meaning of 
legal texts could also be understood as a form of political struggle against the 
established order, in this case the capitalist order.67  Poulantzas broadened the 
debate to a more active notion of the law. A more dynamic law, in movement, 
less one-dimensional, like the structuralists proposed. Law could be understood 
not only as a receptacle of values and priorities determined outside of society, 
but also as part of a complex social whole that society constitutes and where it is 
constituted,68 as the law is essence and appearance, content and formality. 
Though for Poulantzas, the law obscures the real differences behind a facade of 
formalism, 69  classes and social groups have many different determinations, 
which consequently require a negotiation of interests. Poulantzas sees these 
interests manifested as a block that “constitutes a contradictory unity of politically 
dominant classes and fractions, under the protection of the hegemonic 
fraction.”70 Referring to Althusser, Sumner, a legal sociologist, suggests that, 
“Legal enactments must be seen as reflections of contemporary culture and as 
reflections of political manoeuvre as well as reflections of economic structure.”71 
It is interesting to note that these structuralist interpretations (Poulantzas, 
Althusser) are criticized from both the orthodox Marxist perspective and post-
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modernism. In the debate between structuralism and contemporary post-
modernist interpretations, structuralism contributes to explaining and 
understanding the power relations behind the law, while post-modernism warns 
us about the deterministic risks of trying to explain everything through the lens of 
economic and political structures.72 In the 1980s, other theorists indebted to 
cultural Marxism, such as the Frankfurt School or the critical legal studies 
movement, also sought to reveal the deep linkages between legal texts and 
political contexts. Following Gramsci, the critical legal scholars suggest that the 
law cannot be understood by means of its own self-referential introspection, but 
rather through its political relations in order to identify the law’s interpenetration 
with other social processes.73  E.P. Thomson74 most profoundly explores this 
thesis, suggesting that the law is both inside and outside, with both visible and 
invisible legal structures. Though Merritt75 suggests that this thesis could be seen 
as “cultural reductionism”, Thomson proposes that the distinction between the 
superstructure and the infrastructure levels out, as the law not only influences the 
basis of society, but also becomes a part of it.76  
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B. Conflict, consensus and hegemony  
It is not law that defines power or guarantees the autonomy of legal 
institutions, but rather it is the political process that ultimately determines the 
legislative process (laws) and its legitimization. The rule exists because it is 
accepted as a matter of convention, and convention is based on consensus (as 
opposed to disagreement). Therefore, it could be argued that part of social 
cohesion is also the result of a respect for the legitimacy that law confers.  I do 
not wish to understate the importance of the fact that legal rationality has a meta 
rationale that is the result of its own process of legitimization, reinforced by the 
ideological discourses and by the institutions that promote and support it. This 
could probably be termed “hegemonic consensus”.77 This condition is the product 
of the equation between the social and/or political forces that compete to defend 
their interests and, at the same time, influence the processes of law creation. 
There is a circular argument at play: legal rationality is dependent upon the 
power structure in which legality is embedded, and, simultaneously, this legal 
rationality legitimizes the character and environment of power relations.  
Unger indicates, “interest-group pluralism, as we may call it, represents 
law as the product of bargaining among organized interest groups. In a 
democracy the primary but far from the sole locus of this lawmaking activity is 
legislation, with its background in electoral party politics.”78 Unger further argues 
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that, “Interest-group pluralism…is not a sociology of lawmaking, but rationalizing 
legal analysis itself, a prescriptive discourse, providing an account of how law 
becomes legitimate and how it should be represented.”79 For functional pluralist 
traditions as well as for Marxist perspectives, power is dispersed in society in 
individuals, classes or organizations. However Pluralists, unlike Marxist 
traditions, deny that a particular group could dominate another, pointing out that 
everyone has some power and that nobody can have too much. There are 
pressure groups and interest groups that compete with each other, without any of 
them having control of the state. In other words, power is disperse. For some, the 
state is neutral with respect to the resolution of conflicts, and for others it 
certainly is not.80 The differences with respect to the role of the law are not 
insignificant, as for some it is an articulator for conflict resolution and for others a 
mechanism of domination for the interests of the dominant classes, in which the 
essence of the law hides the real differences with the facade of universal 
formalism.81 
Within the conceptual and theoretical framework of the law, when we refer 
to the debate between conflicts or contradictions of interest and consensus and 
models of legitimation, we can distinguish between conformist models and critical 
models. Peters indicates that the critical model has both a static operating 
mechanism, that is, “formal compliance with established law or accepted 
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principles” and a dynamic operating mechanism, which is “justification through 
rational arguments in critical discussion.” 82  It is true that in cultures where 
harmony is highly valued and consensus is encouraged for resolving conflicts, 
these encounters may be rejected.83 However, the pursuit “of consensus” does 
not have to respond only to the functionalist tradition, in which “law answers to 
requirements, customs and necessities emerging from social practice or 
crystallizing out of public deliberations.”84 The law is not only an instrument for 
achieving a social, political or economic objective, but also the result of the action 
and the concrete dynamics and outcome of a cyclical process with its own 
political dynamics. It is not, as Nonet and Selznick85 suggest within the notion of 
“responsive law”, that citizens must appropriate the law in order to arrive at a 
consensus around the direction of society. This formalist consensus, as 
Zumbansen explains, idealizes the forces of cohesion in a society that is 
profoundly complex and fragmented. “Therein lies, to be sure, the great danger 
for law, for political, in particular democratic theory and for grand-scale social 
theory.”86   
Though the liberal state was founded, as Unger points out, upon 
compromise, and this compromise has crucial implications for the law, 87 
consensus on a law is only a conjunctural compromise, produced in a given 
                                            
82 Peters, “Law as a Critical Discussion”, supra note 2 at 270. 
83 Id. at 270. 
84 Zumbansen, “Law after the Welfare State”, supra note 55 at 14. 
85 Philippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition, Toward Responsive Law, (New 
Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 1978) in Zumbansen, Id. at 19. 
86 Zumbansen, Id. at 20 & 21. 
87 Unger, Law in Modern Society, supra note 20 at 75. 
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place and time but for an undetermined period, whose limits and timing will be 
those defined by political dynamics. Even Luhmnann, as a systemic functionalist, 
explores the complex interdependence between conflict and the law, concluding 
that a theory of law is related to a theory of conflict.88 Conflict is productive for 
law, as it gives the legal system the opportunity to open itself up to the 
environment, and it is with respect to conflict that the law makes expectations 
widespread, evolves as a system, fulfills its role in society and attains unity and 
identity.89 Conflict and consensus are not necessarily diametrically opposed or 
extremes of a process. Both are contradictory, both are dialectic, both are 
circumstantial and both are inevitable. One does not exist without the other, and 
they are not fixed in time. Neither is more conservative or liberal than the other. 
Christodoulides illustrates this very well when he indicates that, “Conflict theory 
and consensus theory are too often seen as seeking their departure from gaining 
leverage from, and positing some kind of teleology to, mutually exclusive 
alternatives. This in turn has occasionally led to simplistic equations of 
consensus to social structure and conflict to social dynamics…. Conflict is as 
much inimical to social structures as it is intrinsic to them. Co-operation contains 
conflict as it does consensus.”90  
As discussed above, the process of law creation is an expression of the 
articulation and negotiation of interests in a given social context, producing the 
                                            
88 Niklas Luhmann, Ausdifferenzen des Rechts: Beitrage zur Rechtsoziologie und Rechtstheorie, 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981) in Emilios A. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics, (Dordrecht, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) at 130. 
89 Christodoulidis, Id. 
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dynamics of struggles for hegemony and power. Law, as the result of a process 
of conflict, is, as Szabo puts it, “a condensed or concentrated” product of social 
relations.91 Therefore, law is hardly ever, except during revolutions that generate 
ruptures or dictatorships, imposed without some form of negotiation. It is even 
possible that organized and critical players, as a result of their ability to induce 
legal change without altering the existing order, may defend the status quo in 
order to adopt standards that will achieve change in their respective social 
contexts. It is in this sense that not only are the dynamics of law determined by 
endogenous and exogenous factors, but the law itself can be understood as an 
agent in such processes, hiding the conflicts of interest generated in its own 
creation. Hence, law is a synthesis of both the dynamics that create it and the 
results.  
This debate about the political dynamics at play between conflicts of 
interest and consensus seems to be in opposition with the concept of hegemony. 
I say that it seems to be, as they are not contradictions per se. As Litowitz 
indicates, “the concept of hegemony deserves broader consideration from the 
legal academy because it is a critical tool that generates profound insights about 
law’s ability to induce submission to a dominant worldview.” 92 This does not 
mean that submission to a dominant worldview is necessarily imposed. Political 
dynamics, like all movement, are cyclical and indeterminate, in action, and with 
                                            
91 Imre Szabo, Les Fondements de la Théorie du Droit, (Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973) at 
334. 
92 Douglas Litowitz, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and law”, (2000) Brigham Young University Law 
Review 515. 
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results that are temporary and can even be contradictory. As these are not 
neutral but rather the result of political dynamics themselves, the concept of 
hegemony is crucial for identifying the mechanisms of power and the role of 
ideologies in shaping the law, as a product of consensus. Law is legitimated in its 
formality and accepted and validated as a temporary product of the result of 
consensus, even when we know that this is devoid of content, contradictions or 
hegemony. 
All legal systems evolve as political practice in the exercise of power and 
the construction of hegemonies. They depend upon or change in accordance 
with the social and historical conditions associated with a society. “If we theorize 
the notion of change in relation to the evolution of power relations, and the 
concept of hegemony about constructing alliances, integrating rather than simply 
dominating to win consent,” 93  we realize that law is achieved through the 
dynamic and mutable processes of the construction of hegemony. Therefore, the 
notion of “alliance” is important if we want to “associate” social sectors with a 
specific worldview, in this case the hegemonic worldview. The concept of 
hegemony thus becomes critically essential, since it fundamentally expresses a 
form of domination, originating in lawful practices, exercised in diverse ways and 
invariably linked to relations of influence and the power structure in a given 
society. While social organizations induce and influence social and human 
activity, hegemony is concerned with the reproduction of social structure, and 
                                            
93 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, (Cambridge, Polity Press & Blackwell 
Publishing Inc., 1992) at 92.  
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more importantly, with the need to secure conditions for this reproduction. Law 
has the ability to be and to exercise a function and a role in this process, but it is 
not self-sufficient, neither in its genesis nor in its reason to exist. 
Gramsci, when placing the concept of domination outside the state 
apparatus and the economic sphere, conceptualized that the superstructure may 
be autonomous with respect to the structure,94 and introduced the concept of 
hegemony as organized consensus. Social groups can be subordinated to 
others, but the basis of hegemony is always acceptance of the relation.95 This 
organized consensus promotes a dominant worldview that is ultimately supported 
by the majority of the social classes, with the law contributing to the development 
of the mechanism for securing hegemony under the aegis of the dominant 
class.96  
When the legitimacy of the legal system is in crisis, new political economic 
variables are introduced and new forms of political negotiation are developed that 
minimize the universal nature of formal legality and open up new opportunities 
and dimensions that require the legal and political spheres to be reconciled in 
order to preserve hegemony.97 Furthermore, as the principal characteristic of the 
law is its formal legitimacy, this legitimacy also bears normative strength, but 
                                            
94 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prision Notebooks, (London, Lawrance & Wishart, 1971) 
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95 Anne Showstack Sasson, “Globalisation, Hegemony and Passive Revolution”, (2001) 6 New 
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since the content of law changes, it can also be manipulated to reflect specific 
interests. It is in this process that structural biases are normalized.98 
  
3. LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE  
A. Law, development and the state  
The state, unlike the government (the administrative body of the executive 
power) and the nation (an ethno-cultural concept), is understood as the political 
unit of a geographically delimited, organized human community with social, 
economic, sovereign and coercive political organization. Public institutions in this 
political unit are controlled by the citizens and organized into the state powers, 
which are legislative power in order to legislate, executive power to administer 
legislation, and judicial power to administer justice and enforce the law. The latter 
also falls to the action of the police, which along with the armed forces, hold a 
monopoly on legitimate physical force. For this research in particular, I prioritize 
the intervention and action of the legislative power in its lawmaking processes 
and of the executive power that administers the implementation of laws, leads 
processes of social and economic development, executes social and economic 
policy and must guarantee social rights, the accessibility of public health care 
services and the regulation of private services. 
The notions of development and health are sometimes elusive, but they 
are closely linked to politics and the economy, and they are distinctive in their 
                                            
98 See Al Attar, “Third world approaches to international law”, supra note 31 at 104. 
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capacity to have both a conservative and progressive impact. Economic and 
social policies are based on both endogenous and exogenous factors. The 
former include economic and social development policies, the function and 
evolution of the state, the development of the welfare state, social structure, 
political representation, and the behaviour and action of political parties and 
organized civil society (stakeholders). Finally, foreign influence on economic and 
public policymaking and the country’s involvement in and links to the world have 
been critically important in the shaping of the different health models. 
Health issues, usually associated with medicine, chemistry and biology, 
are addressed with science- and evidence-based practices, while their “political” 
character in influencing policies, reforms and legislation remains neglected.99 As 
Raphael argues, it is relatively uncommon to acknowledge the importance of the 
social determinants of health, and it is even less frequent to consider the political, 
economic and social factors related to health issues,100 yet there is a reciprocal, 
synergistic and close interconnection between health and development.101 In the 
case of the Third World or developing countries, the notion of development is 
much more closely linked to questions of political economy than it is in the 
developed world. Third world countries are less stable, more externally 
influenceable, poltical scenarios are more diverse and development policies have 
                                            
99 See Buse, Kent; Drager, Nick; Fustukian, Suzanne & Lee, Kelley (2001), “Globalization and 
health policy trends and opportunities”, in Kelley Lee (et al.) (eds.), Health Politics in a Globalizing 
World, (Cambridge University Press) at 256 
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more divergent options.  At the same time, law is central to development, since it 
involves policy choices choices and distributive objectives, which contribute to 
development.   
It could be argued that a social system that is sensitive to and dependent 
on the outside world and international influences loses stability and leaves a 
significant part of society without protection, subjecting them to the fluctuations of 
external processes. On the other hand, an autonomous system under its own 
control and its own logic that privileges formalism can be resistant to change and 
less flexible for adapting to the times. Health policies are thus the result of 
changes in economic relations, the action of political forces but also growing 
international influence, which were also modifying the nature and role of the 
state. 
Unger points out, the state must profess neutrality and impersonality and 
seek harmony. It must be the ruler and different from any other group in the 
system of domination and dependence,102 but it is also particularly interesting to 
note that the state can be involved in the negotiating process103 of articulation, 
adaptation, re-articulation and resistance to change. The state is legitimized in 
and with the will of its citizens, while social sectors or groups are also coopted by 
the state with specific social benefits as a form of seeking political support.104  
                                            
102 Unger, Law in Modern Society, supra note 20 at 61. 
103 W. Ratliff, "Development and Civil Society in Latin America and Asia", (1999) 565 Annals of 
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It is in this political process that the state is configured as a product of its 
own dynamics and historical conjunctures. It has a contradictory identity and 
legitimates itself as an entity that intervenes in order to maintain order and the 
Rule of law and to promote the economic and social changes for which society 
“reached a consensus” in the political sphere and that it legitimized in the formal 
sphere. In this context of political dynamics and development, the interventionist 
state plays a double role: it neutralizes social movements through intervention, 
and it promotes social change to contribute to social and economic development, 
thus forming the welfare state105 for a large part of the 20th century.  
 
B. The welfare state  
An analysis of social democratic models of social development considers 
the welfare state resulting of political struggles over state intervention aimed at 
benefiting the working class, and it is interested in the process of how demands 
were articulated and their impact on electoral politics. 106  The welfare state 
                                                                                                                                  
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America. Pressure Groups, Stratification, and 
Inequality, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978) at 8. 
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106 Walter Korpi, “Power, Politics and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship”, 
(1989) American Sociological Review 54 309-28 / Michael Shalev & Walter Korpi, ”Working Class 
Mobilization and American Exceptionalism”, Economic and Industrial Democracy 1 31-61 in 
Chikako Usui, “Welfare state development in a world system context: event history analysis of 
first social insurance legislation among 60 countries 1880-1960”, in Thomas Janoski & Alexander 
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improved income distribution, but it also influenced and affected the 
accumulation of capital. Furthermore, it brought about changes in labour 
productivity and broadened many of the values and rights that certain workers 
have acquired over time. Yet it is important to point out that the concept is not 
necessarily straightforward and creates historical contradictions. Some associate 
it, perhaps mistakenly, with the concept of “Socialstaat”, which is also a social 
option or social intervention for the economic and political problems of capitalism. 
“Socialstaat”, based on the Bismarckian policies of the 19th century, comes from 
the Weimar Republic and Constitution,107 which explicitly protected the labour 
force and regulated or restricted the economy in pursuit of social justice in early 
20th-century Germany.108 It is also correct to say that this “Socialstaat” and the 
policies of Bismarck were not progressive in the strict sense and sought to 
neutralize the social movements in 19th-century Europe that threatened the 
established order.109 This is why this concept of the social state is comparable, 
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but not equivalent, to the evolution of the welfare state and the implementation of 
Keynesian economic policies starting in the second half of the 20th century.110  
In fact, both right and moderate left-wing political parties supported 
Keynesian theory, which proposed mitigating the effects of economic depression 
by stimulating demand through the state and influenced what we now call the 
welfare state, with its most ardent defenders being the social democratic 
governments. The welfare state system encouraged markets and industrialization 
and promoted peace, social stability and social consensus. The welfare state has 
not only improved the distribution of income and influenced the accumulation of 
capital, but has also induced changes in labour productivity and enhanced the 
values and rights gained during an individual’s lifetime. Although what we define 
today as a welfare state stems from different conceptions, of both philosophical 
and moral in their socio-historical genesis, the role and position of the state has 
been unquestioned in its position at the epicentre of social, economic and 
political processes within this model.111   This is particularly evident in Latin 
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America, where the state became more interventionist in order to ensure 
emerging social rights.112   
The welfare state thus seeks to balance the structural imbalances, 
inequalities or inequities generated by political power and market interests. The 
welfare state has also brought about important transformations in society. In 
particular, by extending individual and collective rights to social welfare, it has 
modified political struggles, seen new groups and collectives with demands 
emerge, broadened the concept of democracy and ultimately reformulated the 
state-society relation. 
The welfare state has also been at the centre of criticism from all political 
and ideological sectors. Conservative interpretations present it as an obstacle to 
economic growth (seen clearly today with neoliberal policies), as it limits 
individual liberties and strengthens the role and interventionism of a state seen 
as inefficient and controlling. Classic or orthodox Marxist theory considers the 
welfare state to be an action carried out by the dominant sector to neutralize and 
coopt workers or to include them with less resistance in processes of capitalist 
accumulation. Between these extremes, there are less radical variations, but 
these present the welfare state in its contradictory nature, understanding that 
while having conciliatory effect upon capital and labour, it is no less true that it 
has an impact on social progress and that its effect on the social structure is 
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ambivalent, maintaining both egalitarian tendencies and the preservation of the 
status quo. 
There are valid reasons for maintaining that the legal system of the 
welfare state contributes to the very dynamics of economic growth113 understood 
from the point of view of the development of capitalism, in that the social 
measures contribute and are functional to growth policies. However, as Unger 
notes, 114  contemporary law, through legislation, administration and the 
adjudication and action of the courts, is also important for monitoring economic 
control and unjust accumulation and for keeping markets competitive or 
determinng if an agency is acting in the public interest. 
Today, the significant structural differences between the Socialstaat and 
the welfare state in its Keynesian version are fading, and it must be recognized 
that the latter is instrumental to mass democracy.115  According to a critical 
interpretation, social conflicts between capital and labour transformed into 
conflicts over the distribution of the gross national product. This reconciliation 
between capitalism and democracy is the main reason that the welfare states 
worked following the Second World War.116  
From a strictly theoretical point of view, critical analyses present the 
welfare state as an instrument for realigning capitalist accumulation policies or as 
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a form of attaining political and social consensus without structurally altering 
hegemonic relations. This interpretation has also changed following the 
implementation of neoliberal economic policies that have rearranged capital-
labour relations and the role of the state. “The transformation of the western 
welfare state in the latter half of the twentieth century is marked by a significant 
transformation of the role of the state in the establishment and provision of 
formerly ‘public’ services.”117   
It would seem that the neoliberal view, unlike its liberal alma mater, seems 
to favour a legal system that guarantees more the expression of economic 
freedoms than justice, social inclusion and even the constitution and stability of 
the Rule of law. In this context, it would appear that a central dilemma of 
democracy, depending on how it is interpreted or defined, is the disjunctive 
between freedom and justice. “Whereas much of the twentieth century was 
characterized by the central role of the state…present contentions of 
functionalism emphasize the values of market freedom and competition as 
endangered by state intervention”.118  
The contemporary options of deregulation and privatization are reflections 
of the neoliberal perspective that presents this tradeoff between freedom and 
justice. Of the two concepts, already ideologized, neo-liberalism favour freedom, 
and, hence, reject state intervention. However, as Scheurman puts it, “…we may 
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not need to choose either formal law or the welfare state, either the Rule of law 
or greater social and economic equality. The view advanced by so many authors 
that there is a dramatic decision that needs to be made either for freedom or 
equality is overstated.”119 
Nevertheless, the last decades are demonstrating a metamorphosis of the 
welfare state. Social policies are commercialized, and their function is no longer 
complementary to processes of accumulation; instead, they are directly part of 
this process. This has been thoroughly demonstrated with policies privatizing 
health services and pension systems. Some, such as Peters, estimate that even 
the modern welfare state has very subtly come to introduce major processes of 
alienation, expressed as a “subjectivization of critical thought” in which freedoms 
today are part of consumption.120 
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INTRODUCTION  
The development of social policies in Chile has been unequal and closely tied to 
the trajectory of social struggles and the ability of mostly class-based social 
movements to effectively voice their demands. Defining social movements is 
clearly complex due to the relativity and historicity of the concept. A definition 
cannot be transposed onto a given reality without understanding the reality and 
circumscribing the definition to a given social, political and, of course, historical 
context. For the purpose of this research, social movements are principally 
understood as being associated with the labour movements and their protests, as 
was the case in Latin America and Chile since the end of the 19th century. Later, 
Latin America saw other expressions of social movements, tied to struggles of 
national liberation, revolutionary movements and political and popular 
movements. The common denominator was political struggle itself, in national 
causes closely tied to political life and the political parties. In the final decades of 
the 20th century, other social movements also started to influence political, 
cultural and popular life, distancing themselves from the traditions of the labour 
movement and the primarily Marxist political parties with interpretations that were 
critical of capitalist society. This was theoretically developed in analyses of post-
industrial society, where social movements are seen to go beyond the context of 
the class struggle. 1  Social movements also broadened with globalization 
                                            
1 See Alain Touraine, La Voix et le regard, Sociologie des mouvements sociaux (Paris: Seuil, 
1993) and Claus Offe, “Los nuevos movimientos sociales cuestionan los límites de la política 
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processes and the socio-political impacts of neoliberalism, such as the exclusion, 
atomization and marginalization of large sectors of society. Growing social and 
economic inequity, despite relative economic growth, and the emergence of other 
social and cultural concerns tied to the feminist movements, already more 
consolidated, and the environmental, indigenist, sexual diversity, ethnic, student 
and other movements began to have an influence on organized social 
expressions. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to note both the historical importance that the 
labour movement had for protest in Chile and the fundamental significance of the 
political parties. It is probably due to the extent of the labour and union 
movement’s organization and political tradition that social movements in Chile 
were principally linked to this movement, which I prioritize in my analysis of social 
policy in this dissertation. 
The pension system, health care services and the education system all 
became fragmented and developed in dissimilar ways as fractions of the middle 
class, the working class,2 private interests, the church, medical doctors, health 
professionals and health workers, the armed forces, and organized civil society 
succeeded to varying degrees in pressuring the state to extend coverage.  
This is why, in order to analyze the welfare state, it is necessary to 
understand how political struggles have been articulated and how the state, 
                                            
2 G. Walt, “Implementing health care reform: a framework for discussion”, in R. B. Saltman, J. 
Figueras & C. Sakellarides (eds.), Critical Challenges for Health care Reform in Europe, 
(Buckingham, Open University Press, 1998) at 24. 
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whose role has been decisive, has intervened. The articulation of social demands 
has an impact on electoral politics and, subsequently, on legislative processes.3 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the welfare state has improved social 
conditions and income distribution, and at the same time it has influenced the 
economic structure and stimulated labour productivity. The Chilean welfare state 
was built with a corporatist approach, following the European model, with the 
active but uneven participation of all actors and stakeholders involved in the 
various stages of its development over the course of the century.  
The health system and its hierarchical provision of services was always in 
a process of transition, in which health legislation and health reforms were the 
result of an ongoing process of negotiation between actors and the various 
interests at play.4 Reforms have an element of indeterminacy, due to the fact that 
they are the result of this complex system of interactions among a plurality of 
social actors, and this makes attention to process as important as attention to 
content.5 
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In this chapter, I analyze health legislation in Chile as the outcome of an 
incremental process of negotiated health reforms, and I discuss the role of the 
state and its relationship to economic and political development during different 
economic and political contexts and governments between 1924 and 1973. The 
chapter covers the following periods: the beginning of the welfare state (1924-
1938); the process towards the establishment of the National Health Service 
(SNS)6 (1939-1952); the first decade of the National Health Service (1952-1963); 
and the welfare model during three different political administrations, a) the first 
decade of the National Health Service  (1952-1963) and the conservative 
government; b) the centrist Christian Democratic government (1964-1970) and c) 
the socialist model of the Popular Unity government (1970-1973). 
In order to analyze the process of reforms and health legislation over 
these years, I have adapted Walt’s7 conceptual framework, also modified by 
Giarelli, 8  which includes four components: a) the context (political system, 
macroeconomic situation, ideological and society values); b) the social actors 
(stakeholders, political parties, unions, professional associations and civil 
society); c) the content (strategies, type of reforms, nature of the legislation and 
d) the process (dynamics of the legislation process and its implementation). This 
chapter explores and discusses health legislation in the context of the interaction 
of these four components, allowing an analysis and evaluation of health 
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7 Walt, “Implementing health care reform”, supra note 2 at 365-384. 
8 Giarelli, “Convergence or Divergence?”, supra note 5. 
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legislation during the period in which the welfare state was developed and 
implemented in Chile.  
 
 
1. THE BEGININGS OF THE WELFARE STATE MODEL: 1924-1938 
Pressure to introduce significant social reforms mounted in the early 
1920s. President Arturo Alessandri (first presidency 1920-1924), who enjoyed 
the support of reformist Radicals and Democrats, formed the so-called Liberal 
Alliance. While he received strong support from the middle and working classes 
as well as from provincial elites, he was nevertheless unable to introduce the 
social reforms he advocated. Congress was dominated by the rural landowning 
elites, who pressured the government and forced continuous cabinet changes. 
Yet, while Alessandri’s efforts to introduce reforms were resisted by the 
conservative Congress, reform legislation gained popularity in the Congress 
thanks to pressure from younger military officers who were unhappy about the 
neglect of their armed forces and dissatisfied with the political backbiting, social 
unrest and sharply rising inflation.9 
Finally, under pressure from a faction within the military 10  and with 
President Alessandri’s consent, Congress approved a wide-ranging set of laws. 
For the most part, authorities were simply responding to pressures exerted by a 
                                            
9 Rex A. Hudson (ed.), Chile: A Country Study, (Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1994). 
10 The officers moved to the periphery of the National Congress and struck their swords on the 
floor in protest. The event has come to be known as the "Swords Movement". 
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growing number of workers’ organizations and a long series of strikes. 11 
Ultimately, a context of political and socio-economic crisis, exacerbated by the 
failure of parliamentary action, facilitated the entry of the military onto the political 
scene. In 1924, due to a decisive political change, a fraction of the army seized 
political power and pressured the more conservative members of Parliament to 
implement more reforms.  This military coup forced the resignation of President 
Alessandri, and a military junta, headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs General 
Altamirano, called on Congress to finally approve these changes. The 1924 coup 
thus radically altered the social landscape, ratifying a long list of reforms that 
brought about a major change in the nature of the state, which now adopted the 
charitable perspective from which the welfare state would emerge. The 
determinants of the military action were numerous, including the officers’ 
demands for a speedy approval of the pending labour and social reform bills.  
The most important of these social laws was Law 4,054,12 which created 
the Workers’ Insurance Fund, then known as the compulsory Security Fund and 
                                            
11 The Chilean Labor Federation (preceded by other experiments) had already been founded in 
1909. By the early 1920s, the Federation had approximately 80,000 members. Its charter stated 
that its purpose was "to defend life, health and the moral and material interests of workers of both 
sexes". 
12 Law 4,054: Workers' Compensation Act 4054, Sickness and Disability (Recasting of Act 
4054 of  September 8, 1924) This Act declared and provided for compulsory sickness and 
invalidity insurance for anyone less than 65 years of age who had no other income or means of 
subsistence, wage or salary, not exceeding eight thousand Chilean pesos (year 1926) annually. 
Applicants or apprentices in any job, industry or occupation were also entitled to some kind of 
assistance even if they had no wage or salary.  All workers, artisans and artists working 
independently, traders or those directly serving the public, in the streets, squares, gates, 
warehouses, small businesses, and small traders or trolleys, were also covered under this Act 
even if their average yearly income did not exceed eight thousand Chilean pesos (year 1926) 
annually.  
 55 
later renamed Social Security Services (SSS)13. The medical branch of the 
Workers’ Compulsory Insurance Fund provided homecare and consultations for 
workers and their families. It also offered inpatient and outpatient services, 
created general hospitals and implemented an agreement with the “Charity”—a 
body that controlled most of the hospitals in the country—using payments 
allocated from the Workers’ Insurance Fund.14 The creation of the Workers’ 
Compulsory Insurance Fund was an expression of the changing political reality, 
which included the increasing social role of the state within a context of political 
and ideological struggles and the emergence of a tripartite political spectrum 
(right, centre and left parties), thus restructuring the political scene.  In 
comparison with the personal savings of the former Social Insurance Fund and 
the benefits of the Civil Servants’ Savings Fund, the Workers’ Insurance Fund 
pursued a different objective. Administratively defined as a semi-autonomous 
state agency, the Fund received its revenues from employer and worker 
contributions as well as from state coffers.  
A particularly noteworthy aspect of the reforms implemented during this 
period is the autonomy that was granted to the Fund to either establish in-house 
services or to outsource them. The practice that prevailed was to pay the Charity 
hospitals for services rendered to the insured at cost price, according to prices 
set by the Fund, without having to negotiate with doctors. This regulation was 
                                            
13 SSS, Servicio de Seguro Social. 
14 Fernando Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, in M. Livingstone 
& D. Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y bienestar social, (Santiago, CIEPLAN, 1976) at 66.    
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crucial in the shaping of the Chilean health system. As the Security Fund lacked 
its own hospitals, it did not become isolated or dissociated from the rest of 
society. Instead, it was thought of as dependent upon Charity hospital services. 
This facilitated the recruitment of more professionals and better-qualified health 
personnel. The organizational structure also allowed the Fund to immediately 
draw attention to the need to integrate and rationalize services, which was 
specifically addressed in subsequent draft legislation. Before its enactment, 
though, Law 4,054 faced several important challenges. Prior to its 
implementation, employers launched an open boycott of compulsory 
contributions, and business owners threatened to close down factories. The law 
was finally promulgated on 8 September, 1924, along with a series of other 
reforms, with little discussion and brought before the legislature at military 
gunpoint.15  
The new social welfare legislation was approved under a new conceptual 
differentiation between “working” people and “the indigent”, providing new 
grounds for legitimating waged labour that would become the essence of the 
working class vis-à-vis the state.16  The Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare, Labour and 
Social Welfare was created in 1924 to carry out the new legislation, naming Dr. 
                                            
15 The following bills were thus approved without almost any parliamentarian discussion: National 
Budget (1924); Nominations for Army personnel, promotions and retirements; Salary increases 
for junior officers of the Armed Forces and Police; Police reorganization; Reform of the Armed 
Forces’ Pension Fund; Granting legal standing to the Army factory; Labor Code amendments with 
respect to unionization, labor contracts, right to strike, arbitration, tribunals and cooperatives; 
Social Security coverage for disability, sickness and labour accidents and Law that was part of 
the Labor Code.  
16 M. Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, Historia Social de la Salud 
Pública. Chile 1880-1973, (Santiago, Colectivo de Atención Primaria, 1993) at 197. 
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Alejandro del Río as minister, who distinguished himself with advanced public 
health proposals. With this nomination, the country officially recognized for the 
first time the superior role of medical science in ensuring the physical and moral 
welfare of its citizenry.17 The new ministry was responsible for public health, for 
coordinating and administering all medical services and for monitoring the 
institutions related to health care and social protection. Public authorities 
recognized the interrelationships between health issues and socio-economic 
conditions, the right of the population to receive curative care and the state’s 
sense of responsibility for health care. This translated into the need to give 
priority to the protection of disadvantaged sectors of the population.18 
The following year, in March 1925, the organization of health services 
became formally regulated with the creation of the Division of Social Hygiene.19 
The historical importance of this legislation is indisputable, given the magnitude 
of its social reach and the significant role that it gave to the state. Indeed, the law 
involved all of Chilean society in health control measures, while the state took on 
an important responsibility, becoming a highly centralized overseer. 20   The 
political aim of this welfare project was twofold: first, to restore the bonds 
between the population and the ruling class, and second, to incorporate the 
working class into the national public realm. It thus focused on the most 
                                            
17 Id. at 204-07.  
18  Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, supra note 14 at 66-67. 
19 División de Higiene Social.  
20 Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, supra note 16 at 219-21. 
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interesting aspect of the welfare state, which was to attend to, maintain and 
restore the health of the working force—the pillars of the productive process.21  
Although the state had no intention of taking over or reducing private 
health care, it planned to consolidate its centralized vision and policy vis-à-vis the 
socio-political organizations, such as the municipalities, that had considerable 
jurisdiction over public health matters. These were regulated by the Health Code, 
which the new law would modify. It is in this context that the new Ministry of 
Hygiene, Welfare, Labour and Social Welfare transferred all public health 
services from the municipalities to the Division of Social Hygiene. 
These changes in the distribution of health care responsibilities were also 
of great conceptual significance, as health became increasingly present in the 
public agenda in terms of regulating working conditions, making health care 
savings compulsory and extending the role of the state in public policies. Social 
legislation gained enormous political, economic and social prestige and 
contributed to social stability, as it helped to ensure the contributions of a stable 
and healthier workforce to the process of economic growth and development. In 
October 1925, Decree-Law 576 created the Retirement Fund and Social Security 
for all municipal employees in municipalities and provincial assemblies. 
Employees who were fifty-five years old and had completed thirty years of 
service could retire with an entitlement to the rights guaranteed by this statute.22   
                                            
21 Id. at 141. 
 
22 The Retirement and Municipal Employees Social Security Fund was exempt from all tax. The 
discount was a mandatory 5% of the earnings of each employee. The Fund could acquire real 
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Although, as mentioned above, the law appears to be a hybrid of politics 
and ideology and a means for controlling social practice,23 it is also closely linked 
to negotiation processes to approve legislation related to social benefits, pursuits 
of equity and protection from (arbitrary) state intervention.24 In these cases, the 
relation between the law and social change encourages or at least facilitates the 
mobilizing capacity of actors25 to promote legislative changes.   
While organized labour had its own position with respect to the reforms,26 
the medical intelligentsia supported the overall model of the welfare state in its 
construction of a new and modern concept of “welfare”, a successor to the 
concept of charity. The reforms were also a result of pressure from the large 
contingent of workers migrating to cities following the marked decline of mining 
                                                                                                                                  
estate on behalf of a request received by it, and could also provide mortgage loans on property 
within its unique domain. 
23 C. Sumner, Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the Marxist Law Theory of Ideology and 
Law, (London, Academic Press, 1979) in Roman Tomasic, The Sociology of Law, (London, 
SAGE Publications, 1985) at 13. 
24 D. Grimm, “Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Zukufunt der Verfassung” in D. Grimm 
(ed.) Staatsaufgaben, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996), 613-646 and E.-W. Bockenforde, “The rise of 
the state as a process of secularisation”, in E.-W. Bockenforde (ed.), State, Society and Liberty 
Studies in Political Theory and Constitucional Law, (Trans. J.A. Underwood, New York and 
Oxford, Berg, 1991), 26-46 in Peer Zumbansen, “Governance: an Interdisciplinary Perspective”, 
in David Levi-Faur (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012) at 86. 
25 Michael Mc Cann, “Rights at Work: pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization”, in  
Kostiner, “Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social 
Change”, (2003) 323 Law & Society Review 2 at 324. Helena Silverstein, “Laws, Meaning, and 
the Animal Rights Movement”, in Kostiner, Id. 
26 The workers’ organizations did not offer unconditional support to all the new reforms.  They did 
not, for example, support the Workers’ Security Fund (Law 4.054). They criticized the reforms as 
a “fraudulent attempt to legally rob the workers of their wages”. The organizations added that 
workers would never be able to enjoy their pensions, as their miserable conditions would not 
permit them to live to the required age to obtain the pension. They also argued that while 
employers contributed to the Fund, eventually and ultimately the workers would suffer due to poor 
living conditions. They concluded that the creation of the Ministry of Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare, 
Labor and Social Welfare Hygiene, did not necessarily support the interests of the working class. 
In contrast, the medical intelligentsia supported the overall model of the welfare state in its 
construction of a new and modern concept of "welfare", successor to the concept of charity. 
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operations in the northern regions of Chile between 1910 and 1920. This entailed 
the need for social policies that could alleviate growing concerns about the 
struggle for subsistence. In this context of social turmoil, the working class began 
to take on an important political significance as a force of electoral support. At the 
same time, new movements within the military faction called for a Constituent 
Assembly. Alessandri was recalled to the presidency to complete his agenda of 
reform, beginning with a new constitution that was ratified in September 1925.  
The new constitution reflected international changes and global trends, 
such as a tendency to recognize individual rights and a growing acceptance of 
the state’s obligation to ensure social rights. Essentially, it gave the executive 
branch broad administrative powers, increasing the presidential term from five to 
six years, with direct election. The 1925 Constitution deprived the Chamber of 
Deputies of the authority to impeach ministers, but it upheld its right to indict 
ministers and the president of the Republic for abuse of power. It also 
established the incompatibility of the position of minister with that of a member of 
Parliament. It determined the separation of the church from the state and 
guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience, while ensuring civil liberties and 
individual guarantees. The protection of labour, industry and social welfare was 
ensured. The new constitution also helped create the Electoral Court and the 
Central Bank.  
These legal provisions also sought to protect workers’ right to social 
welfare, decent housing and satisfactory socio-economic conditions and to 
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guarantee the health of the population. That same year, Decree-Law 37927 
approved the final text of Law 4,05528 on workplace accidents. Under this new 
law, the definition of “workplace accidents” did not change, but now the onus of 
proof fell on the employer and not on the employee, as in the past, employees 
had to demonstrate that they had suffered an accident at the workplace (theory 
of fault liability or tort). Since the new law followed contractual theory, it was a 
significant advance from the previous legislation. 
Notwithstanding these social advances, the conservative opposition and 
labour unions were, for different and even opposing reasons, strongly against to 
these changes and reforms. The same year, 1925, the Social Republicans’ 
Front29 was created, with the aim of safeguarding social legislation. Among its 
leaders were workers, employees, and two medical students.30 The importance 
of this Front lies in its reconceptualization of the corporate welfare state—a 
                                            
27 Decree-Law L 379 (1925). Work Accidents. The employer's responsibility also extended to 
diseases resulting indirectly from the exercise of the profession or the work undertaken by the 
employee, and which caused the disability. Without prejudice to the responsibility of the 
employer, the accident victim, or those who are entitled to damages, can also claim from third 
parties responsible for the accident, the total compensation for the damage suffered in 
accordance with the requirements of the law. When it came to a case where a third party, having 
caused the accident, was required to pay, this law absolved the employer of all responsibility 
towards paying the compensation. The law provided for full coverage of occupational injury and 
illness (medical benefits in cash and in kind).  
28 Law 4,055 (1924). Reformed the Law of Industrial Accidents. An industrial accident meant 
any accidental injury suffered by the worker or employee during work or in any way related to 
his/her work, and resulting in disability. The employer was liable for accidents and injuries 
sustained by their workers or employees. However, the employer was not liable for accidents that 
occurred in bizarre circumstances, unrelated to the work and intentionally caused by the victim. 
No. 5 of Article 574 of DFL 178, Social Welfare, published on May 28, 1931, along with other laws 
relating to work, merged into a single text of this law, and finally repealed this rule.  
29 Frente Social Republicano. 
30 J. Flores, La Dictadura de Ibáñez y los Sindicatos (1927-1931), (Santiago, Dirección de 
Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, 1993) at 79. 
 62 
model that would subsequently be taken up by Chile’s Social Republican Union 
of Employees.31  
In 1926, the Workers’ Federation of Chile 32  and employee unions 
supported by the Communist Party33 organized national strikes and protests 
demanding the immediate dissolution of Law 4,054, the elimination of the newly 
formed Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare, Labour and Social Welfare and the end of 
the welfare state model.34  González Cortés, a deputy at the time, expressed 
what was being disputed by workers’ organizations with great clarity: “...the 
Compulsory Insurance will smoothly and rationally generate social peace, a 
friendly alliance between the two major factors of production [i.e. capital and 
labour], today deeply divorced due to the sad and real misery of those who work 
and to the blind and senseless hatred that the professionals of the revolution and 
their crazy dreams are condensing in them.”35 
                                            
31 Unión Social Republicana de Asalariados de Chile 
32 Federación de Trabajadores de Chile (FTCH). 
33 The Communist Party was founded in 1922 and which began to have a strong presence in the 
organization of Chilean working class activities. Until then, these had been organized and 
coordinated by the Democratic Party, led by Luis Emilio Recabarren considered the father of the 
Chilean labor movement.  
Luis Emilio Recabarren was born in Valparaiso in 1876, from very poor parents and worked from 
a young age as typographer. With formal schooling, he was self-taught. In 1894 he joined the 
Democratic Party of Chile. He became an ardent public speaker and founded several 
organizations and newspapers to foment solidarity within the workers. Became director and editor 
of the El Trabajo (Work) newspaper. Later he became the publisher of the La Vanguardia 
(Vanguard) newspaper. Recabarren was elected Member of Parliament in 1906, representing the 
Democratic Party, but he was prevented though from assuming his position because he refused 
to be sworn on a bible. He was very involved with the Labor movement and was prosecuted to 
exile in Argentina.  In 1910, after returning from Europe he was arrested and sent to jail. He 
founded the Socialist Party in 1912 and founded several other politically engaged newspapers.  In 
1918 he contributed to the foundation of the Argentina’s Communist Party and later in the 1922 
the Chilean Communist Party. He lost the presidential election in 1920, while being in jail. 
34 Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, supra note 15 at 228. 
35 Chamber of Deputies, Session Bulletin, 25th Special Session, May 19, 1922. Bill declaring 
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However, the expanding welfare state continued to enact new laws and 
regulations, extending social legislation. The second Health Code was created 
along with the Higher Council for Child Welfare36 and the Central Board of 
Welfare and Social Assistance,37 which was an autonomous entity with technical 
and financial resources. This semi-public institution was responsible for the 
management, administration and construction of hospitals, shelters, asylums, 
mental institutions and orphanages. Two years later, in 1927, charitable services, 
medical services and compulsory insurance were centralized and regulated by 
Decree 2,101, and Decree 581 also approved a set of laws on occupational 
diseases. 
Numerous social measures resulted from the new institutions founded in 
the 1920s, which sustained the increased action of the welfare state. The 
functions that Decree-Law 689 of October 17, 1925 prescribed for the Council for 
Social Assistance and Welfare Departmental Boards were subsequently moved 
to the Central Board of Charities.38 Decree with Force of Law (DFL) 17839 
                                                                                                                                  
compulsory Sickness and Invalidity insurance submitted by Exequiel González Cortés. Also 
processed the Act that created the Fund for Private Employees based on the individual 
capitalization system enacted in 1925. 
36 Consejo Superior para la Protección de la Infancia. 
37 Junta Central de Beneficencia y Asistencia Social. 
38 The Central Board of Charities served the Welfare Services and Social Welfare under the 
authority of the President of the Republic. It was composed of the following members: The Social 
Welfare Minister who presided over the board; the President of Charity Services of Santiago, the 
Director General of Health, two members of the Council of Welfare, and the Dean of the Faculty 
of Medicine. The Central Board appointed the presidents of the Charity Services- both, Provincial 
and Departmental. Medical assistance as in the Compulsory Insurance Act 4054, and which was 
granted to individual employees, eventually came under the jurisdiction of the Central Board of 
Charities. The President had to decree the regulations for the operation of Charitable Services 
and Social Welfare.  
39 Decree-Law (DFL). 178 (1931). Created the Labour Code.  Merged laws and decree-laws 
promulgated between 1917 and 1931. 
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created the first Labour Code in Chile, and in terms of social security, it is worthy 
of note that employers were obliged to take all necessary steps to effectively 
protect the lives and health of their workers and employees. They were 
responsible for all hygiene and safety measures in the workplace and for 
facilitating timely and adequate medical, pharmaceutical and hospital care.40 
At the end of 1927, the new Chilean political landscape again witnessed 
major changes. President Alessandri resigned due to lack of support from 
General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who had previously brought him to the 
presidency in the 1924 military revolt. Alessandri went into exile, and the 
government was taken over on an interim basis while General Ibáñez, without 
the support of the political establishment, announced his candidacy for the 
presidency. Finally, Emiliano Figueroa, the sole candidate for the Liberals, 
Conservatives and Radicals, won by a large majority, but he was rapidly 
subjected to pressure by the now Minister of Internal Affairs, General Ibáñez. A 
                                            
40 Injury: referred to an accident that the worker or employee had suffered on account of or in 
connection to his work. The employer was liable for accidents caused to their workers and 
employees, except for accidents occurring under bizarre circumstances, those unrelated to work, 
and those intentionally caused by the victim. The onus of proving the exceptions stated above fell 
on the employer.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the victim of the accident or anyone entitled to compensation 
could claim compensation from third parties for the damage suffered. The employer was held 
responsible for a disease caused directly by the exercise of the profession or work performed by 
the worker or employee, which caused the worker’s disability. There were three types of 
Disabilities: temporary, permanent-partial and permanent-total.  If the accident resulted in Death, 
the relatives and other persons mentioned in the Code were entitled to compensation. Other 
important issues to be highlighted are the following:  
Pregnant workers were entitled to have a six weeks break before birth and six weeks after. The 
employer was required to reserve the working position and had to pay a subsidy. The working 
places had to have independent adjoining facilities, where mothers could breastfeed their children 
and leave them there while they were at work. In the warehouses, shops, bazaars and other 
similar commercial establishments, the employer had to maintain a sufficient number of seats and 
chairs and make them available to the dependents or employees. 
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new election ultimately brought the general to power, and he ruled in a dictatorial 
fashion from 1927 to 1932, suspending Parliament and administering the country 
with decree-laws. The repression led to arrests, and many of his former allies 
and partners were forced into exile. His aim was to institutionalize a “foundational 
state” through a project of “national salvation”. This came as a response to his 
desire for a strong government that would put an end to government corruption 
and public disorder and rebuild political parties, Parliament and the concept of 
the free vote. With an anti-oligarchic discourse, Ibáñez sought to contain the 
ruling class and resolve what he saw as the moral crisis of Chilean society.  
Ibáñez sought the support of a fraction of workers attracted by the idea of 
non-politicized policies free of class distinctions, put forward by the Republican 
Confederation of Civic Action (CRAC, 1929-1931). 41  & 42  His main political 
instrument and argument was social legislation, which allowed him to delimit the 
boundaries of social conflict in legal terms.43 He also created new social and 
health-related institutions, like the Biological Society of Chile44 founded in 1928. 
Shortly afterward, in 1929, the Bacteriological Institute45 was established, which 
                                            
41 Flores, “La Dictadura de Ibáñez y los Sindicatos (1927-1931)”, supra note 30 at 127 in  Mario 
Parada, (2004) Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile: un análisis 
sociológico,  (Ph.D.  Thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) at 159. 
42 Confederación Republicana de Acción Civil. 
43 Ibáñez requested the elaboration of the Work Code, promulgated in 1931. 
44 Sociedad Biológica de Chile.  
45 The Bacteriological Institute of Chile, created by the Act 4556 was designed to accomplish the 
following: 1) A forum for bacteriologists, who were dedicated to research and other working 
needs required in the country; 2) The development of serums, vaccines, biological products and 
biochemical in general; and 3) Control of the manufacture and sale of bacteriologist products, in 
accordance with the guidelines issued by the Directorate General of Health. The Bacteriological 
Institute of Chile was also legally entitled to carry out manufacturing and sales. The Institute was 
dependent on the Ministry of Education, notwithstanding the technical supervision exercised by 
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was responsible for the development of biological and chemical products, 
scientific research and the training of hygienists. That same year, the Superior 
Council of Hygiene46 was also created, and in 1931, Law 5,51547 created the 
Central Board of Charities.48  
Ibáñez’s uncertainty concerning the implementation of a refounding of the 
state, along with his indifference to workers’ claims, the economic crisis of 1930 
and the fatigue across the political spectrum caused by indiscriminate 
repression,49 led to the failure of his corporatist projects. His initiative to unify, 
without consultation and by decree, all health care services under a new super-
ministry of social welfare sparked the fury of professionals, teachers and 
students in the medical field.  Ultimately, the dictator-president resigned due to 
pressure from a large civic movement, with doctors and medical students playing 
a major role.50 There ended the advancement of corporatist initiatives, but not 
their underlying ideology, which remained latent in the conservative mind until 
their comeback in the mid-1960s.   
                                                                                                                                  
the Ministry of Social Welfare, through the Directorate General of Health. A Director who was 
appointed by the President of the Republic headed the Institute. It comprised of the following 
departments: Biochemistry, Bacteriology, and Control. A Board of Directors, consisting of the 
Director and Heads of Departments, formed the management. The Institute had to supply their 
products to all the institutions designated by the Government. It conducted free examinations, 
and provided bacteriological, immunological and entomological support.  
46 Consejo Superior de Higiene.  
47 Law 5,515 (1932). Created the Central Board of Charities. Appointed the Board’s members 
and executive officers and outlined the conditions for electing the remaining members, including 
the vice-president. According to this law, the president of the Board was the Minister of Social 
Welfare. 
48 Junta Central de Beneficencia. 
49 Persecution, banishment and exile of prominent figures like Arturo Alessandri and Dr. Exequiel 
González Cortés. 
50 Contributed to the death of a medical student in the riots during the civil insurrection against 
Ibáñez.  
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In the 1930s, a new phase in the conceptual development of Chilean 
medicine began. A series of new principles was being applied in the organization 
of care services, such as periodic planning, comprehensive treatments, multiple-
cause diagnoses, a concentration of efforts towards the most vulnerable people, 
the creation of a public technical authority and the ongoing responsibility of the 
state in social matters. Along the same lines was the growing state involvement 
in pension policies. In 1930, blue-collar workers and journalists saw the creation 
of the National Public Employees and Journalists Fund51 as an autonomous 
institution and a legal entity in itself. The Fund, among other functions, was 
responsible for managing the payment of pensions and allowances, which the 
law provided for by means of a Trust Fund established specifically for this 
purpose along with life insurance allocations when needed.52 The country already 
had the necessary legal basis for state intervention, reinforced by the 1925 
Constitution and the 1931 Health Code.53 The provisions of the Health Code 
governed all matters relating to public health in the country.  
At the same time, the impact of the global economic crisis of the 1930s 
and disputes within the Chilean working class led to the creation of the Socialist 
Party in 1933. Later, 1937 saw the introduction of free distribution of milk to 
                                            
51Decree-Law (DFL) 1,340 Bis (1931). Creates the National Public Employees and Journalist 
Fund. Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas (CEPP) 
52 All employees appointed by the President or any other competent authorities, and those being 
paid out of public funds, were subject to the provisions of this Act. In terms of benefits, they were 
entitled to retirement or a disability pension, a family subsidy and a life insurance. Medical 
services and the possibility of applying for loans from the fund were additional benefits. 
53 Law 226 (1931). Established the Public Health Code. (Código Sanitario). The Health Code 
also created the National Health Service under the responsibility of a General Manager who 
necessarily had to be a doctor. 
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children under two years of age, and in 1938, Law 6,17454 established the 
principles of preventive medicine with the aim of defending and restoring the 
productive capacity of the workforce, which suffered from tuberculosis, 
rheumatism, syphilis and cardiovascular diseases, as well as many other 
disabilities and illnesses caused by poor working conditions. This law came as a 
response to the fact that the curative system was not adequately protecting the 
population, as both visible morbidity and hidden (cardiovascular) morbidity were 
having a serious impact on workers and their families. The law thus ordered the 
implementation of regular health check-ups for workers.  The Workers’ Insurance 
Fund, through its own medical services, offered medical care, allowing the Fund 
to monitor the health conditions of its members and prevent the onset of chronic 
disease, along with detecting the causes of occupational diseases. The Fund 
also created the Mother and Child Division for workers and their wives during 
pregnancy (a preventive measure) and for the children of the insured up to two 
years of age (a combined measure of prevention, care and protection).  
Chile’s social and health laws up to 1938/1939 already illustrated the 
state’s involvement in health and welfare. However, the multiplicity of institutions 
that were created, then modified, subdivided or merged, in addition to the 
                                            
54  Law 6,174 (1938). Established the Department of Preventive Medicine. Established that all 
provident funds to be covered by Act No. 5.802, would come under the purview of the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Social Assistance, and Mutual of Police. It provided for preventive medical 
services to monitor the health status by imposing and adopting measures aimed at discovering, 
and preventing the early development of chronic diseases such as tuberculosis, syphilis, 
rheumatism, diseases of the heart and kidneys, as well as work related diseases: lead poisoning, 
anthracnose, silicosis, hookworm, and others of the same nature.  
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fragmentation of family coverage (i.e. different members of a family were covered 
by different services or divisions), caused the curative and preventive services to 
become both expensive and complex. Furthermore, the welfare state model had 
failed to resolve the lack of access to public services for the middle classes. 
Hence, the universal right to medical care became the great challenge of the 
Popular Front, which took office in 1938. It was in this new political scenario that 
the minister of health of the time, the socialist Salvador Allende, emerged as the 
architect of the relationship between politics, social medicine and the medical 
movement.  
The Socialist Party joined the Communist Party and the Radical Party 
(sectors linked to the petite bourgeoisie, the middle classes and professionals) to 
form the Popular Front, 55  which won the 1938 presidential elections and 
accelerated the process of industrialization and the increased involvement of the 
state in social affairs. 56  A major earthquake in 1939 placed a number of 
additional demands upon the health sector, and therefore the administrative 
                                            
55 The Popular Front in Chile was an electoral and political left-wing coalition from 1937 to 
February 1941, made up of the Radical Party, The Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the 
Radical Socialist Party. Two of the Popular Front presidents belonged to the Radical Party (a 
middle-class, liberal party). Other organizations, such as the Confederation of Chilean Workers 
(Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile), the native Mapuche movement (Frente Único 
Araucano) and the women’s movement (Movimiento Pro-emancipación de las Mujeres de Chile), 
also joined the Popular Front. The Popular Front candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, won the 
presidential elections in 1938 and governed until his death in 1941. The Front was then 
transformed into the Democratic Alliance, which also won the 1942 presidential election, with 
Gabriel González Videla as president. 
56  Carolina Tetelboin, (1980) La práctica médica en Chile, (Thesis, Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana-Xochimiloho, México) at 46-47. 
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harmonization of different health-related services became an imperative of the 
times.57 & 58   
 
2. TOWARDS THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (SNS): 1939-1952  
The Popular Front administration brought the Socialists and Communists 
into the already established bargaining system for political negotiations, 
transforming potentially revolutionary forces into relatively moderate participants 
in legal institutions. The newly elected President Pedro Aguirre Cerda59 pursued 
a model of state capitalism in which the government collaborated with private 
enterprise in the construction of a mixed economy. The Popular Front promoted 
import substitution industrialization along with welfare measures for the urban 
middle and working classes.  
Early in 1941, the Socialist Party withdrew from the Popular Front coalition 
because of its animosity towards the Communist Party, its rival in its claim to 
worker loyalty and Marxist inspiration. Because the Conservatives and Liberals 
blocked nearly all legislation in Congress, little social reform was accomplished, 
                                            
57 Roberto Belmar & T. Hall, “Evaluation of Chile’s Health Care System 1973-1976”, (1977) 7 
International Journal of Heath Services 532. 
58 T. Hall & P. Díaz, “Social Security and Heath Care Patterns in Chile”, (1971) 1 International 
Journal of Medical and Sanitary Services 364. 
59 Pedro Aguirre Cerda was born in 1879. He became a Spanish teacher in 1900, and in 1904, a 
lawyer. He completed law studies at the Sorbonne in France and later became president of the 
National Society of Teachers. He was also a member of Parliament, a deputy and a senator, and 
he was the first dean of the new economics school at the University of Chile. As a member of the 
Radical Party, he was the minister of Public Instruction and of Internal Affairs, serving two 
presidents (Juan Luis Sanfuentes and Arturo Alessandri). He was also an active politician against 
the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. In 1938, he won the presidential election to become 
president with the Popular Front under the slogan, “To govern is to educate”, promoting technical 
and industrial schools, creating thousands of new regular schools and encouraging the growth of 
the university system to cover the entire country. 
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except for improvements in housing and education. The greatest achievement of 
the Popular Front was the creation, in 1939, of the Corporation for the Promotion 
of Development and Production.  
In January 1941, Law 6,640 was merged with Law 6,334 (1939) and the 
revised text approved creating the Corporation for Reconstruction, Relief and 
Development of Production. This new law subsequently created two separate 
entities: the Corporation for the Promotion of Development and Production 
(CORFO)60 and the Corporation for Relief and Reconstruction. The CORFO was 
founded to promote domestic production in order to raise the population’s 
standard of living by exploiting the country’s natural conditions, lowering 
production costs, supplying credit to new enterprises, especially in 
manufacturing, and improving Chile’s international balance of payments.  
The CORFO mission also included maintaining a geographic balance in 
the development of mining activities, agriculture, industry and trade, thereby 
ensuring the satisfaction of the economic needs of different regions. The 
Corporation also collaborated in the manufacture and import of machinery and 
other elements of production. It put forward proposals and helped in the adoption 
of measures to increase domestic consumption, and it advocated a greater 
participation of Chilean interests in industrial and commercial activities. Finally, 
CORFO oversaw the various means by which the general developmental and 
                                            
60 Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO). 
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production plan was being financed, and it tracked the direct funding of various 
planned works and granted loans according to the law. 
In terms of health care, this historical period saw trade unions’ demands 
and petitions for improved universal medical care and comprehensive health care 
services. They called for such services to be coordinated and integrated in order 
to facilitate workers’ access to medical benefits. There was also the support of 
the medical profession, which, lacking alternatives, was eager to advance the 
project that sought to unify and better coordinate work opportunities and 
professional development.  
These transformations in health services took place while a whole new 
economic sector was developing: the large mining industry. This spawned new 
types of social organizations, increasing the unionization of workers and 
stimulating active state intervention in labour-capital relations. In a move towards 
the preventive and curative integration of health services, coverage slowly 
broadened to include workers’ families, directed more towards a specific class, or 
its sub-groups, than towards the individual. Funding for the new administration of 
these services was obtained through contributions from beneficiaries, employers 
and the state, while the medical profession was increasingly demanding better 
planning.61 
Once political conditions were more appropriate for a deeper reform, the 
Popular Front government submitted a bill to Congress known as the “National 
                                            
61  Haydee López, “Proposición para una evaluación de la experiencia chilena”, II reunión 
científica sobre los sistemas de salud, INTA, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1981 at 3. 
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Health Service Bill”, which was the first of its kind in Latin America and only the 
second in the world, after the British National Health Service. 62  However, 
President Aguirre Cerda established two conditions for the bill: it had to be 
accompanied by a “down-to-earth” development program and by sound 
economic studies, assuring the availability of resources. The approach was 
based on a formula according to which all of society contributed to the funding of 
the service with a solidarity-based system.  
The proposal incorporated the original objectives for establishing a 
professional corporation, but considerably widened the scope and influence of 
such a corporation. The project boasted a laudable mission—to strongly protect 
public health and maintain a high level of professional ethics, thereby promoting 
the public medical profession and punishing those doctors who did not comply 
with these ethical principles. In this new scheme, the role and activities of the 
profession remained the responsibility of the Medical College. Holding onto these 
responsibilities was intended to assure physicians a central position in the health 
system. Accordingly, it was proposed that physicians should also get involved in 
legislative reform and procedures, as well as in the administration and control of 
public health services, private medical institutions and all or part of the health 
                                            
62 “The British National Health Service was established in 1948 in accordance with the Beveridge 
Plan, implying an overall reform of the welfare system in order to widen citizens’ protection by the 
state; it represents the fulfillment of the Welfare state comprehensive philosophy in the health 
care domain in order to increase the population coverage of health care by means of a universal 
and free at the point of services access to health care, equal delivery of services among social 
classes and different territorial areas, democratic planning and management of the health care 
services”. R. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare state, (London, Allen & Unwim,1958). See too 
Giarelli, “Convergence or Divergence?”, supra note 5 at 177. 
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sector. 63  However, entrusting these responsibilities to physicians displeased 
parliamentarians, particularly lawyers, who expressed their concern at the 
provision that physicians’ disciplinary tribunals would have the power to 
administer justice on economic and ethical issues related to their professional 
practice. Ultimately, the project was deemed to be extremely flawed and was 
rejected by Parliament. President Aguirre Cerda died of tuberculosis on 
November 25, 1941, and a new president, Juan Antonio Ríos, was elected in 
1942. 
The same year, as a result of the merger between the Central Department 
of Maternity Protection and the Department of Infant Health, the General 
Directorate for the Protection of Maternal Health, Children and Adolescents 
(PROTINFA)64 was created. This Directorate carried out preventive activities for 
mothers and children who were not benefiting from the services provided by the 
Workers’ Insurance Fund. Despite a limited budget that severely restricted its 
work, PROTINFA offered preventive and curative maternal care, childcare, dental 
care, maternity clinics, hospitals for children with special needs and orphanages. 
It thus sought to protect and assist mothers from the early stages of pregnancy 
up to the end of the breastfeeding period and then to assist children through to 
adolescence.65  
                                            
63 Chamber of Deputies, Session Newsletter, 30th extraordinary session of January 7, 1941; 54th 
extraordinary session of April 2, 1941 & 1st extraordinary session of April 14, 1942. 
64 Dirección General de la Protección de la Maternidad, de la Infancia y de la Adolescencia 
(PROTINFA). 
65 Hernán Romero, “Desarrollo de la Medicina y la Salubridad en Chile”, (1972) 100 Revista 
Médica de Chile  897. 
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Also in 1942, the Employees’ National Health Service (SERMENA)66 was 
created and tasked with providing medical and dental benefits to public and 
private employees. SERMENA was founded by merging the health departments 
of the National Fund for Public Employees and Journalists (CEPP)67 and the 
Private Employees’ Prevention Fund (EMPART). 68  These were semi-
autonomous public administrative entities whose funding came from the 
contributions of employees and manual workers (who had a different contractual 
legal status and public benefits) and from state funds. The SERMENA, as a new 
system, offered enhanced benefits for private and public employees and 
constituted an innovative body in Chilean health care. It offered a free-choice 
system (services could be paid for with vouchers provided to beneficiaries) for 
private and public employees of the Social Security Services (SSS), and for 
retirees and their families. Later, in 1968, the SERMENA was restructured under 
Law 16,781,69 which aimed to reorganize curative medicine.  
                                            
66 The Employees National Health Service (SERMENA) was a semi-public institution with a legal 
personality of its own. It coordinated with the government through the Ministry of Health, without 
prejudice to the powers granted to the Social Security Superintendent. This service was also 
exclusively responsible for the Preventive Medicine of several Family Allowance Compensation 
Funds. The SERMENA performed the following functions entrusted by law: a) It provided 
preventive medical services according to Law No. 6.174; b) The payment of the time-out 
subsidies and other economic benefits imposed by law was its responsibility; c) Through a 
controlled fee, it provided dental care to family members affiliated to the Service; d) It had to 
sanction medical and dental loans for the passive and active affiliates; and e) It was responsible 
for building, acquiring or leasing suitable facilities to cater to the clinical and hospital requirements 
of its beneficiaries. This Act also created an Advisory Council comprised of fourteen members. 
67 Caja Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Periodistas (CEPP). 
68 Caja de Previsión de Empleados Privados (EMPART). 
69 Law 16,781 (1968). Curative Medicine Act. The law was established to provide medical and 
dental assistance to beneficiaries, retirees, the unemployed of the institutions listed in Article 2 of 
Decree-Law No. 286 of 1960, dependents, and those receiving widows’ and orphans’ pensions.  
The beneficiaries of the Social Welfare Fund of the Municipal Workers, the Crew section of the 
Pension Fund for the National Merchant Navy and the staff of the National Health Service and 
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Chile went through different stages in its socio-economic development and 
was also subject to significant international influence, which shaped its social 
model and its health system. In the mid-20th century, the country was embedded 
in the economic traditions characteristic of “Third World” models, as mono-
exporters of raw materials and natural resources. As in other countries in Latin 
America, attempts were made to apply alternative economic and social 
(“developmentalist”) models that implemented the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) strategy, with an emphasis on Keynesian economic policies 
and a welfare state. This was even further developed during the Popular Front 
governments between 1938 and 1941 and in the years that followed. 
Health policies were also highly influenced by changes in domestic 
economic relations and by the influence of the international context of the period. 
For example, a partnership between the School of Sanitation and the Rockefeller 
Foundation was included among the objectives of the Division of Health and 
Hygiene at the Institute of Inter-American Relations. The Institute, created in 
1942, pursued military, political, productive and moral objectives. Its political 
objectives were to improve health conditions in zones considered strategic for the 
                                                                                                                                  
their dependents were excluded from the purview of this law. In accordance with Article 65 of 
Decree-Law No. 338 of 1960, all those who could be considered as dependents of 
parliamentarians - serving and retired - were entitled to the benefits prescribed by this law. The 
administration of the health care system created by this law, and in particular, the Medical 
Assistance Fund that would fund all or part of the benefits, was entrusted to the National Medical 
Service for Employees (SERMENA). The Medical Assistance Fund granted a number of benefits, 
including, medical consultation, surgery, several medical tests and examinations, hospitalizations, 
emergencies, and obstetric and dental care. The benefits were granted by the SERMENA under 
the "free choice" protocol (the beneficiaries could choose the provider of the medical service).  
The SERMENA had the power to sign agreements with the National Health Service or any other 
public or private entity. The law also created the National Advisory Council on Health in the 
Ministry of Public Health.  
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United States and its allies. In practical terms, its goal was to be instrumental in 
the growth and development of the industrial sector by stimulating improvements 
in productivity, obtained principally by improving the health of the workforce. The 
Institute’s moral objective was to demonstrate the tangible benefits that resulted 
from democracy in action and to gain the support of the working population. 
Collaboration with the United States came in the form not only of funding for 
hygiene programs, but also of training for medical doctors and human resource 
development. 
In 1943, the School of Public Health70 at the University of Chile was 
created in response to the urgent demands of public sector health institutions. 
The new school offered specialized training in techniques that could provide 
responses to the needs and concerns of health institutions. Two years later, the 
National Health Board created the Health Units,71 which were inspired by the 
United States Health Centers. These units were preventive in nature and 
constituted the first attempt to implement a holistic type of medicine at the 
municipal level. Hence, the distinction between preventive and curative medicine 
was re-evaluated, and access to medical services in suburbs and underprivileged 
neighbourhoods was ensured. 72  A considerable number of Latin American 
physicians were trained in different public health schools in US universities and 
later served in several Chilean public health departments. It thus became 
                                            
70 Escuela de Salubridad. 
71 Unidades Sanitarias. 
72 Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, supra note 14 at 70.    
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possible to articulate a particular conception, paradigm or understanding of public 
health and its role in Latin America, and this conception was promoted, spread 
and implemented in several countries in the region. 
Also in 1943 and despite numerous objections to the “excessive medical 
dictatorship”, the National Health Service Bill was finally approved and sent to 
parliamentary committees. Once again it suffered setbacks, which continued for 
another four years until 1947, when a controversial article regarding doctors’ 
authority on wages for professionals working in the public sector was eliminated. 
A swift final vote in Congress approved the bill. On that occasion, the then 
senator Allende stated that for the first time in the history of Chile, doctors and 
senators agreed.  It is worth noting that the mandate of the Popular Front’s health 
experts was to ensure compulsory social welfare managed under government 
control, delivering preventive and curative physical and mental health care. The 
overall strategy was threefold: a) a social medical program aimed essentially at 
improving health and nutrition, b) a national campaign against pests and viruses, 
and c) improved housing standards for families.73 
At the international level, at around the same time as the creation of the 
United Nations in 1945, the World Health Organization (WHO) was founded. A 
process of redesigning existing regional entities was also taking place, such as 
the reconfiguration of the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and the 
                                            
73 Chamber of Deputies, Session Newsletter, 17th extraordinary session of December 30, 1942; 
19th extraordinary session of January 5, 1943 & 20th extraordinary session of January 6, 1943. In 
Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 40 at 183 
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Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, now ECLAC). Also, during this 
time, innovative changes were taking place throughout the region with respect to 
health and its relationship to economic development. According to the new 
conception, health was not simply the “absence of disease”, but according to the 
WHO definition, it was also “the complete state of physical, mental and social 
well-being”. Meanwhile, the Chilean state was praised for playing an important 
role in the planning of health actions and their integration with national 
development.  
In this historical context, the Popular Front government introduced a new 
bill to bring the management of all hospitals under a single government agency. 
These hospitals were classified into three broad sectors: 1) private charity 
hospitals, which received government subsidies; 2) social security medical 
services, and 3) state-run health care organizations, such as the Board of Health 
and the Directorate for the Protection of Maternal Health, Children and 
Adolescents (PROTINFA), which provided primary-level care and delivered 
preventive health programs. The bill would eliminate at least six state agencies, 
which would be merged into one new organization. At the time, the eradication of 
the divisions of Public Health, Charity and Security appeared to be a significant 
political loss for the purposes of allocating government posts, which went against 
the traditional pursuit of the support necessary to remain in power. The growth of 
the state bureaucracy since the 1930s indicates an unnatural expansion, 
especially in the social realm. This is a reflection of ongoing agreements and 
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circumstantial political settlements more than any actual requirements or real or 
legitimate technical or institutional needs.74 The bill took ten years to become 
law.  
The reality in Chile and the long history of negotiations between political 
actors and civil society was a reflection of the complexity of the situation and of a 
society that was very fragmented, highly politicized and with a great degree of 
participation in public life. As Zumbansen indicates, the forces of cohesion in a 
society are profoundly complex and fragmented: “The reason for the growing 
regulatory challenges to modern law was and continues to be the rising 
complexity of society. To address a multiplicity of values, interests and 
rationalities with a dedication to democratic governance ultimately to result in 
consensus idealizes the forces of cohesion in a society that is actually deeply 
complex and fragmented.” 75  However, this context was not only a great 
challenge; it was also, as demonstrated above, what enabled actors to express 
themselves and citizens’ voices to be heard during the legislative process. 
Referring to Zumbansen, this offers “great hope for to better identify the potential 
of law to play a distinct role in the complex array of voices and forces.”76 
In the 1946 elections, the Radical Party candidate, Gabriel González 
Videla, won with 40.1% of the total vote and, according to the Constitution, 
                                            
74 There is consensus in pointing out that the Socialists also participated in the proportional 
system, but the excessive division of its leaders offset its efficacy. As to the Communist Party, it 
was opposed to participating in coalition governments except during the six months it joined the 
first cabinet of González Videla.  
75 Peer Zumbansen, “Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn 
to Reflexive Law”, (2008) 04 CLPE Research Paper 03 at 20 & 21. 
76 Id, at 21 
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required Congress to ratify his election. Without sufficient parliamentary support, 
González Videla was forced to redefine his alliances and make pacts with the 
Liberals. This entailed a major constraint for the centre-left coalition that had 
originally proposed and supported his candidacy. It even gave way to the 
unprecedented occurrence of Communist leaders taking on three ministerial 
portfolios. But later, in 1947, after municipal elections that increased support for 
the Communists, the Liberals refused to work with the Communist ministers and 
demanded their expulsion from government.77 This situation was exacerbated in 
the context of the Cold War and, in response to pressure exerted by the United 
States and Great Britain, González Videla denounced a Communist conspiracy 
against the established order.  
Chile quickly became enmeshed in the Cold War, as Moscow and 
especially Washington meddled in its affairs. As a result, González Videla also 
launched a parliamentary debate that culminated in the 1948 enactment of the 
Law for the Defence of Democracy, otherwise known by the opposition as the 
“damned law”. He expelled the Communist Party from his cabinet and then 
completely banned them from participating in politics under the new law. 
Although González Videla feared Communist intentions and respected the 
wishes of the United States government, he also turned against the Communist 
Party for several other reasons, including his wishes to mollify right-wing critics of 
                                            
77 The rise of the Communist Party to power reaped significant electoral dividends for the Chilean 
Communist Party since the municipal elections of 1947, when it secured its highest historic vote 
(17% of the vote) and emerged a virtual threat to the ruling classes. 
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his government, especially landowners, to whom he promised a continuing 
moratorium on peasant unionization. He also sought to remove any ideological 
justification for a military coup. 78  For the following ten years, the so-called 
“damned law” proscribed the Communist Party.79 In addition to the repressive 
repercussions, this provoked popular protests and ultimately led to the 
fragmentation of the party system.80 
Meanwhile, the protection model developed in Europe was attracting 
enormous interest around the world, including in Chile, which sent legal and 
health professionals off to Europe to study it in the field. In their report, two 
specialists (Pinto Santa Cruz, an attorney and Dr. Viel, a medical doctor) 
introduced the “ought to be” concept of social protection, illustrating it with the 
successful British model and comparing it to the Chilean situation. Their report 
showed that the country was able to reach a “higher state of consciousness” with 
respect to social rights with the same legal, institutional and technical elements 
already in place. They put forward three lines of action that would be necessary 
in order to achieve these objectives: 1) address/reduce risks that affect 
productive capacity (epidemiology, sanitation, safety and hygiene) in coordination 
with a sanitary housing plan; 2) provide curative care for the population, including 
                                            
78  Country Studies, online: U.S. Library of Congress, retrieved (November 23, 2011) 
http://countrystudies.us/chile/26.htm  
79 González Videla betrayed the promise that "there will be no human and divine power capable 
of breaking ties" linking it with the Communist Party and the people. See also M. Aylwin (et al.), 
Historia del Siglo XX, (Santiago, Emisión, 1986) at 159.  
80 A section of the Radical Party issued a manifesto denouncing the treachery of González Videla 
to the Council of the party because of the monstrous "damned law" and economic policy favoring 
the capitalists. See Journal of the Senate, 39th session, ordinary Session, August 31, 1948, at 
233. 
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periodic check-ups, early diagnosis, clinical treatment and rehabilitation; and 3) 
provide monetary subsidies for citizens when deprived of income due to illness, 
disability, unemployment, etc. 
The development of these lines of action involved a dual structure—one 
that could maintain workers’ economic security while protecting their “physical 
and biological” integrity. Policies developed under these lines of action also had 
to be in harmony with the imperative to maintain purchasing power, fair income 
distribution and the productive capacity of the population. In summary, the model 
clearly reflected a way of organizing services that was based on a notion of 
solidarity. It was postulated that to be effective, the new social system should be 
considered along with other important measures. Among these were wage 
increases and a comprehensive social protection plan based on the principles of 
unity, consistency, continuity and universality in the legal protection of all people, 
at all stages of life and independent of a person’s occupational activity. With 
regard to the administration of the system and given the characteristics of 
Chilean insurance and medical care, the distinction between “commercial 
services” and “personal services” was to be highlighted.81 Personal services 
included medical services offered to all members of the community, not as 
charity, but as a right guaranteed by law and implemented by the National Health 
Service.82 
                                            
81 The separation is important because the Chilean health system granted financial aid for 
common illnesses and Maternity. 
82 Pinto & Viel (1950) illustrate the chaos of Chilean Health Care with the following example: The 
Charity institution receives the workers not as rightful recipients, but as indigents. If the head of a 
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This entailed a significant break with previous policies and demonstrated 
how the health system was being reformed and health legislation was being 
articulated as a function of new socio-economic and political conjunctures, in 
response to competing interests and the local importance of international 
influence. The most important consequence of social policy reforms was the re-
conceptualization of the social functions of the modern state, bringing various 
inter-linked institutions together under the same welfare principle. However, 
although these different institutions shared similar objectives and functions, they 
were not governed by any national guidelines, coordination or planning. 
Moreover, the beneficiaries of the different services were completely dispersed 
due to the fragmentation of both public and private-public institutions. The 
duplication of roles was common, and comprehensive family care was suffering. 
Laboratory and radiological examinations, for example, were conducted when a 
patient first consulted with a doctor, and then repeated in the hospital when the 
patient was subsequently hospitalized.83 The atomization of services and a lack 
of coordination contributed to the need to create a single health care service at 
the national level. In addition, some experiences of collaboration between 
different services, such as the “coordinated fight against venereal diseases,” 
demonstrated the possibility and effectiveness of a single national health service. 
                                                                                                                                  
household is sick, the Insurance Fund protects him, but it is the Charity that hospitalizes the 
patient on behalf of the Fund. Francisco Pinto & Benjamín Viel, Seguridad Social Chilena: Punto 
para una Reforma, (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1950) at 40. 
83 Jorge Mardones, “Origen del Servicio Nacional de Salud”, (1977) 105 Revista Médica de Chile 
656. 
 85 
Ultimately, tight budgets and administrative barriers limited the efficiency of all 
existing services.  
The Radical Party84 and the centrist Falange Nacional Party disagreed on 
proposals regarding the future implementation of the National Health Service. 
This divergence further postponed the adoption of the law while also highlighting 
major differences between the government and the opposition. This became 
evident with regard to certain articles in the bill addressing the feasibility of 
merging services and concerns about the future of preventive medicine. 85 
Another key issue was the future of curative medicine, which, according to the 
government and to conservative political forces, should be in the hands of either 
the public or the private sector.86  
Further, the importance of other factors that also delayed the reform 
cannot be overlooked. These were related to the government’s economic plan, 
which, as indicated, sought to align economic policies with the national program 
of import substitution industrialization. Given the political strength of the right-
wing parties in Congress, doubled by the de facto power of the conservative 
forces, which controlled most of the media and business, negotiations on the 
                                            
84 Partido Radical. 
85 Chamber of Deputies, Session Newsletter, 29th month, extraordinary session, December 28, 
1950. 
86 The existence of a large number of medically qualified parliamentarians in the 1940s would 
have facilitated the passage of the bill of the SNS. However, existing data on the number of 
doctors in parliament indicates no differences in the adoption of Health legislation during that 
period. Moreover, the proposed Pension reform and Health went through the most radical 
medical representation in Congress without it being approved as it had been in 1942. See also 
the law relating to the Order of Architects and Pharmacists in Labra, (1997) Política, Saúde e 
Interesses Médicos no Chile (1900-1990), (Ph.D. thesis, Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do 
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro) at 158. 
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economic program significantly limited social reforms, which would have imposed 
even greater tax burdens on capital. President González Videla was in a minority 
position and did not respect the commitments of the same political parties that 
had put him into the presidency. Changes in the political discourse before and 
after the election were considered serious and unacceptable. The crisis led the 
president to veer to the right in exchange for support from conservative political 
forces. Moreover, strict bicameralism demanded a verdict from both houses, thus 
further delaying the legislative process.  
The lawmaking process was also subject to a likely presidential veto, thus 
making the elimination of the entire National Health Service Bill even more 
probable. As deliberations about the SNS continued, in December 1948, DFL 
9,26387 ,88 created the Medical College, thus converting the Chilean Medical 
Association into a professional body that granted doctors official representation, 
allowed them to participate as official interlocutors with state authorities and 
ensured their ethical and professional regulation. Membership in the Medical 
College was mandatory for physicians, which contributed to control by peers and 
                                            
87 Senate, Daily sessions Journal, 39th month, ordinary session, August 31, 1948.  The Senate 
quickly discussed bill No. 9.263, which was promulgated on November 15, 1948.  The law was 
regulated by the Ministry of Health Decree No. 940 (April 3, 1951). The Medical Officer status, 
that will be discussed later, was enacted in December 1951. 
88  Decree-Law (DFL) 9,263 (1948). Created the Medical College of Chile. The law created and 
established the Medical College of Chile as an institution with a legal capacity of its own. The 
objectives of the college objectives were to improve the economic and social protection, and the 
supervision of medical doctor- surgeons.  Its members were authorized to organize themselves 
into Federations with their own regulations. Patients had the right to complain to the Medical 
College if they felt unfairly treated by a professional. The respective Council was empowered to 
impose sanctions on the doctor founded guilty of any act bringing dishonor to the profession, 
abusive exercise or incompatible with the dignity and culture of the profession.  These sanctions 
as such could vary from a reprimand, or censure, to a suspension from the practice of the 
profession for a period of not more than six months.  
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reinforced the credibility of the health care institutions. This legislative change, 
however, revealed important disputes within the medical profession, whose 
political action on specific social issues reflected divisions along party lines. The 
Medical College thus failed to reach unanimity on a professional vision of the 
economic and labour demands of doctors and other health professionals. Given 
the growing political and economic importance of the middle class and the 
strengthening of corporatism, it was not possible to ignore or easily overcome the 
vagueness and lack of consensus that plagued the physicians’ decisions.89  
Debate over the need to extend curative care to the entire population 
continued. Senator Allende indicated that the impact of the SNS was immense. 
He also declared that he was convinced that these ideas, for which he had fought 
for so many years along with workers and technicians, employees, professionals 
and intellectuals, would become a reality and would constitute an advance in 
social legislation.90 To appease right-wing opposition to the SNS Bill, the article 
on public care for work-related accidents was removed, and it was proposed that 
this responsibility remain in the hands of private insurers. For their part, the 
Liberals supported the “free-choice” format in order to give greater options to 
patients and to encourage physicians to fulfill their “mission” and “cease thinking 
of the patient as just statistics”.91 On another front, through political transactions, 
                                            
89 María E. Labra, "Padrões de formulação de políticas de saúde no Chile no século XX", (2000) 
43 Dados 153.  
90 Senate, Daily sessions Journal, 33rd ordinary session, September 6, 1951. In Parada, Evolución 
del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 181 
91 Chamber of Deputies, Session Newsletter, 8th month, extraordinary session of November 23, 
1950. 
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a political agreement was reached to include the SERMENA in the SNS. This 
suggestion was incorporated into the bill that government sent to Congress, but 
President González Videla soon vetoed it. The health minister explained that 
instead, a provision would be introduced into the law allowing the president to 
decide, by simple decree and whenever deemed appropriate, to include the 
SERMENA in the SNS.92     
With a “national consensus” cabinet formed by members of the Radical 
Party, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, the government faced a very 
difficult economic and social situation. Finance Minister Jorge Alessandri 
balanced fiscal accounts and increased the salaries of civil servants, but he soon 
had to propose special legislation imposing measures to stabilize prices and 
wages, causing major popular upheavals.  In January 1950, the Chilean National 
Board of Employees93 sparked a general standstill with a series of strikes. The 
ambiguity of the Radical Party led it to support the strikers against the president, 
forcing him to meet popular demands.  Almost immediately the press accused 
him of leading “a government that works for the unions”. Only a month later, the 
government changed the composition of its alliances by calling on Radicals, 
Social Christians and Falangists to join a cabinet focused on “social sensitivity”.94 
The new cabinet received political support from across the political spectrum, 
                                            
92 Chamber of Deputies, Session Newsletter, 6th and 7th months, ordinary session of June 11, 
1952.  
93 Junta Nacional de Empleados de Chile (JUNECH). 
94 This was a response to reports issued by the Falange Nacional Party, affirming that the cabinet 
was "socially insensitive" and that only a "political earthquake" could bring an end to national 
unrest. 
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and, as a result, it was able to move forward on the social policies demanded by 
many different actors.95 
It is important to note that social legislation progressed only when the 
Social Christian wing of the conservative political forces and the also 
conservative Falange Nacional group joined the “social sensitivity cabinet”.96 
Senator Allende was instrumental in this process, given his reputation as a great 
speaker, respected physician and outstanding political leader.97  This facilitated 
the development of a more extensive and inclusive health plan,98 along with 
clarifying the country’s social protection principles and the association between 
“biological protection” and “economic security”, thus defending for the first time 
the idea of health insurance reform.  
As changes to health care were, then, an expression of the articulation of 
interests, there was no reason for them to be merely functional. The law was not 
only an instrument for achieving a social, political or economic objective, but also 
                                            
95 It seems that it was only in 1947 (once González Videla's government separated from the 
Communist Party), that the political context permitted legislation on pension and health reforms, 
along with the government’s positive response to the physicians’ demands. This political shift 
facilitated the restructuring of agreements and alliances with conservative forces, which felt 
included and hence less suspicious of the proposals and reforms under discussion. It also 
postponed conflicts over limited resources, thus enabling right and left to compromise. Political 
institutionalization and accommodation prevailed, partly because the unorganized urban poor and 
especially the rural poor were excluded from political affairs. 
96 In the parliamentary elections of 1949, the National Falange elected three deputies who played 
a crucial role in building the new position on the social question. Then, in November 1950, 
González Videla reiterated the urgency of the proposed amendment to the Workers' Compulsory 
Insurance. The “Falangists” were able to introduce motions and a set of articles to unify the public 
health services and medical care into a National Health Services— called SNS— that was similar 
to Britain's National Health Service. 
97 Allende held several leadership positions such as Chairman of the committee on Hygiene and 
Sanitation; Assistant to the Senate representative on the Council of the Social Security Fund; 
President of the Medical School; President of the Pan American medical conference; and 
President of the Senate, where he served for many years. 
98 Health medical project. 
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the result of political dynamics, which were reconceptualizing the notion of health 
and models of health care administration. Conflict and consensus are not 
necessarily opposites or extremes. Law is a conjunctural compromise that is 
made manifest at a given place and time, and its timing is determined by political 
dynamics. As discussed by Christodoulidis “Conflict is productive for law in a very 
important way. Conflict provides the legal system with an occasion of openness 
to the environment. It is in litigating conflict that the law perceives the social 
environment and it is in communicating about conflict that law links operations to 
previous operations and exists as a system”. 99  
Social demands, slow economic growth and an increasingly heated 
political arena characterized the 1950s. In addition, the accelerated mobilization, 
polarization, and radicalization of ideologically opposed parties placed more 
stress on the state to compromise and reconcile demands and projects. The 
legislative process was, hence, the result of political and corporate agreements 
that made the projects viable. At the same time, an influential and interventionist 
state was clearly already developing by the middle of the 20th century, which 
would have not only an important economic mission, but also a strategic role in 
the social and health sectors. The state was given a strategic role as the key 
“national plan” for social and health policies. This certainly contributed to 
guaranteeing greater social and political stability, as by promoting social 
development and improving living conditions, social movements were 
                                            
99 Emilios A. Christodoulidis, Law an Reflexive Politics, (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1998) at 130. 
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simultaneously neutralized. Also, while state intervention brought about 
unquestionable progress in the improvement of the health of the population, it 
also contributed to maintaining the privileged position of medical professionals 
within the biomedical paradigm. Chilean democracy advanced by means of 
political agreements that were constantly making exceptions for certain groups. 
This is how extensive legislation, a multiplicity of institutions, various regulations 
and a range of procedures created legal confusion and greater difficulties for 
financial oversight.100 This situation still has consequences today, as is evident in 
the popular belief that good health is mainly associated with access to free or 
low-cost medical services. 
In this reform process, the conservative political forces were hegemonic, 
but parliamentary discussion allowed “windows of opportunity” for various actors. 
Taking advantage of one such window of opportunity, on 23 November, 1950, 
Parliament unanimously approved new health insurance legislation, with a 
landmark article based on a report stating the need to create a National Health 
Service responsible for protecting public health with hygiene activities and 
preventive and curative medical care. Clearly, pressure was mounting and a 
consensus was being built to meet the country’s health needs in a 
comprehensive way. The creation of the SNS, initially proposed years earlier, 
was seen as a necessary step toward these ends.   
                                            
100 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America. Pressure Groups, Stratification, and 
Inequality, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978) at 14. 
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During discussions about the creation of the SNS, the medical body went 
on strike several times, using the “collective resignation of public office” as a 
powerful threat to force the government to send new draft legislation to 
parliament that would regulate physicians’ working conditions, remuneration and 
professional development as well as the labour relations of health professionals. 
In response, the government presented the Medical Employees’ Act.101 In its 
defence, Senator Allende emphasized that “only a great sense of responsibility 
and an incredible amount of tolerance have enabled doctors to continue 
working,” because they had been “violently harassed” by the economic reality.102 
He argued that the suspension of their services was the only means with which 
to “shake up the lack of national awareness,” and that there was an urgent need 
to consider “a new conception of our public health.”  
When the SNS proposal was finally presented to Parliament in September 
1950, Allende also spoke in favour of passing the Medical Employees’ Act, 
stating the need for a comprehensive plan that would transform society in 
support of the defence of human capital and a social conception of medicine. He 
added that all doctors were already committed to this mission, and it was only 
their physical working conditions that still needed to be improved. His purpose 
was to establish parameters that would go beyond a corporatist vision and seek 
ways to integrate physicians into a more comprehensive and holistic medical 
                                            
101 Estatuto de Medicina Funcionaria. 
102 Senate, Daily sessions Journal, 8th extraordinary session of November 28, 1950. In Parada, 
Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 185 
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approach, which would facilitate and promote the health of the population. During 
the discussion of the Act, a great doctrinal and ideological dispute arose 
regarding the care model the country needed. Parliamentary debates featured 
strong arguments that endeavoured to make it politically acceptable for doctors 
within the public health sector to receive preferential treatment. This proposal 
involved high fiscal spending and hence, the assurance of adequate funding was 
required, which meant a 73% increase in public health expenditures.  
With this parliamentary approval, a global solution to the doctors’ 
problems had been found. They were well remunerated for six hours a day in the 
public sector, with the possibility of complementing their income in private 
practice.  The Act initially focused on physicians, who were soon joined by 
dentists and public-sector pharmacists, excluding all other health professionals, 
including university-trained nurses.103  
The right-wing sectors argued that they feared that the same groups of 
professionals who requested the project’s approval would eventually turn against 
the law, as they would find that their professional freedom, the only true stimulus 
ensuring the high quality of medical professionals, was disappearing. 104  In 
contrast, the Communist MPs argued that the project brought privileges to 
physicians but did not consider the situation of all health workers at large. Law 
                                            
103 Communist senator and labour leader, Elías Lafertte, argued that the benefits should be 
extended to nurses, social workers and practitioners. Senate, Daily sessions Journal, 8th 
extraordinary session of November 28, 1950.  
104 Chamber of Deputies, Sessions Newsletter, 45th ordinary session of August 28, 1951. In 
Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 186 
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10,223 105 finally established the Medical Employees’ Act on December 17, 1951. 
It was an extensive and detailed legal instrument that became increasingly 
complex with multiple modifications over time to accompany changes in the 
professional activity of medical work.106 The Act fixed wages, limited professional 
working hours to 36 hours a week and controlled the distribution of hours to be 
worked in different institutions. Just as the National Health Service would soon 
be created as a new employer of medical doctors, the Medical Employees’ Act 
finally secured their individual and corporate rights. An important result of this 
new legislation was that doctors were now grouped into one body, as Law 10,323 
made membership in the Medical College a compulsory requirement in order for 
doctors to practice. This enabled them to gain great bargaining power, propose 
initiatives, defend their corporate interests and regulate the relations between 
themselves, the public and the state. 
However, other problems arose. The Medical Employees’ Act granted 
proportionally more incentives based on seniority than on merit, which dispirited 
public service employees and led doctors to seek private patients while refusing 
to perform public service in the future SNS. Furthermore, the Act did not ensure 
                                            
105 Law 10,223 (1951). Established the Medical Employees’ Act. For surgeons, pharmacists 
and dentists, who were denominated “professional officials”. This law was regulated by Law 
8,282, which created the Act for the Public Administration of the State. 
106 In those years, there was a diversification of the professional market for physicians due to the 
creation of new public programs, and the entry into operation of the free choice option model for 
employees (SERMENA) as well as private medical practices. This expansion was however 
insufficient to absorb the existing unemployment. There were thus real problems that the 
physicians wanted to resolve through the creation of a unified and extended health service, 
claiming that the public authorities should make serious efforts to extend and repair hospitals, 
urban health centers, rural jobs and relief houses.  Along with that, they requested for an 
increment, and regulation of the entry and advancement in the medical profession. 
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the economic security of professionals, as inflation was rampant and the wage 
increases stipulated in the Act were not granted. Finally, on August 8, 1952, Law 
10,383107  was promulgated, establishing (article No 63) the National Health 
Service108 as an independent legal and administrative entity for ensuring public 
health and health care for the population. This law modified Law 4,054109 on 
compulsory insurance, making insurance against sickness, invalidity, old age and 
death compulsory for all workers earning a wage. It also covered workers, 
applicants or trainees in any job, industry or occupation. Those self-employed as 
artisans, artists, small manufacturers and fixed or mobile shopkeepers or people 
who performed jobs and provided services directly to the public on the streets or 
in squares or warehouses, were insured as long as their total annual income did 
not exceed the annual living wage.  
The onus of implementing the policy and the law fell on two institutions: 
the Compulsory Health Insurance and Disability Fund, which was eventually 
renamed the Social Security Service (SSS), and the National Health Service. The 
SNS reported to the Ministry of Health, which remained responsible for protecting 
                                            
107 Law 10,383 (1952) modified Law 4054 (1924) relating to Compulsory Insurance.  
108 The National Health Service was responsible for the protection of health through health 
activities, as well as social, preventive and curative medical care.  It was an autonomous self-
governed body, dependent on the Ministry of Health. It was subject to administrative and 
technical control, under the Health Code, and the General Directorate of Social Welfare. The 
Director General along with the National Health Council, comprising of twelve members, headed 
the senior management.  
A Board consisting of eleven members administered the Social Security Service. Its main function 
was to administer and monitor the service, receive their funds, manage their assets, deliver 
benefits, patron and resolve requests from policyholders and employers. The SSS granted 
insurance benefits covering diseases (medical care, examinations, dental care etc.), Maternity 
benefits, Invalidity benefits, Old-Age benefits, Survivors' pension (including death benefits).  
109 See supra note 12 
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the health of the entire population and was also mandated to improve and 
promote the health of workers, their spouses and their children up to 15 years of 
age. 
Despite all these up and downs, doctors successfully concluded the first 
phase of a lengthy legal battle in support of their ongoing professional activities. 
They first secured the creation of the Medical College in 1948, and then they 
continued with the unification of the medical workforce under the SNS. They 
finally secured their own labour and economic regulation with the Medical 
Employees’ Act in 1951.110 With all these prerogatives, the medical corporation 
was now prepared to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of 
health policies. Thus, the creation of the Medical College in 1948 and the Medical 
Employees’ Act were actually two “parallel laws”, adopted as a direct response to 
physicians’ demands. Together, they contributed to the creation of the National 
Health Service in 1952 (Law 10,383). 
 
3. THE WELFARE STATE DURING THREE DIFFERENT POLITICAL 
    ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
A. The first decade of the National Health Service (SNS): 1952-1963 and the  
     conservative government  
 
By the middle of the 20th century, the Chilean State had already assumed 
a predominant role in the health sector, greatly impacting the well-being of the 
population. The state was responsible for implementing programs for health 
protection and recovery, and the National Health Service (SNS) developed 
                                            
110 They also won a majority in the National Health Council (NHC – Consejo Nacional de Salud). 
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policies for prevention and promotion, health education and eradication of 
infectious diseases. It also employed all new graduates from medical schools, 
offering them a career within the country-wide SNS. It also emphasized its social 
commitment and provided opportunities for improving the quality of care.111  
The principles that guided this philosophy, on which the actions of the 
National Health Service were based and which outlined the structure of the 
welfare state, were the following:   
A. People are more than mere biological units. They are natural beings who 
create families and communities and live in ways that are favourable or 
detrimental for their health.  
B. Individuals contribute to their collective well-being with their physical and 
intellectual energy. Health is a component of economic development, 
which exists in a relationship of dependence with other factors that 
condition one’s standard of life.  
C. Health results from an ecological balance. The country requires a single, 
centrally-administered service and integrated health care actions.  
D. Both the SNS and the organized community at large are responsible for 
health.  
E. The main goal of the SNS is to reduce the risks of disease and death. 
Integrating health care actions under appropriate and systematic 
programs to meet health priorities fulfills this objective.  
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The SNS responded to the extensive demands of the population in an 
effort to make health care a social right. It was the synthesis of specific, 
articulated interests as well as social and political contradictions and 
disparities.112 With the creation of the SNS, the following organizations were 
merged into a single health authority: the Charity and Social Assistance Office,113 
the Workers’ Insurance Fund Medical Service, 114  the National Hygiene 
Service,115  the Office for the Protection of Children and Adolescents,116  the 
Technical Hygiene and Industrial Safety Section of the Labour Department,117 the 
Bacteriological Institute of Chile and the municipal health and medical 
services.118 Thus, 90% of public-sector medical resources were integrated into a 
single entity, leaving out only the SERMENA, the health departments linked to 
national defence institutions, universities and railway employees.119 
The institutional and legal organization of the SNS120 followed that of the 
SSS: it was a public legal entity that functioned autonomously and was 
administered by the Ministry of Public Health. During the discussion of Law 
10,383 around the creation of the SNS, the spirit of the bill was that the National 
Health Council would oversee the administration and supervision of the financial 
resources of the Service. Nevertheless, Parliament did not legislate accordingly 
                                            
112 Tetelboin, La práctica médica en Chile, supra note 56 at 49. 
113 Dirección General de la Beneficencia y Asistencia Social. 
114 Servicio Médico de la Caja de Seguro Obrero. 
115 Servicio Nacional de Salubridad. 
116 Dirección General de la Protección a la Infancia y a la Adolescencia. 
117 Sección técnica de higiene y seguridad Industrial de la Dirección General del Trabajo. 
118 Instituto Bacteriológico de Chile. 
119 Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, supra note 14 at 71. 
120 A Director General, who was appointed by the president and administered by the National 
Health Council (Consejo Nacional de Salud, CNS), led the SNS. 
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and refused to provide the CNS with these capacities. Instead, it turned the CNS 
into a merely administrative advisory organ of the SNS Director General. Initially, 
the Council only included representatives from the business sector; later 
however, in response to a proposal by the “Falangista” MPs (later the Christian 
Democratic Party),121 labour representatives were also incorporated. This was a 
significant change, as for the first time in history, non-health and non-medical 
professionals, who had typically been considered outsiders, were able to 
participate legally in the closed circle of technical decision-making. After several 
adjustments, the Council was made up of fifteen members with the right to vote, 
ten of whom were doctors and two of whom were labour representatives.122  
Over the years, the SNS Director General accumulated a large amount of 
power, making him the most important public official in the health sector; even 
above the minister of health.123 This led to political disputes, which did not end 
until 1979 with the dismantling of the SNS.  In these disputes, the Medical 
College insisted that physicians’ rights be respected, in particular with regard to 
fixed remuneration and flexible daily hours of work.  
                                            
121 Political party based on Christian principles in a democratic regime. It is a reformist party as 
opposed to a left revolutionary party. In Europe many Christian democrats have formed the 
government or have govern in a coalition with other parties. 
122 The composition of the Council went through many changes. Its members, according to 
Decree No. 856 (April 21, 1953) were: the Minister of Public Health and Social Welfare; Director 
General of the SNS (SNS); Director General of the SSS; two professors from the Faculty of 
Medical Sciences; two representatives of the Physicians Professional Association; two 
representatives (elected) of the employers institutions; two representatives of the workers 
(nominated); two Senators; and two Deputies, plus the Superintendent of the SSS (non-voting). 
123 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 40 at 188. 
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The Service was also charged with supervising the municipalities to 
ensure proper safety standards within each jurisdiction and the Surgeon General, 
who received public subsidies and was responsible for the supervision and 
technical protection of private charitable health-related services. SNS officials 
were divided into technical and administrative officers and technical assistants. 
The country was divided into provinces, and each  province had a chief 
physician. The SNS mandate included establishing centres to prevent and 
protect the public from health risks. Its activities included: a) immunization 
against communicable diseases; b) monitoring pregnant women, infants and 
children; and c) providing pre-nuptial consultations in order to prevent hereditary 
diseases. The SNS was also tasked with education and the promotion of the 
means and conditions to protect health throughout the country. Its main tasks 
were to disseminate information about health practices and to connect the public 
with services for the protection of collective and individual health. It also relied on 
its adequate and stable infrastructure and excellent human resources, all of 
which were influenced by the labour movement’s social demands and by the 
European experience.  
To accomplish its objectives, the SNS was structured in eight health care 
units124 and guided by five structural principles: a) technical, administrative and 
                                            
124 The health care units in the SNS were divided into 8 categories: 1) Hospital Class A, which 
included almost all medical and surgical specialists and technical examination and treatment 
services; 2) Hospital Class B, which included some medical and surgical specialists and some 
examination and treatment services; 3) Hospital Class C, other specialized medical services 
including obstetrical and gynaecological care; 4) Hospital Class D, which was responsible for 
general medicine; 5) Health Care and Medical Care Offices in specific geographical areas; 6) 
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financial autonomy; b) formal and functional integration; c) normative 
centralization; d) executive decentralization; and e) definition of priorities and 
program planning. It was structured around three main organizational levels: a) a 
central level, including the office of the Director General and its departments, in 
charge of the regulations, inspection and evaluation of the service; b) an 
intermediate level consisting of health zones with essentially a coordinating 
function, responsible for supervision and inspection and c) a peripheral or 
executive level, constituted by hospitals and other establishments that directly 
executed health actions.  
As a state system and central authority for medical services and public 
health interventions, the SNS contributed enormously to mitigating the 
differences between the various social security funds, which were eventually 
eliminated, creating the same entitlements for all formal workers and their 
dependents. The SNS granted medical services to individuals and their families 
organized in several categories: a) individuals covered by the SSS (Law 
10,383); 125  b) workers covered by the commercial marine fund law (Law 
10,662);126 c) municipal employees; d) victims of work-related accidents, covered 
                                                                                                                                  
small, local community clinics with nursing services and close links with community organizations, 
permitting the decentralization of specific health care actions; 7) small, local emergency units 
mostly linked to police departments in isolated areas; and 8) general hospitals with limited health 
care services.  
125 The Social Security Service was a public institution in charge of the implementation of the law 
10 383 (1952) of social security for blue-collar workers. 
126 Law 10,662 (1952). Occupational hazards of merchant seamen. The law allocated a 
section in the Insurance Fund of the National Merchant Navy, with the intention of insuring the 
crew of merchant ships and maritime workers against occupational hazards. All salaried workers 
were entitled to coverage. . The main prerequisite for eligibility under this law was that all 
claimants had to be employed as crew members of ships, docks, boaters and other maritime 
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by the Service of Social Insurance; e) civil servants, retired employees of the 
SNS and the indigent, with the exception of individuals who had completed 
military service in any branch of the armed forces; f) firefighters who suffered 
accidents in the line of duty; g) seniors 65 years of age and older without social 
insurance; h) students in primary, secondary and technical schools, colleges, 
tertiary training institutes and universities; i) patients protected by infant and 
maternal care programs; j) patients participating in venereal prevention and 
rheumatic fever prevention programs; k) affiliates of institutions with agreements 
with the SNS, whose expenses were covered by their  institutions, and finally, l) 
all individuals without any type of insurance coverage and not included in any of 
the preceding categories.  Overall, while the indigent already had access to free 
services, the SNS tripled the number of non-indigent people able to receive free 
medical services in the new institution’s hospitals and clinics. 
The SNS provided curative care to 4,200,000 people, representing 70% of 
the population. The SNS also took on other responsibilities related to disease 
prevention and social protection, such as the free milk-distribution program and 
the payment of indemnities to workers in case of illness, which was administered 
by the Social Security Service.127  In addition, the SNS was responsible for 
providing social assistance to seniors and retirement residences as well as 
                                                                                                                                  
trades. They had to be serving Chilean ship owners, ship operators, maritime industries, 
domestic and foreign companies, state enterprises, semi-public and public corporations, or 
individuals, and directly or indirectly performing maritime operations, in the ocean, rivers or lakes.  
127 Servicio de Seguro Social. 
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minors in need of special services.128 The SNS thus became a fundamental pillar 
in the public health sector, providing resources and performing key activities 
under its mandate. Its creation meant a revolution in the health sector in legal 
terms, while the changes it brought to the structure, organization, programs and 
objectives of health care caused a true upheaval.129   
The new health legislation of the 1950s thus shaped the direct intervention 
of the state in medical care and public health and facilitated free access to 
medical services, which gained the status of a social right. This right was 
internalized by the population and attained total legitimacy with the SNS. The 
state became the neuralgic centre of health care and was the target of demands 
made by health professionals and the general public. Therefore, the socialization 
of health services, demands for greater state involvement and state responsibility 
for responding to health needs and guaranteeing the right to medical services 
were the historical “leitmotiv” when it came to health for the great majority of the 
population. The presence of the state also allowed for the professionalization and 
development of a highly scientific, first-rate hospital infrastructure, following the 
recommendations of the Flexner Report130 from the early 20th century in the 
United States.  
                                            
128 Rodríguez, “Estructura y características del sector salud en Chile”, supra note 14 at 72. 
129 Id.   
130  The Report called on North American medical schools to enact higher admission and 
graduation standards, and to adhere strictly to the protocols of mainstream science in their 
teaching and research. It also managed to institutionalize in medicine a paradigm that conceived 
the human body as the sum of a series of interconnected elements, and reinforced the need for 
research and scientific knowledge in the treatments of diseases. 
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Nonetheless, Chilean society was clearly differentiated into three socio-
economic classes: a) the business sector, self-sufficient in the satisfaction of their 
social and health care needs; b) employees and professionals, with stable 
incomes and economic situations based on their capacity to accumulate savings 
and c) workers and farmers, who required legal protection as a result of their low 
remuneration. SNS legislation reinforced this class differentiation. 131  It 
consolidated the SNS as a service that reconciled interests, distancing it from the 
health reformist utopias promoted by Chile’s very brief so-called “Socialist 
republic”, which held power for only 100 days in 1932.132 However, despite its 
strong orientation towards a social concept of medicine, the Service maintained 
the exclusion of those social groups not covered by the health insurance policy 
implemented in 1924.133 It is interesting to note that the nature of the health 
services, the type of medical practice, the technology applied and the definition of 
health and illness were rarely criticized.  
Despite its beginnings and its unique, innovative and internationally 
recognized development, the SNS gradually distanced itself from the model that 
had inspired it. This was the result of several factors, the most critical being the 
continuous redefinition of its mandate due to ongoing changes in the 
government. The SNS also faced serious operational limitations and 
inefficiencies caused partly by the successive attempts by authorities and 
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physicians to modify the legal bases of its structure as well as the health system 
at large. Furthermore, slow economic growth and pressure to reign in increasing 
medical expenses did not allow the SNS to grow as quickly as the needs of its 
beneficiaries.  
By the end of the 1950s, Chile was still facing an economic and 
development stalemate. As the crisis intensified, it became increasingly evident 
that conservative President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) was unable to deal 
with the economic and the social problems facing the country. At the same time, 
the economic and social proposals of the so-called “developmentalist” approach, 
which included agrarian reform, a national program for marginal urban 
populations and the creation of various community organizations, were gaining 
momentum. These benefited from the expansion of the “Alliance for Progress” 
promoted by President Kennedy in the United States, aimed at limiting the impact 
of the Cuban revolution in the region.134  In this context and with the 1964 
presidential elections in mind, Jorge Alessandri’s government proposed a new 
health law to Congress in an attempt to respond to the demands of the middle 
class.  
Due to the high cost of medical services for middle-income groups, who 
received no benefits from the SNS,135 the government proposed the creation of 
                                            
134  Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 
193. 
135 Already in March 1964, the publication of Law 15,565 renamed the Social Welfare Fund of 
the Municipal Workers of Santiago, as the Social Welfare Fund for Municipal Workers of the 
Republic.  It was a semi-public institution. Under this law, the country's municipal workers started 
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an alternative and complementary service to the SNS. Approximately 1.5 million 
people would benefit from the new law. This bill aimed to develop a less 
bureaucratic system and to resolve several limitations of the current system, 
including offering employee health care benefits (for active and retired 
employees and their families) in the same SNS institutions, but under a free-
choice model. This system 136  entailed extending SERMENA preventive 
measures (created in 1942) by fusing the health departments of the Fund for 
Public Employees and Journalists and the Government Social Security Fund for 
Private Employees.  
As part of the bill, the SERMENA would be reorganized to offer free 
choice in curative care to public employees and individuals belonging to different 
funds of the Social Security Service along with the retired and their families. 
Initially, SERMENA benefits and health care services were offered exclusively in 
SERMENA facilities, but later a series of agreements were signed so that SNS 
establishments could also be used. Something worthy of note in this initiative is 
the way it was negotiated, which was unlike previous lengthy negotiation 
processes. For the project presented to parliament in 1961, no consensus was 
reached, in spite of the existence of the National Health Council,137 medical 
conferences and ongoing discussions with stakeholders.   
                                                                                                                                  
to contribute to the Social Security Fund of the Municipal Workers. The National Health Service 
was in charge of the medical and hospital services. 
136 The benefits provided were medical visits, examinations, hospitalization, surgery, obstetric 
care and medical emergencies.  
130 Consejo Nacional de Salud. 
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In September 1964, MPs passed an imperfect piece of legislation, leaving 
the most controversial parts of the basic legislative discussion unaddressed. 
Similar to what had occurred in 1952, the main obstacle for this initiative was 
insufficient clarification about where the extra and necessary funding required for 
the SNS would come from.  It is also interesting to note that the Medical College, 
as a powerful and prominent lobby, was already disappointed with the 
predominance of the socialized medicine approach at the time. The College was 
determined not to increase the number of SNS health care services included in 
physicians’ salaries and advocated instead a free open model, where payments 
would be received for medical consultations.138  
Later in 1963, when the Christian Democratic Party proposed its 
“Revolution in Freedom”139 program as part of its political platform, the country 
was facing a critical internal political crisis. The “Revolution in Freedom” program 
was a development model that combined capitalist growth with social 
development and the strengthening and reinforcement of popular participation. 
                                            
138 This was especially true when the Ministry of Health insisted on modifying the Medical Act to 
reinforce the law that would increase the physicians’ workday to eight hours. The College 
expressed its opposition to this change of policy and sought instead to impose a type of payment 
that was fee-based, instead of salary-based. 
139 His Christian Democratic Party – largely Catholic – was the first liberal religious party in Latin 
America. The Catholic Church in Chile, which had supported rural conservatism, had become 
reformist and was encouraged in this by the Second Ecumenical Council.  For President Frei: 
“There are two principal roads-capitalism and communism (…). Man is sacred.  He is greater than 
the system. He has the right to life, liberty and to his own personality. No system has the right to 
deprive him of his rights.  Both principal systems do this  (….) Capitalism by dehumanizing him 
(…) and communism by making the good of the state more important than the good of the 
individual”.  Eduardo Frei M. in Gross, L., (1967) “The last, best hope: Eduardo Frei & Chilean 
democracy”, New York: Random House, retrieved (May, 10, 2013)  
http://book.filipinofutures.com/christian-democracy/revolution-in-freedom-eduardo-frei-montalva.  
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The program was endorsed by both centre and right-wing parties, primarily to 
avoid a division and to defeat the political forces of the Popular Front (composed 
of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the middle-class Radical Party), 
headed by Salvador Allende, who was leading the polls as the likely winner of the 
1964 presidential elections. In 1964, Eduardo Frei Montalva was elected 
president and became the first Christian Democratic candidate to win presidential 
elections in Latin America. His victory resulted in the modification of health 
policies such that the idea of health became a basic right to which all citizens 
should have access, and the 1925 constitutional principles were fully respected, 
recognizing that the state was fully responsible for providing the resources 
necessary to implement a national health plan.  
 
 
B. The centrist Christian Democratic government (1964-1970)  
With the beginning of President Frei’s administration, Chile witnessed the 
appearance of two major health paradigms. The first was influenced by the 
Cuban socialist model, which was implemented after the victory of the Cuban 
revolution in 1959. The second paradigm was based on a flexible liberal model 
with a social orientation, close to the German social market economy model. The 
new Christian Democratic government supported the second approach, hoping to 
reinforce state responsibility in the health sector while, simultaneously, 
stimulating private health-related initiatives. In order to increase popular support 
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for the government and to include the population in the decision-making process, 
the government implemented a series of measures to increase popular 
participation.140 With the creation of the “Revolution in Freedom” program, which 
would correct Chile’s extreme inequities without the need for violent political 
struggle, the possibility for real and global health reform was closer than ever. 
Employee participation became an issue of national interest for President Frei. 
His government intended to create a National Health System for all citizens that 
would be universal, complete, self-sufficient, efficient, appropriate, community-
oriented, equitable and respectful (to human dignity).141 For the first time, the 
country was seeing health reforms proposed that aimed to overcome the existing 
deficiencies and to put an end to two-tier medicine wherein one system catered 
to blue-collar workers and the other to white-collar workers.  
This proposed system was not much different from the Unified Health 
System 142  proposed later by the Popular Unity coalition that replaced the 
Christian Democratic government in 1970.143 The desire to restructure the SNS 
was due to its internal limitations and to overall changes in the health sector and 
the medical profession after six years of a conservative regime. The government 
hoped to implement a deep reform, with the ideal of unifying all health care 
                                            
140 Eduardo Morales, “Sistema político, planificación y políticas públicas. La política de salud en 
Chile 1964-1978”, (1981) 110 Documento de trabajo FLACSO 11. 
141 Senate, Daily sessions Journal, 16th session of April 10, 1965, statements by the Minister of 
Health Dr. Ramón Valdivieso. 
142 Servicio Único de Salud. 
143 R. Valdivieso & B. Juricic, “El sistema nacional de salud en Chile” in (1970) 63 “Boletín de la 
Oficina Panamericana de Salud” 480, in Livingstone & Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y 
bienestar social, supra note 14 at  9. 
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services under one single umbrella. This was clearly demonstrated in the 
parliamentary debates of 1964, when the Director General of the SNS avowed 
that the government policy was to move towards the creation of a National Health 
System with a standardized funding and management mechanism. To supporters 
of the initiative, the National Health System seemed to be an ideal and definitive 
solution. However, a significant amount of public opinion had to be swayed, 
along with tough negotiations with many stakeholders, especially the Medical 
College, beneficiaries and other health care professionals.144  
As soon as President Eduardo Frei assumed his mandate, he established 
a Compulsory Insurance Fund to meet the needs resulting from the high 
numbers of work-related accidents and illnesses.145  The Frei Government also 
attempted to extend the role of the SNS, elaborating a policy of national planning 
that was adapted to limited resources and addressed the high infant mortality 
rates and the relatively short life expectancy of the population. On the other 
hand, there was a political consensus that public resources and health benefits 
were insufficient and unevenly distributed, socially and geographically. Also, with 
the objective of incorporating other social groups into the economic and social 
process, the government reinforced the role of peripheral health care services 
and rural clinics. Due to the increasing enrolment rates in nursing, medical and 
                                            
144 Id. 
145 The initiative to legislate on industrial accidents was excluded from the reform of 1952. During 
the Frei administration, Decree-Law No. 16.764 (February 1, 1968) was promulgated, providing 
insurance against risks from accidents and occupational diseases. 
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obstetrical schools, the quality of health assistance and human resources 
improved.146  
In terms of the problem of accessibility, availability and payments of 
medical services for employees, President Frei indicated in his first presidential 
message that the solution was to make the SNS a genuine health care provider 
at the national level, covering all sectors of the population. He added that any 
alternative solution had to be considered only temporary, since it was not 
possible to accept two classes of medical care (one for blue-collar workers and 
another for white-collar workers). In this respect, between 1966 and 1967 the 
Ministry of Public Health emphasized several important initiatives, as follows:  
a) The Decennial Health Plan (1966–1975), following the lead of the Pan-
American Health Organization (PAHO), whose methodology emphasized 
the need for greater efficiency in the provision of health care services, 
better coordination of existing health care instruments and a more rational 
use of the resources available;147  
b) The creation of the National Planning and Budget Office for the health 
sector;148  
c) The creation of the National Consultative Health Council 149  (CNCS, 
replacing the CNS)150 and of Community Health Councils151 and  
                                            
146 Morales, “Sistema político, planificación y políticas públicas”, supra note 140 at 50. 
147 OPS-OMS (1965). The planning method advocated the rationalization of resources according 
to priorities. These were associated with costs, and were established taking into account the 
extent of health damage, the importance of the targeted social group, their vulnerability and other 
specific actions to evaluate against the backdrop of specific circumstances. 
148 Oficina Planificación y Presupuesto del sector Salud.  
149 Consejo Nacional Consultivo de Salud. 
150 The constitution of the National Health Advisory Council was enacted in April 1967, and 
incorporated in 1968 in accordance with Law No. 16.481 pertaining to curative medicine. 
151  The Community Councils (Consejos Comunitarios de Salud) were representative 
organizations that worked at the community level in areas linked to health care institutions and 
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d) The completion of a national study on the availability of human resources, 
with the support of the PAHO and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  
 
In summary, the Decennial Health Plan attempted to target the most 
critical problems, developing political programs to extend health care and 
benefits and focusing on improving the integration of services. 152  The new 
National Consultative Health Council was mandated to support the Ministry in all 
aspects of the planning, coordination, and integration of health actions at the 
national level. The CNCS acquired the mission of establishing the National 
Health System, intended to serve the entire community equally.153,154 Its primary 
objective was to promote public awareness, educate the population on health 
issues and facilitate prevention programs, but its interventions were clearly 
insufficient. The 80 community health councils created by the end of the Frei 
administration did not accomplish their mission, primarily due to their 
organizational limitations and their lack of political direction.155 
On the other hand, the Medical College noted that this new scenario was 
actively modifying medical practice in public institutions, with an emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                  
hospitals. In 1970, eighty community councils were operating in the country (Emanuel De Kadt, 
"Las desigualdades en el campo de la salud" 133 in Livingstone & Raczynski (eds.), Salud 
pública y bienestar social, supra note 13. As they had to be convened by a delegate of the 
Ministry of Interior, their development was hampered by bureaucratic procedures. 
152 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 196. 
153 Most of its members were directors of services (SNS, SERMENA, armed forces, police, 
gendarmerie etc.), to which were added the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of 
Chile, representatives of the Association of Faculties of Medicine, professional associations 
(doctors, dentists and pharmacists), and one representative of the workers and other employees. 
154 Valdivieso & Juricic, “El sistema nacional de salud en Chile”, supra note 143 at  9. 
155 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 196-
197. 
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providing assistance for those needing social assistance. The Medical College 
also emphasized the need for medical doctors to migrate to rural and isolated 
areas. The College stressed the need to preserve a totally professional and 
ethical approach to health care, independent of political interference.156 However, 
the health sector did not receive resources proportional to the growth of the 
population, and these restrictions and the uneven distribution of health 
professionals and resources for doctors ultimately limited its capacity to improve 
the country’s health indicators.  
Public health legislation, in place since 1931, was also modified in 1967. 
The new Public Health Code157 took on a great mission: to resolve all issues 
under the SNS mandate related to health protection and to supervise public 
hygiene under the umbrella of municipal services. In addition, it contemplated 
offering coverage to pregnant women and mothers during the first six months 
post-partum, as well as free dental service to students in public schools. At the 
same time, the new code regulated the compulsory reporting of some diseases, 
imposed regulations on food storage and preparation and was responsible for 
regulating sexual education, controlling venereal diseases, vaccinating the entire 
population and supervising laboratories and the pharmaceutical industry.  The 
new Public Health Code also regulated the actions of the SNS with respect to 
                                            
156 See 14 Vida Médica (1952), Revista del Colegio Médico in Id. at 192. 
157 Decree-Law (DFL) 725 (1968). Modified Law  226 (1931) that Established the Public 
Health Code 
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monitoring the mental illnesses of alcoholics and drug addicts, the sanitation of 
cemeteries and the hygiene of public spaces (including public transportation).158  
However, the Curative Medicine Bill, 16,781159, presented by the previous 
government in 1961, continued to move through the parliamentary debate 
process despite the change in government, as it was already too late to reverse 
the process. In addition, all physicians and their employers were in favour of a 
free-choice model, in direct conflict with the principles of universality, integration 
and equity advocated by the Frei Government.160  This proposal divided the 
population of employees into three income groups, where each group had 
different access to medical care. The cost of the service was established 
according to specific tables. This way, the payment structure included an already 
complicated financial equation that attempted to balance several interests: the 
government’s need to reduce costs; users’ requests for a reduction in the cost of 
co-payments; and professionals’ wishes to maximize their incomes.161,162 
The new social and political scenario following the election of the Christian 
Democrats was reflected in the parliamentary debates about Bill 16,781. This 
                                            
158 Romero, “Desarrollo de la Medicina y la Salubridad en Chile”, supra nota 65 at 885-886. 
159 See infra note   No 172. 
160 The Medical College publicly contradicted the President by claiming that they were not 
consulted. They rejected the government’s proposal of the universal Right to Health mentioning 
that throughout the world, Health was in crisis due to the cost of medicines, thus creating the 
need to find ways to assume these costs according to the society’s economic capacity to 
adequately compensate physicians. (See (1965) 7 Vida Médica). 
161 The issue of co-payments was the most controversial because of the harsh economic reality of 
the employees. According to the Ministry of Health data, 70% had an income equivalent to two 
monthly minimum wages, thus fulfilling the same criteria as the workers who received free care 
by law. Hence employees considered the co payment to be a kind of discrimination. (See (1965) 
7 Vida Médica). 
162 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 197. 
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time, however,  representatives with various interests were involved in the 
process, not only physicians and the bureaucratic elite. The decision-making 
process was open and democratic, with diverse organizations represented, thus 
altering the nature of the debates. The energetic demands of the employees and 
health workers weakened the powerful influence of the Medical College and 
forced the government to modify its purely technocratic position.163 Declarations 
made by public employees in the Senate highlighted the issues that were at play, 
affirming that this project was a long-held aspiration of employees because their 
low incomes were not sufficient to cover their medical expenses.164 As a result, 
the employees not only supported the physicians’ demands, but they also 
requested that the free-choice model of health care be extended to all, without 
any differentiation based on economic status.165 All this clearly demonstrated 
how the passing of laws and especially their implementation required the 
collaboration of intermediate bureaucrats and health authorities, who could either 
facilitate or block the reforms.166 
The conflicts of interest increased in 1966, when the opposition, led by the 
“gremialista” 167  group, supported the physicians by demanding a socialized 
                                            
163 These views were articulated by the Confederation of Private Employees (CEPECH) and the 
National Association of Public Employees (ANEF), whose president, Tucapel Jiménez, was an 
important leader who was later assassinated by agents of the Pinochet dictatorship.  In Parada, 
Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 199 
164 Senate, Daily sessions Journal, October 24, 1964.  
165 Funding through the pension institutes, the construction of hospitals for employees, and the 
auditing of the SERMENA’ accounting by an employee’s representative, was also sought. (See 
Vida Médica 14, 1965). 
166Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman, Development, Democracy and Welfare States, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008) at 197. 
167 Not to be mistaken with the right-wing “gremialista movement” during the Allende Government, 
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model of medicine. This group, along with more conservative sectors, argued 
that the SNS was moving away from a modern conception of health care and 
endangering the practice of medicine. They held that the SNS had gained too 
much power and was putting health care in danger, as the profession was not 
able to delegate responsibilities or revise the fundamental principles or payment 
structures proposed in 1952. 168  Rather, their proposals had to be sent to 
Parliament for review, and they had to request that their demands be heard by 
the Medical College before any decisions were made.169 & 170  
At a more general level, the Curative Medicine Bill articulated three logics 
that had been associated with the health system since its very beginnings: a) the 
political logic of universal, free access to health care and professionals paid by 
salary; b) the social logic of middle-class values, such that white-collar workers 
would accept sharing the same services that blue-collar workers received, in 
equal conditions; and c) the corporative logic, which attempted to impose market 
flexibility on the public-private relationship, following a free-choice model. These 
interrelated logics corresponded to three contradictory fronts of change: a) the 
institutional front, led by technocrats wishing to sustain the transformation and 
rationality of the Decennial Health Plan; b) the corporative front, which tried to 
                                                                                                                                  
which was the critical intellectual elite behind the pro-Pinochet Unión Democrática Independiente 
Party. “Gremialismo” is a conservative current of thought closely linked to sectors of the Opus Dei 
in the Catholic church. In Chile, gremialismo was the ideological support for the political party 
Unión Democratica Independiente (UDI, Independent Democratic Union). 
168 Vida Médica 4 (1966), Revista del Colegio Médico in Parada, Evolución del sistema de 
protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 199 & 200. 
169 Vida Médica 7 (1965) in Parada, Id. 
170 The Medical College initiated a "hard line" policy and undertook a wide mobilization against 
the curative medicine project. They also reinforced their ties with the employees’ associations. 
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accommodate the interests of the SNS; and c) the socio-political front, which 
expressed the new face of Chilean society in an active process of 
democratization and mobilization for more and better services and social 
participation.171 
The government was thus losing control of social dynamics, while 
physicians faced unexpected changes to their profession, such as the greater 
autonomy of non-medical doctors and the spread of popular awareness in favour 
of health rights. The Curative Medicine Act172 & 173 presented by the conservative 
government in 1961 was finally passed in 1968. The same year, at the end of 
President Frei’s mandate, despite the growth of the social medicine model and 
the influential role of the SNS, a difficult scenario of complex political and 
ideological orientations took shape. These orientations facilitated some structural 
                                            
171 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 40 at 198. 
172 Law 16,781 (1968) Curative Medicine Act The law was established to provide medical and 
dental assistance to beneficiaries, retirees, the unemployed of the institutions listed in Article 2 of 
Decree-Law 286 of 1960, dependents, and those receiving widows’ and orphans’ pensions.  The 
beneficiaries of the Social Welfare Fund of the Municipal Workers, the Crew section of the 
Pension Fund for the National Merchant Navy and the staff of the National Health Service and 
their dependents were excluded from the purview of this law. In accordance with Article 65 of 
Decree-Law No. 338 of 1960, all those who could be considered as dependents of 
parliamentarians - serving and retired - were entitled to the benefits prescribed by this law. The 
administration of the health care system created by this law, and in particular, the Medical 
Assistance Fund that would fund all or part of the benefits, was entrusted to the National Medical 
Service for Employees (SERMENA). The Medical Assistance Fund granted a number of benefits, 
including, medical consultation, surgery, several medical tests and examinations, hospitalizations, 
emergencies, and obstetric and dental care. The benefits were granted by the SERMENA under 
the "free choice" protocol (the beneficiaries could choose the provider of the medical service).  
The SERMENA had the power to sign agreements with the National Health Service or any other 
public or private entity. The law also created the National Advisory Council on Health in the 
Ministry of Public Health. 
173 It was called so in relation to the law of Preventive Medicine (Cruz-Coke Law) that was 
benefiting employees with the creation of SERMENA in 1942. 
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changes and resulted in a more liberal reorientation of the health sector.174 As 
already indicated, the SERMENA175 was responsible for the implementation of 
the Curative Medicine Law, which benefitted two million people. Thus, the SNS 
and the SERMENA176 became the fundamental pillars of the National Health 
System. 177  At the same time, health policy overall was becoming more 
technocratic, more interested in the management and efficiency of health care 
and less interested in the principles of socialized medicine in Chile.  
The new Curative Medicine Law attempted to solve two problems at once: 
the shortage of medical assistance for employees and the demands of 
physicians trying to reorganize their working conditions according to their 
professional and economic interests. The SNS thus began to incorporate the 
free-choice system, with beneficiaries responsible for co-payments. This funding 
                                            
174 Labra, (1997) Política, Saúde e Interesses Médicos no Chile (1900-1990), supra note 89 at 
158. 
175 The SERMENA, according to the definition established by the Decree-Law 286 (March 31, 
1960) was a semi-public institution, endowed with a legal personality, whose relations with the 
government were maintained through the Ministry of Public Health. Its fundamental role was to 
provide exclusive curative services and preventive medicine to contributors in the various 
insurance institutions. Its sources of funding were the transfers from workers’ and employers’ 
salary contributions. Another source of revenue came from the direct sale of the bonds of curative 
medicine to patients. (Francisco Ortiz, “El sector salud y sus recursos financieros análisis de la 
década”, in Hugo Lavados (ed.), Desarrollo Social y salud en Chile, (Santiago Corporación de 
promoción universitaria, 1980) at 174-177). 
176 The Employees National Health Service (SERMENA) as a semi-public institution with a legal 
personality, coordinated its activities with the government through the Ministry of Health. The 
service was also exclusively responsible for the Preventive Medicine of several Family Allowance 
Compensation Funds The SERMENA performed the following functions entrusted by Law: a) It 
provided preventive medical services according to Law 6,174; b) The payment of the time-out 
subsidies and other economic benefits imposed by Law was its responsibility; c) Through a 
controlled fee, it provided dental care to family members affiliated to the Service; d) It had to 
sanction medical and dental loans for the passive and active affiliates; and e) It was responsible 
for building, acquiring or leasing suitable facilities to cater to the clinical and hospital requirements 
of its beneficiaries.  
177 In 1968, the Chilean population was distributed as follows: manual workers (blue collar) 47.9% 
and white-collar workers, 20.6%. In total 27% of the population was not covered by any social 
security scheme. 
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mechanism coexisted with the traditional system and was established in Law 
15,076, 178  which regulated the professional work of surgeons, biochemists, 
dental surgeons, pharmacists and chemists. This legislation, along with Law 
16,744179—implemented on February 1, 1968, creating “mutuales” or workers’ 
insurance associations to cover accidents in the workplace and occupational 
illnesses—consolidated the free-choice model and contributed to the increase of 
private health care providers. 180  The mutuales established a compulsory 
                                            
178 Law 15,076 (1962). Revised the text of the Statute for medical-surgical, pharmaceutical 
or chemical-pharmaceutical, bio-chemical and dental surgeons (Law 15,021[1962]). The 
medical-surgical, pharmaceutical or chemical-pharmaceutical, bio-chemical and dental surgeons, 
who were enrolled in their respective professional colleges, and exercised professional duties in 
office or as paid employees, were called "public officials." This law did not apply to the private 
exercise of the profession of public officials.  
The provisions of the law applied to the National Health Service, the Services of Public 
Administration, Public, semi-Public or Autonomous institutions and, in general, to any natural or 
legal entity. The professional staff serving in the Armed Forces or the Carabineros de Chile 
(Police) was subject to the laws governing the armed service or the Corps of Carabineros de 
Chile, respectively. The National Health Service and the State Universities (or those recognized 
by it) could grant scholarships for the development of a proprietary form of training grants or 
scholarships for nursing homes.  
179 Law 16,744 (1968). Established rules on occupational accidents and occupational 
diseases. The Law declared that Social Insurance against risks of accidents and occupational 
diseases should be made mandatory. This Insurance was compulsory for employees, public 
servants, and also employees from the municipal and de-centralized State administration.  This 
law covered students who had a source of income from their respective institutions, as well as 
self- employees and family workers. The law ensured that all students were insured against 
accidents suffered during their studies, or in carrying out their professional practice.  
For the purpose of this law, an accident meant any injury that occurred to a person in the 
workplace or in connection with the work, and that resulted in disability or death. Work accidents 
also referred to accidents that occurred in the direct path (one way or return) between the 
bedroom and the workplace, and those occurring in the direct path between two places of work, 
but corresponding to different employers. Occupational accidents were also considered under 
this law.  Occupational accidents comprised those accidents suffered by union leaders in the 
performance of their union duties. Interestingly, this law did not entertain accidents caused by 
circumstances unrelated to the work or intentionally inflicted by the victims. Occupational 
diseases included those caused directly during the exercise of the profession or work, resulting in 
disability or death. Benefits were provided for temporary incapacity, disability, survival and death. 
However, “death” was eliminated in 1979.  The administration of the Insurance came under the 
purview of the Social Security Service, the National Health Service, the Welfare Funds and the 
Employers Mutual. 
180Jorge Jiménez, online: Escuela de Medicina Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, retrieved 
(November 23, 2011) http://escuela.med.puc.cl/publ/medamb/OrganizacionSanitaria.html, at 2. 
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insurance plan to which employers were required to contribute 0.9% of the 
taxable wages they paid and could optionally make an additional contribution 
based on the risk and the business activity of the company, up to a maximum of 
3.4% of taxable remuneration. Law 16,744 covered the following individuals: a) 
all the self-employed; b) public servants in the central government as well as in 
decentralized public institutions and municipalities; c) students who worked for 
their educational institutions; d) employees and their families and e) students in 
public and private schools who suffered accidents while in school or in 
internships. 181  DFL 163 182  regulated social security and the extension of 
compulsory insurance. This enactment fixed the text of Law 10,383 from August 
8, 1952 and Law 16,840 from May 24, 1968, making it compulsory for all persons 
indicated by law to receive insurance against sickness, invalidity, old age and 
death.183  
As already highlighted, the curative medicine legislation was clearly the 
outcome of a dispute of interests between white- and blue-collar workers, where 
the latter were displeased with their dependence upon public services like the 
SNS.184 The law also resolved conflicts between the Medical College and the 
SNS Association of Employees, preventing the SNS from becoming the sole 
                                            
181 Id. at 8. 
182 Decree-Law (DFL) 163 (1968). Social Security and extension of compulsory insurance 
183  In compliance with this enactment, the Mandatory Insurance Fund (Caja de Seguro 
Obligatorio), which was renamed the Social Security Service (Servicio de Seguro Social), and the 
National Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud) were set up as was established by Law 
10.383. The Social Security Service was also responsible for compliance with the severance 
benefits of services, and family allowances for workers. 
184 Morales, “Sistema político, planificación y políticas públicas”, supra note 140 at 52-53. 
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employer in the health sector.185 These two groups had clearly different views 
and understandings of the payment mechanisms in the public health system, with 
the physicians preferring a free-choice system paid for through service fees and 
the Association of Employees preferring salaries. The Curative Medicine Law 
regulated the use of SNS facilities during hours that did not conflict with the 
medical attention of legal beneficiaries and also allowed the possibility of offering 
public health care services in private clinics in order to avoid the construction of 
expensive health centres.186  
The SERMENA coordinated its operations187  with many of the health 
professionals’ associations, enabling beneficiaries to purchase subsidized 
“coupon-cheques” to pay for their medical care.188 As white-collar workers and 
the middle class frequently complained about the lack of accessible services, 
which forced them to pay to access the private system or wait for long periods for 
an appointment in the free, public system, the law introduced a new option that 
transcended this two-tier medical system. With the new free-choice model, 
                                            
185 The Medical College was responsible with registering the professionals who wished to join the 
free choice system and with determining prices for all medical acts that were to be covered. 
186 The funding of these activities came from several sources, the most important being employee 
contributions of 1% of their taxable income and a contribution of 2% by the insurance fund. The 
law also gave the SNS the power to regulate work schedules, resources and the hiring policy for 
all its personnel, including physicians. 
187  Since the SERMENA and other public and compulsory insurance institutions were also 
involved in the implementation and administration of services under the Curative Medicine Law, 
an advisory council was created to coordinate and control the system, to determine the 
mechanisms for payment and to oversee the remuneration of health care professionals. 
188 The services provided by the SERMENA were diverse in nature, and included hospital care, 
private home visits, referrals, medical appointments, surgery, laboratory exams, X-rays, 
hospitalizations, dental treatments, obstetrical care, emergency care and specialized treatment. 
R. Gutiérrez, “Acceso de obreros y empleados a los beneficios de la medicina socializada” in 
Livingstone & Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y bienestar social, supra note 14 at 96. 
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patients189 were able to choose their doctors from a list of all registered doctors, 
with the possibility of using some specially allocated hospital units. However, this 
new option also placed new constraints on the infrastructure, which had 
previously been used largely by only blue-collar workers.190  
Despite the new Curative Medicine Law’s acceptance of the free-choice 
model, which the Medical College had been advocating, the College manifested 
its opposition. In particular, according to the physicians the new law gave doctors 
very little power to co-administer the new system, with only modest flexibility in 
the fixing of prices for medical services and remunerations. They also objected to 
the lack of financial stimuli offered by the new system and to an increase in their 
workload. Hence, the Medical College increased its lobbying capacity, pressuring 
the government both to change the law and to meet its economic demands.191 
The Medical College penetrated all the layers of the SNS, forming a control 
pyramid with the leaders at the top and the base of the organization spread 
throughout the country. 192  This facilitated the College’s links with other 
stakeholders, especially the National Federation of Health Workers (FENATS).193 
With these connections and corporate relationships, they were able to form a 
vast movement within the health sector, which became very aggressive and 
                                            
189 The figures drawn from the National Survey of Family Income in 1968 illustrated that the 
average income of the SERMENA beneficiaries was twice as high as the beneficiaries of the SNS 
(SNS). 
190 Illanes, “En Nombre del Pueblo, del Estado y de la Ciencia...”, supra note 16 at 197. 
191 The Medical College announced that it would eliminate from the "free-choice option records” 
all doctors who did not comply with the rules of the General Council. Vida Médica 10 (1968) in 
Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 200. 
192 Parada, Id. at 201. 
193 Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud (FENATS). 
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conservative. In this context, the opposition to the Christian Democratic 
government, the corporate “gremialista” movement and the historical supporters 
of social medicine shared the College’s demands until their ideological 
differences were brought to the surface in the presidential elections of 1970, 
when physicians divided into two irreconcilable factions.194   
The Curative Medicine Law did not try to incorporate white-collar workers 
into the SNS, nor did it create a parallel system just for them. Instead, the 
SERMENA was based on an intermediate formula that offered similar benefits to 
those offered by the SNS, and, unlike the SNS, operated on the free-choice 
model, with some restrictions. In general terms, although the Curative Medicine 
Law was contested and patients were presented with two public models, the law 
finally allowed white-collar workers to have access to free medical care and 
transformed the SNS, which became a great pillar in the health system, covering 
almost 90% of the population. It was complemented by hospitals, university 
hospitals and medical care for the armed forces, railroad workers and the police. 
The private sector, however, covered 10% of the population and was organized 
around private clinics, doctors’ offices, assistance services provided by large 
corporations and different popular and traditional medical practices. Although the 
                                            
194 The symptoms of the crisis were many and diverse. The government did not report their plans, 
and tried to reform the SNS excluding the Medical College. It wanted to implement an 
administrative reform, which required a commitment of eight working hours, destroying the gains 
obtained in the past. The honorariums for physicians were not respected. Foreign doctors were 
entering the country (to meet the shortage of nationals). The Minister of Finance discriminated 
against the Medical College, which forced the physicians to go on a strike, or move on "turtle 
operations”, to reduce their involvement. Labra, Política, Saúde e Interesses Médicos no Chile 
(1900-1990), supra note 89 at 158. 
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free-choice model did not meet the interests of the majority of doctors and only 
25% of physicians registered with this system, the number of patients who opted 
for health care under this new model increased exponentially.195 More than one 
million people already benefited from the SERMENA between 1964 and 1972. 
The number of medical services increased yearly, jumping from 27,100 in 1964 
to 2,356,900 in 1972.  
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SNS AND SERMENA 
CARACTERISTIC SERMENA SNS 
BENEFICIARIES 
Private employees and 
public servants  
Manual workers, farmers, 
peasants, artisans, craftsmen, 
clerks, employees and the poor. 
COVERAGE 20% of the population  
48% of the population as direct 
beneficiaries and approximately 
17% of the population due to 
indigence. 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Very limited. Beds 
located in private 
institutions and in SNS 
facilities. 
Hospitals and clinics in a fully 
regionalized system. 
                                            
195 The Minister of Health requested the Medical College for a wider dissemination of information 
on the curative health system, as "many professionals throughout the country were not interest to 
enroll in the free choice option believing it was against their interests." Vida Médica 3 (1970) in 
Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 205. 
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TYPES OF 
SERVICES 
Diagnostic and 
therapeutic care, 
preventive screenings. 
Comprehensive preventive and 
curative care. Public health care 
for the entire population. 
 
COST FOR THE 
PATIENT  
 
Co-insurance; patients 
pay part of costs. 
Free for services covered by the 
law.  
HEALTH 
PERSONNEL  
Employees and 
contract workers 
Salaried employees 
 
Source: Adapted from T. Hall & P. Díaz, “Social Security and Heath Care Patterns in Chile”, 
(1971) 1 International Journal of Medical and Sanitary Services 364. 
 
In general terms, criticism of the Christian Democratic government’s 
health policy came from different political and social sectors, which caused 
conflicts between the workers’ unions and professional associations and the 
state as the regulator of the health reforms. According to the government, 
popular participation increased, wages improved, bureaucratization was reduced 
and medical services were extended. Critics, however, argued that the increase 
in popular participation was insufficient, as community participation in the 
management process was considered to be weak, superficial and symbolic, even 
when recognizing the presence of such participation in the advisory councils. In 
addition, they noted that during this time there was a lack of innovation in the 
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practice of medicine, which continued to be developed under the same dominant 
and orthodox model. The biomedical model controlled by medical doctors 
persisted, based on the health-disease paradigm, despite evidence that pointed 
to the benefits of a wellness paradigm.  
In terms of statistics, public health expenditures increased by 68% 
between 1964 and 1970—a 49% per capita increase. The number of people 
working for the SNS also rose from 42,165 in 1964 to 55,173 in 1970, 
representing a 31% increase. Finally, the percentage of total expenses used to 
pay wages increased from 50.2% to 61.5% during the same period.196 Of all the 
deficiencies of the SNS, the inequities in the services provided to the rural 
population and the poor were the most critical. Furthermore, the system was still 
very bureaucratic, and funding was inadequate. The distribution of resources was 
also uneven, with 40% of resources concentrated in the private sector. 
On the national political scene, society was demanding the 
democratization of public institutions, beginning with the University of Chile, 
accused of supporting the country’s conservative forces, which were resistant to 
social change. As a result, in 1968 the country embarked upon a university 
reform process. All medical educational institutes were questioned and criticized 
for their inability to train enough professionals to meet the demands of the public 
health system. In order to address these problems, the curriculum in the medical 
schools was reformed, introducing social science courses and opening a 
                                            
196 National Institute of Statistics, (Instituto Nacional de Estadística); (1970). Annuary of Nacional 
Health Service (Anuarios del Servicio Nacional de Salud); Ministerio de Hacienda. 
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Community Medicine Department as well as emphasizing research based more 
on a social-medicine approach.197 With the participation of the Medical College, a 
new joint educational committee was formed to produce professionals with 
critical skills, social awareness and active involvement in the community.198 
Ultimately, the Medical College decided to partake in the new changes to make 
up for lost opportunities in previous attempts to assert technical and economic 
autonomy.199 Furthermore, the salary model of payment for health care services 
positioned doctors against public employees, which privileged but also 
constrained the doctors’ professional development.  
Meanwhile, non-medical health workers organized themselves in the 
combative National Federation of Health Workers (FENATS), which did not 
believe in the supposed technical and rational superiority of the bureaucracy or 
that the altruism of the medical profession would lead to an advance towards a 
model of social medicine. Disillusioned, the FENATS decided to push for the 
democratization of services to fracture the rigid professional hierarchy. They 
protested that they had neither control nor representation in the SNS, adding that 
if they had some influence, several problems in the health sector that had been 
                                            
197 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 202-
203. 
198 E. Villarroel, & G. Venturini, “La contribución del Colegio Médico a la educación médica 
chilena”, (1972) 100 Revista Médica de Chile 844. 
199 In previous historical periods the Medical College was unable to influence significatively in the 
outcome of health reforms or legislative changes.  For instance, in 1924 and 1930, the Medical 
College was poorly organized and did not trust the postulates of the leftist-progressive medical 
union of Valparaiso. In the 1950 and 1952 health reforms, physicians lost another opportunity to 
influence a more comprehensive medical education curriculum and to promote decentralization at 
the local level. This was the result of its desire to gain control over the SNS and also a 
consequence of the hegemony of the specialization paradigm within the profession. 
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reported to the authorities and the public would have already been resolved.200  
The health workers went on several strikes with the support of the 
Workers’ Central Union (CUT) 201  and launched a campaign for the 
democratization of the SNS and a socialized form of medicine. Among other 
demands, they called for the direct participation of workers, via their 
representatives, in the administration and management of all public institutions 
and state corporations. During these demonstrations, the FENATS claimed that 
the SNS was not providing health but selling it, denouncing that the Curative 
Medicine Law was an incentive to return to the old liberal system. They pointed 
out the serious wage disparities: 10% of health care workers (4000 physicians) 
received 55% of all wages, whereas the other 45% of wages were distributed 
among 40,000 non-medical health care workers (blue- and white-collar workers).  
The political context was already highly charged. In addition, President 
Frei failed in his attempt to create a National Health System, and following 
several strikes, the Decennial Health Plan collapsed. The Christian Democracy 
administration completed its final year amidst great political, ideological and 
social turmoil, enormously frustrating the health sector.  The government was 
paralyzed and isolated. Its own party was divided, giving rise to radicalized 
sectors such as the “MAPU”202 and, later, the Christian Left.203 However, many of 
its reformist efforts were not in vain, as it had accomplished significant progress 
                                            
200 Morales, “Sistema político, planificación y políticas públicas”, supra note 140 at 59. 
201 Central Única de trabajadores (CUT). 
202 Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (MAPU). 
203 Izquierda Cristiana. 
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in agrarian reform, industrial modernization, technological innovation, the partial 
nationalization of the copper mining industry, 204  education reforms and the 
unionization of farmers. In the health field, despite political, financial and 
administrative difficulties and little cooperation from medical doctors, access to 
services was extended and the basic indicators of health improved. The 
democratization process was furthered, and the accessibility of health care 
services for the middle-class improved as a result of the predominance of the 
middle class and parties of the political centre.  
However, by 1970, forces of the political left wished to revert the capitalist 
model of development and further expand the process of democratization in 
order to build a new society based on the premises of socialism. This was the 
socio-political project known as the “Chilean road to socialism”, under the 
leadership of Salvador Allende, the former health minister and senator. This 
political program was widely supported by a coalition of parties, headed by the 
Socialist and Communist Parties. Their coalition, known as “Unidad Popular” 
(Popular Unity), was elected in the presidential elections of 1970, making 
Salvador Allende the first president of Marxist inspiration to be democratically 
elected in the world.   
 
 
 
                                            
204 A semi nationalization of the mining industry, without any expropriation.  
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C.  The socialist model of the Popular Unity government (1970-1973) 
The Popular Unity government’s goal was to reorient economic 
development and re-direct the process of capital accumulation to satisfy the 
basic needs of the workers, peasants and middle class. Its primary objective was 
to reduce the high degree of concentration of foreign and domestic monopoly 
capital. Beginning in 1970, the Popular Unity government implemented the 
nationalization of strategic enterprises (especially mineral resources), a vast 
agrarian land reform, the control of foreign trade and the financial market, price 
controls and wage increases. Although the Popular Unity program and political 
platform facilitated a series of fundamental changes and transformations in the 
socio-economic structure, these changes were not mere reforms or amendments 
to the productive system, nor were they merely measures to reduce the social 
inequalities that were structurally linked to economic underdevelopment. With 
these reforms, the government sought to ensure state control over economic 
processes in order to restructure the economy and transform the existing model 
of development.205 
The formation of the Popular Unity government marked a new advance 
and a further strengthening of the state apparatus and a qualitative change in the 
nature of government intervention in society. The purpose of ensuring state 
control was not to destroy the state apparatus,206  but rather to establish a 
                                            
205 Pilar Vergara, Las transformaciones del Estado chileno bajo el régimen militar, (Mimeo, 1980) 
at 7. 
206 As in the Marxist approach. 
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revolutionary process207 that would change the living conditions for the vast 
majority of the population—people who had traditionally been ignored. The 
Allende government developed a political and socio-economic platform to found 
Chile’s first socialist society. 
The government’s economic policy had four main objectives: a) the 
redistribution of income; b) the expansion of government programs and services; 
c) state control of key and strategic industries and d) the expansion of agrarian 
reform. At the same time, its social policy aimed to strengthen the process of 
wealth distribution through reforms in the fields of education, housing, social 
welfare, health and employment. The proposed changes also attempted to 
profoundly transform the health sector. According to the minister of health, the 
implementation of the aforementioned reforms, such as the control of natural 
resources and the main and strategic means of production, along with extensive 
land reform and income redistribution, would result in the improvement of overall 
living conditions, thus impacting health determinants and the well-being of the 
population. 
The doctrine of the Popular Unity government and its proposal for the 
transformation of the health sector were presented in the first presidential 
message to Congress. In this message, President Allende insisted on the 
necessity of extending public and universal health care to combat important 
                                            
207 The replacement of the economic, social and institutional capitalist foundations of the country 
was the result of decades of struggle by several generations of activists, who were finally able to 
take advantage of suitable historical conditions. Salvador Allende, second Presidential Address, 
May 1972. 
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social and medical problems—a position he had been advocating since the 
1930s. He recalled the important role played by the left-wing political parties and 
himself in the creation of the National Health Service, following the health 
definitions and principles proposed by the World Health Organization. He also 
linked his political principles to the Cuban revolution, arguing that health was a 
dialectical biological and social process, a result of the interaction between 
individuals and the environment, both of which are influenced by the relations of 
production in a given society. These were, as he highlighted, the overall 
determinants that influenced the level of wellness in society, including physical 
and mental health. 
For Allende and his government, health was strictly correlated to the 
economic and social structure and the improvement of individual living conditions 
within society. The close relationship the government saw between health 
determinants and socio-economic development permitted it to situate health 
within the complex relationship between the individual and the environment. As a 
result, improving the health status of the population was related to bringing an 
end to the old capitalist mode of production and building a socialist society. It was 
in this context that Allende expressed his commitment to defend and promote the 
right to full access to health care and preventive and public health services for 
the general population. The government asserted that health was an inalienable 
human right and that its full realization was the state’s responsibility. The 
government declared its full responsibility for encouraging revolutionary changes 
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to challenge traditional policies that were hindering the construction of a more 
equitable, efficient and adequate health system.208 
As previously indicated, the National Health Service was already a key 
form of government intervention in health, and its creation was the culmination of 
a historical process of state legitimation in the health field, in which Allende 
himself had been a key figure. The work of the SNS included the administration 
of physical and human resources in order to implement national programs and to 
evaluate and assess the impact of its services. In addition to environmental 
control programs and the monitoring of infectious diseases, the population had 
access to ongoing services that controlled the spread of communicable diseases, 
ultimately contributing significantly to reducing the morbidity and mortality rates of 
the population. Regardless of the diversity of the successive governments and 
the resistance of a great number of physicians, and despite political, financial, 
technical and managerial limitations, the SNS always sought and encouraged 
active community participation in the implementation of health activities. It is 
interesting to note, for instance, the progress made in preventive medicine by 
means of the implementation of health education programs that promoted 
awareness and facilitated a better understanding of health-related issues and 
prevention strategies.  
According to one of Chile’s most respected physicians, Dr. Alejandro 
Goic,209 the SNS was instrumental in the development of educational programs 
                                            
208 Salvador Allende, third Presidential Address, May 1973.  
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that drew on the expertise of professionals, technicians and specialists. The SNS 
also had a regulatory function, facilitating a more equitable distribution of medical 
resources throughout the country. The mission of the SNS, coupled with the 
organizational principles of decentralization and the training of professionals 
according to humanist and social principles, helped to develop a more all-
inclusive medical approach210 and an appreciation of the value of teamwork.211 
The SNS thus encouraged professionals to engage in superior practice through 
training programs, to focus on specializing, to participate in clinical and 
experimental research and to undertake epidemiological work.212 Most of the 
physicians who worked in public hospitals for a certain number of hours per week 
allocated their remaining time to working in a private practice. Their involvement 
in the public sector was motivated by their social vocation and by the benefits 
their involvement entailed, such as prestige, access to the hospital infrastructure 
for experimental research and the opportunity to share knowledge and 
experience with colleagues.  
Despite all the improvements in the health field, the SNS still had notable 
gaps and weaknesses. It was most criticized for its excessive administrative 
centralization and slow decision-making process. These two basic problems not 
only limited its effectiveness, but also served as a barrier for the establishment of 
                                                                                                                                  
209 Alejandro Goic, “Visión crítica del S.N.S.: 1978”, (1978) 273 Mensaje 626. 
210  Comprehensive medical care meant that all the medical services were provided to a 
population not exceeding 25,000 inhabitants in a care center (clinic) located near their center of 
work, in order to facilitate the accessibility, planning and organization of the services. 
211 A health team was a group of professionals, technicians and volunteers who worked in groups 
to accomplish common goals and objectives. 
212 In this regard, the Education Unit and the SNS Care played a key role. 
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regional or local authorities and complicated the rational and prompt 
redeployment of resources. Another criticism often levied against the SNS was 
related to its enormous magnitude, which allowed it to control nearly all the 
hospitals, nursing homes and urban and rural clinics in the country. Critics held 
that its size, coupled with its oversized staff, transformed the SNS into a giant 
with a heavy and complex administrative system. Moreover, the rigid funding 
structure (due to the elaborate bureaucracy) and the reduction in the funding of 
services also affected staff salaries, which were generally below that of other 
public-sector employees. Finally, the most radical criticism of the SNS came from 
defenders of private medical practice and targeted the very concept of socialized 
medicine.   
In the public system, patients had to accept the hospital, the medical 
professionals and the available and accessible resources without almost any 
choice.  This situation was not acceptable to many physicians, who called 
instead for the right to “free choice”. This prerogative was continuously requested 
by the Medical College, despite its strong interest in facilitating medical careers 
within the SNS that simultaneously preserved the possibility to engage in private 
medical practice. The victory of the Popular Unity coalition in the 1970 
presidential election even further radicalized these different health care models. 
Without suppressing the activities of the private sector, the government 
took action to allocate the majority of public sector expenditures through a 
redistribution of taxation and a reorganization of social security. The health policy 
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was aimed at implementing three major reforms: a) the development of greater 
and improved capacity for the provision of health and medical services; b) the 
expansion of democratization and popular participation in the implementation of 
health actions and activities and c) the establishment of a Unified National Health 
Service with greater centralized capacity and the inclusion of the SERMENA.  
The new paradigm for implementing these policies entailed a 
transformation of the organizational structure by centralizing the decision-making 
process and decentralizing the level of execution. Improving access to medical 
services was part of the government’s Six-Year Health Plan (1970-1976), in line 
with its Six-Year Economic and Social Development Plan. The Health Plan 
emphasized the need for planned structural changes. This was reinforced with 
the establishment of an ad hoc Ministry of Health office within the SNS and the 
transformation of the CNCS into the Council for the Development of the Health 
Sector.213  
The Health Plan identified the resources and funds allocated annually to 
the SNS and redirected them as needed to meet the new demand for services. It 
was believed that the demand for services would increase, not only because of 
the new awareness, educational programs and enhanced popular participation 
process, implemented to promote the right to health, but also because of the 
incorporation of marginal and economically weak social sectors into the system 
and the income redistribution called for in the Six-Year Development Plan.  
                                            
213 Consejo de Desarrollo del Sector Salud. 
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The Six-Year Health Plan included the following objectives: a) to meet the 
quantitative and qualitative health needs of the population; b) to increase the 
number and accessibility of services; c) to enhance the effectiveness of 
resources and funds and d) to improve the quality of medical services in order to 
optimize health indicators.214 Another aspect of the Six-Year Health plan was the 
development of local health centres and satellite clinics tasked with administering 
outpatient services 215  and attracting specialists, community volunteers and 
medical students. A local “health team”, which constituted an excellent 
opportunity for medical students to gain experience, offered services 7 days a 
week, 24 hours a day. Health teams shared their expertise with their 
communities and also participated in community training and education, 
especially with respect to the prevention and control of disease. This program 
permitted newly qualified students to practice and assist those in greater need in 
remote areas. Overall, the program helped to provide medical services to two 
million people and reduced the long wait times and denials of medical assistance 
by the SNS.216 Despite its shortcomings, the SNS had come to embody the 
principle of social responsibility in the health field, moving towards offering 
                                            
214 Oficina de Planeamiento SNS, “Plan Sexenal de Salud: modelo de programación vigente para 
1973” in Ortiz “El sector salud y sus recursos financieros: análisis de la década”, supra note 173. 
215 These new out-patient services were primarily performed in large urban areas such as 
Santiago, the capital, and the southern city of Concepcion. Greater Santiago, for example, had 83 
health centers, located primarily in the poorest sectors. In addition, the country already had 
special programs for the provision of rural health care services, and despite the large and 
historical concentration of resources in big cities, an internship program for general practitioners 
was created. 
216 J. Kandell, ”Chile’s poor get more medical aid”, (March 31, 1973) New York Times. 
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comprehensive and socialized medicine, which was noteworthy in a developing 
country like Chile.  
In general, and despite its inefficiency, lack of resources, and financial and 
organizational shortcomings, the political establishment and the general 
population never questioned the state’s involvement in the health sector. The 
extensive coverage of the SNS throughout its large network of hospitals, urban 
clinics, rural clinics and dispensaries permitted the extension of health care and 
health-protection services to 100% of the population, covering 90% of all 
hospitalizations and 60% of all ambulatory services. No more than 10% of the 
population was covered by the private sector. Indeed, this responsibility of the 
public sector and the growing importance of state intervention in the health sector 
was also part of the overall trend towards an increased role for the state in 
ensuring the country’s socio-economic development.  
The evolution of the Chilean economy reflected the increasing amount of 
state intervention in all economic areas, which started as early as 1939, when the 
state became the economic engine of the development process. As previously 
discussed, this permitted the creation of large public companies, not only in 
unprofitable areas of the private sector, but also in critical economic areas of the 
industrial sector that were devoted to the production of intermediary products like 
pulp, petrochemicals, metal products and rubber. The state also played a 
significant role in investing in public works, providing a boost to the overall 
economic process and expanding the availability of social services. 
 139 
The new organization of health services as presented in the Allende 
administration’s Health Plan was informed by a belief in democratization as the 
main instrument necessary for transforming the structure of the SNS. This was 
considered to be a fundamental reform “that would allow citizens to participate in 
the implementation of the program’s objectives, as their participation would 
ensure the appropriate use of resources to satisfy their health care needs.”217 
Politically, the Popular Unity health reform sought to democratize services 
in a broader sense than that entailed in the concept of decentralization 
advocated by physicians. Full participation and responsibility were expected from 
all staff and citizens in evaluating the role of management and monitoring the 
performance of each of the services, as well as in critically evaluating the steps 
taken to meet policy objectives. To enable this democratization process and 
secure the participation of health workers and the user population in the decision-
making process and power structure, the government promulgated Decree 602 
on September 21, 1971.218  This decree created local and multi-stakeholder 
health councils. It also modified the structure of existing health councils and 
                                            
217 Salvador Allende, first Presidential Address, May 1971. 
218 Decree-Law 602 (1971). Created the Local Health Council and Council of Local Health 
Areas.  The Decree created Local Health Councils in every National Health Service institution, 
formed the Council of Local Health Areas, modified the structure and remedied the deficiencies of 
the community councils that had been created during the previous administration. A designated 
person from the Local Health Council was to investigate the problems affecting the health of the 
community. He was expected to offer prompt and effective solutions, and promote the interest of 
the population in actively participating in the solutions to their detected problems.  He assisted in 
the dissemination of health plans, and presented the anomalies that emerged during the 
execution of those actions. In addition, each health facility had a joint (employer and employee) 
council directly responsible for carrying out the duties and powers assigned to the Local Health 
Boards. Members of the Local Health Councils and Joint Boards had to be appointed 
democratically by constituencies.  
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remedied the deficiencies of the community councils that had been created 
during the previous administration, though the health councils started to enjoy 
much greater decision-making capacity than the community councils.219 Between 
September 1971 and December 1972, 269 local councils and another 207 multi-
stakeholder health councils were created across the country. Approximately a 
third of these units belonged to the province of Santiago, where the population 
already enjoyed better health conditions than the national average.  
These health councils constituted additional political forces as the 
administration dealt with physicians’ strikes, which had sabotaged medical 
services, and they allowed a reasonable level of service to be maintained in the 
face of the civil disobedience movement and ongoing opposition to government 
policies. They were also instrumental in redesigning the nature of curative 
services by establishing a direct link between patients and medical personnel. 
The intention was to coordinate joint action and initiatives by the popular health 
                                            
219 Under the law (Article 1), in every SNS establishment in which one or more health actions 
were performed, it was mandatory to have a Local Board of Health, regardless of the number of 
territorial districts. The Councils were mandated (Article 2) to examine the health problems 
affecting the community; achieve solutions through prompt and effective action; promote the 
interest of the citizens to participate actively in the solution of health problems and concerns; 
assist in the dissemination of health actions; and represent the anomalies that appeared in the 
execution of those actions. Furthermore, according to Article 4 of the Decree, the Local Board of 
Health had the following functions:  
 
1) Propose effective and ongoing coordination between the local health authority, the health 
workers and the public;  
2) To be aware of health problems through the information provided by the Director of the Health 
care unit and members of the Council, and propose corrective measures to ensure the 
accomplishments of the proposed programs;  
3) To encourage the active participation of the community in collecting basic information, 
detecting problems and needs, and assisting in the prioritization and implementation of the health 
programs through volunteer work; and  
4) To promote the integration between the local health authorities, the health workers and the 
population in the evaluation process of the programs. 
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councils and the local and multi-party health councils, bringing together 
representatives of trade unions, neighbourhood organizations, youth 
organizations, sports clubs and women’s organizations.220  
During this time, many health actors were actively involved in political 
struggle. Medical students, for instance, expressed their commitment to labour 
organizations as well as their willingness to work exclusively in the public sector. 
They also supported reforms to create a Unified National Health Service, in 
which physicians would share with each other and with other actors the mission 
of delivering public and popular medical services. 
Along with its democratization policies, the government introduced 
regulations to reduce the bureaucracy of the SNS. This restored political and 
administrative power to the local level to allow for better planning in line with the 
social needs of each community or region. Without a doubt, the democratization 
process seemed promising. This was palpable, for instance, in the successful 
organization of the Health Brigades, which were supported by the Social 
Development Council and composed of volunteers. In the region of Santiago 
alone, these Brigades had 2,800 “health volunteers”. The Brigades’ actions 
reached different neighbourhoods in an attempt to identify citizens with health 
risk factors. These moves to promote the participation of the general public were 
recommended and adopted by participating states during the Third Special 
                                            
220 Gustavo Molina  “El gobierno de Allende y los médicos”, (1970) 11 Vida Médica 13.  
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Meeting of Ministers of Health of the Americas.221 At this meeting, the region’s 
physicians expressed their scepticism about the efficacy of purely technocratic 
planning measures due to structural inefficiencies at the national level. They also 
demanded that the concept and function of public health once again be 
rethought.222  
Despite its promise, the program’s countless efforts to encourage 
democratization ultimately achieved more modest results than expected, 
especially at the management level. A study of the democratization process223 
demonstrated that in the local health boards in the Santiago area, community 
participation was essentially limited to women, particularly through the centres for 
mothers. The limited participation of the broader public resulted in a lack of 
qualitative change in the nature and kind of medical services offered. It provoked 
instead the criticism of users demanding increased services, better coverage and 
greater accessibility, while the public did not question the dominant paradigm or 
the administration of medical services.  As a consequence, there was a lack of 
innovation at the conceptual or paradigmatic level, and no new discoveries were 
made regarding how to deliver health care services in the future. We can 
hypothesize that the lack of qualitative changes was due to the lack of creativity 
                                            
221 A. Pérez Miravete, “Papel de la OPS y la OMS en relación con las políticas nacionales de 
investigación”, (1981) 15 Educ. Med. Salud 1 8.20. 
http://hist.library.paho.org/Spanish/EMS/5740.pdf 
222 B. Breuer & D. Schwefel, Organización de servicios descentralizados de sanidad pública en 
América Latina, (Berlín, Centro de Seminarios de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Fundación 
Alemana para el Desarrollo Internacional, 1973) at 56. 
223 Sepúlveda, Celis & Neuhauser, “Estudio del proceso de democratización en unidadyes de 
salud del SNS”, in Livingstone & Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y bienestar social, supra note 14 
at 25. 
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and autonomy in the public participation process. It appeared that planners, 
administrators and politicians drove public participation from the outside, with 
goals that were not always equally shared.224   
Despite the shortcomings and limitations of the popular participation 
program, though, it made visible the relationship between health issues and 
social determinants such as housing, drinking water, hygiene, sanitation and 
nutrition. Furthermore, some programs improved health conditions, such as 
those implemented to combat childhood diarrhea, improve nutrition (a campaign 
provided children with a half-litre of milk per day), fight alcoholism and intensify 
preventive health measures. At the same time, the greater financial, human and 
material resources devoted to the health care system permitted an increase in 
staffing and in the number of contracted doctor-hours. This directly benefitted 
mothers and children, but at the same time prioritized hospital care over 
ambulatory services. In the end, just as with the previous Frei administration, the 
geographical redistribution of human resources was insufficient, despite all the 
decentralization efforts.225 
The third major reform in the Popular Unity administration’s health policy 
was the establishment of a Unified National Health Service (SUS).226   The 
purpose of the unified service was to ensure the “right to health” for all citizens, 
and this meant that the SUS had to be more comprehensive, with the capacity to 
                                            
224 Breuer & Schwefel, Organización de servicios descentralizados, supra note 222 at 60. 
225 Emanuel De Kadt, “Políticas y programas de salud en Chile: 1964-1973”, in Livingstone & 
Raczynski (eds.), Salud pública y bienestar social, supra note 14 at 150. 
226 Servicio Único de Salud, (SUS). 
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provide “efficient, timely, equitable, ongoing, adequate and free” medical care. In 
addition, as previously indicated, the SUS aimed to integrate all health 
institutions, including the public services created by the SNS under the umbrella 
of the employees’ medical system (SERMENA), which was primarily accessible 
to the middle class.227 This proposed change was not insignificant, since it was 
clearly perceived as an end to the two-tiered system, with a free-choice system 
for employees (the middle class) and the public system for blue-collar workers 
and peasants. The free-choice system covered about 25% of the population, paid 
for with patients’ pre-payments and supplemented with subsidies from both the 
private system (30%) and the SERMENA public system (70%). 
According to the minister of health, the cornerstone of the health policy 
was a significant change in the structure and organization of the sector.  With the 
creation and the development of a Unified National Health Service, the country 
was seeing historic measures being taken in the health field. In this context, 
health sector planning took on an entirely new meaning, streamlining decision-
making processes and improving and rationalizing the use of resources.228 The 
government attempted to coordinate health activities and maintain positive 
relations with various universities, professional associations and other 
organizations as a result of its belief that these institutions were essential 
partners. Similarly, the administration relied on the active participation of health 
                                            
227 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 214. 
228 Health Minister interview,(July 30, 1971) La Prensa, in Morales, “Sistema político, planificación 
y políticas públicas”, supra note 140. 
 145 
volunteers, whose associations functioned much like unions and community 
organizations, willing to contribute mainly in the most remote and marginalized 
areas of the country.  
The obstacles were not insignificant, as the overall objectives were 
extremely challenging, aiming not only to improve the quantity and quality of 
services, but to enhance the degree of humanization in the services offered and 
to promote decentralization, democratization and popular participation. For 
Allende, this was a revolutionary process that required health workers to be 
united in their “cohesion, fervour, charisma and sacrifice in the performance of 
their duties”.229 He insisted that the revolution had to start with the very people 
who participated in the process. 
In October 1972, after the country came to a standstill due to mass 
protests against the Allende administration, the government was finally able to 
progress further in terms of its administrative reforms, as all negotiations with the 
opposition to change legislation had become impossible. The government 
amended the Curative Medicine Law, establishing a partnership between the 
SNS and the SERMENA and abolishing the process of direct payment from 
patient to doctor. This lowered the final cost of health care services and granted 
employees access to the SNS, providing coverage to at least two and a half 
million employees. The differences between government authorities and the 
Medical College on the establishment of the SUS, along with widespread political 
                                            
229 Salvador Allende, third Presidential Address, May 1973.  
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opposition to the government, made it exceedingly difficult to implement legal 
changes to reform the health sector. The SNS-SERMENA agreement was thus 
presented as an administrative measure intended to prevent a complete 
paralysis of the reform process.  
The Medical College took great offense to this administrative act and 
reacted vigorously to oppose the measure, as it modified the principle of free 
choice. The new procedure replaced the “bonus cheque” pre-payment that had 
been administered by the Medical College with a referral that directly linked the 
patient to public SNS services. According to the government, this measure 
allowed the public sector to secure increased funding, improve health care and 
more rationally redistribute financial, material and human resources. As a result, 
the monetary value of each medical service was also reduced, and the 
SERMENA had to pay the SNS for the use of its infrastructure and resources.  
As we have seen, this measure sought to increase the capacity of the 
public sector and improve the quality of care while also limiting to some extent 
the private practice of medicine. These two goals were intended to reduce 
inequalities in the distribution of health care services. The limitations on the 
private practice of medicine were strongly criticized by the Medical College. 
Physicians were also irritated by other measures, such as calling upon doctors 
for eight-hour shifts and the extension of working hours to 9:00 p.m.,230 and they 
                                            
230 Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 214. 
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were displeased with the unprecedented open and participatory interaction 
encouraged between health workers and the community.  
Between November 1970 and October 1972, the tension between 
physicians and the government intensified considerably.  It is astonishing to 
observe that within less than two years, the Medical College went from honouring 
President Allende “for his extensive and brilliant performance in public life, 
especially in the field of social medicine, and the merit of being the first physician 
elected as president of the Republic,”231  to serving as a strong and active 
opponent in 1972 as a leader of the professionals against the government.  
Even so, during that time the Allende government had been able to transform the 
health system into a more equitable, efficient and unified organization through 
negotiation and consensus building. Many of the problems in the SNS were 
caused by more liberal visions and approaches within the medical sector, 
opposed to the socialist views of the Allende government. The government 
exaggerated its revolutionary discourse and, overall, the almost irreconcilable 
ideological viewpoints deepened the crisis and accentuated the fear felt by health 
professionals. Physicians favouring a more open or a more blended private-
public health care system refused to accept the changes toward a model of 
socialized medicine, which they feared would alter their status by positioning 
them as state medical employees. In October 1972, the Medical College took 
over the leadership of all professional associations, joining the opposition 
                                            
231 Vida Médica 3 (1970) in Parada, Id. at 218. 
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movement to promote the paralysis of the country and signing its so-called “Chile 
petition”.232 Finally, in August and September 1973, the College called for the 
indefinite suspension of medical activities and demanded the resignation of 
President Allende.  Among the government’s supporters, the most radical sector 
called for a deepening of the political, economic and social changes underway. 
The parties that formed part of the coalition began to clash, which limited the 
president’s capacity to govern. 
However, the situation was even more complex, as beginning in October 
1972, some government political parties and their supporting social movements 
called for the creation and implementation of a “people’s power” movement 
composed of non-traditional territorial organizations, aimed at defending the 
government and facilitating unified actions between the Popular Unity coalition 
parties and the popular movement.233 This movement, with its radical political 
discourse, clashed with the cultural universe of the middle class and its 
attachment to order and security. The People’s Power movement was politically 
criticized and rejected on the basis of its extremity and provocative ideas and 
found almost no support from the parties in the government. The Chilean road to 
socialism clashed with the middle class, whose ideology was based on the 
naturalization of social inequalities and a rejection of unrest, instability and 
turmoil.  
                                            
232 Pliego de Chile. 
233 Poder Popular. 
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The health sector was witnessing the same political turmoil as the country 
at large, with a growing inability of the political class to negotiate and 
accommodate the interests of several actors and stakeholders in order to reach a 
consensus on the urgent reforms the country needed. The country was thus 
faced with the limitations of its economic model, the inability to implement 
equitable and redistributive policies within its economic paradigm and a social 
crisis with profound structural, social, and political contradictions. At the same 
time, stiff resistance from employers exacerbated the decline in industrial 
production and fuelled the shortage of consumption goods, creating critical food 
shortages and increasing the opposition’s antagonism with respect to the Popular 
Unity government. Accusations that the government was engaging in illegal and 
incompetent behaviour gained favour in the public opinion, while authorities 
interpreted these signs as merely technical problems that would be overcome 
and resolved through the revolutionary process. It is particularly interesting to 
note how even though the changes were carried out within the same 
constitutional order inherited from previous governments (the 1925 constitution), 
the Allende government was accused of circumventing the legal system.  
Another element of the crisis was the growth of the opposition movement, 
including several business organizations in the areas of trade, transportation and 
construction. This also created a new political context and new political dynamics 
for the opposition movement. The increasingly hard line of the opposition is 
exemplified by the refusal of the president of the Senate and of the House of 
 150 
Representatives234 to even speak to President Allende. The physicians’ support 
for the “Chile petition” made it close to impossible for them to negotiate with the 
government, as their endorsement implied a belief in the illegitimacy of the 
government, as the opposition charged. The government, however, relied on the 
apparent support of the Armed Forces and the revitalization of its own political 
parties, which had gained popular support and saw electoral growth in the 
previous municipal elections. It agreed to resume dialogue with the unions, but 
with each union separately, and only after they put an end to the strike. The 
government’s legal, constitutional and political systems were still able to regulate 
conflicts and reduce tensions while awaiting the outcome of the parliamentary 
elections scheduled for March 1973. The results of these elections were not 
unlike those of 1970 and 1971, and opposition parties won a parliamentary 
majority 235  to impeach the president and to compel the Popular Unity to 
negotiate. 
Between March and September 1973, a series of events took place that 
once again modified the political scene, deepening the political crisis. Important 
legal changes introduced by the government included the implementation of: a) 
the Unified National School (ENU);236 b) the Social Property Area (industries that 
were transformed into public properties through government intervention, 
                                            
234 Cámara de Diputados. 
235 Chile has a presidential system were governments can still govern and stay in power until the 
next scheduled presidential elections and are not forced to resign even if they don’t have the 
support of the Parliament or the Senate, as is the case in a parliamentary system. 
236 Escuela Nacional Unificada. 
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nationalization or expropriation); and c) new forms of popular organization. These 
three changes generated even more resistance from the opposition to the 
Allende administration. In June 1973 there was an attempted military coup that 
was considered a trial run for future intervention. This crisis and the country’s 
intense emotional climate allowed opposition forces to escalate their threat of a 
military solution to the crisis. The collapse of the democratic process and the fall 
of the elected government became the only way for the opposition to re-establish 
its hegemony over the political and economic process.  
Due in part to the bitter struggle waged by the opposition and the 
intensification of terrorist actions against the government, the legitimacy of the 
military hierarchy and the democratic process itself continued to erode. However, 
neither the violence nor the failure of talks between the Popular Unity 
government and the Christian Democrats frustrated Allende’s efforts to 
reconstitute his cabinet, surprisingly incorporating the Armed Forces as well. But 
a new general strike against the government, led by the professional 
associations, was supported with military discourses invoking the need for an 
authoritarian government with a strong and impersonal character. The message 
to the Armed Forces was clear: control all political instability and overthrow the 
government. The discourse of the oppositional political elite reflected the 
conservative ideology that the Armed Forces constituted “the moral reserve of 
the Nation”.  
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As a consequence of this turbulence and instability, on August 22, 1973, 
Parliament declared that the elected government was illegal, setting the stage for 
the military coup237, of September 11, 1973 (euphemistically called a “military 
intervention”) that brought a brutal end to the government elected in 1970. The 
new military dictatorship radically altered the economic, social and political 
processes underway in the country. These changes had a profound impact on 
health policy, as the new regime imposed a new liberal market approach to 
health care, bringing drastic changes to the social welfare system that Chile had 
known since the beginning of the century. 
                                            
237 On 11 September 1973, the combined Chilean Armed Forces (the Army, Navy, Air Force and 
the Carabineros (Police) overthrew the democratically elected Allende's government in a coup. 
Augusto Pinochet, a highly ranked Chilean general became the commander in chief of the army, 
later the chief of the Military Junta and finally the self-nominated President of the Republic, with 
the support of the other military branches. The military junta held the executive role until 17 
December 1974, after which it remained strictly as a legislative body, when the executive powers 
were transferred to Pinochet.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores and analyzes health legislation during the 
development of the neoliberal market approach implemented after the 1973 coup 
d’état in Chile. The beginning of the military regime marked the beginning of a 
legal and institutional crisis characteristic of a country in a dictatorship. In 1974, 
Decree-Law 788 was enacted, specifying that constitutional, legislative and 
executive powers would be exercised via supreme decrees issued by the Military 
Junta. In addition to concentrating legislative and executive powers in a single 
body, constitutional power, which in democracy lies with the citizens, was 
“legally” eliminated. This decree declared that when supreme decrees were 
contrary to the existing constitution, the constitution was thereby modified,1 
violating the basic principles of law and granting the Military Junta a constitutional 
authority that nobody had ever conferred it. This “legalization” of the dictatorship 
illustrates the rationality of the legal and institutional procedures that made 
possible the military regime’s transformations of economic, political and social 
sectors. 
The end of the republican regime and democratic rule had come to be 
seen as the only viable way for the hegemonic bloc to restore the balance of 
power and create the economic conditions to bring health and welfare into a 
business model. The economic and social reforms of the socialist Allende 
government, elected in 1970, were considered to be interfering with the historical 
                                            
1 Decree-Law (DFL) 788 (1974): “a - f” & art. 1,2 7 3.  Regulates the exercise of constitutional 
power.  
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reproduction of the capitalist model of development and economic growth. A true 
neoliberal economic revolution was in the making, which, given the long-standing 
and broad societal consensus on maintaining the welfare state, could only be 
carried out by dictatorial rule.  
The state was thus transformed, focusing its action on ensuring the free 
exercise of market activities, becoming a product of the market. The liberal state 
was said to have overstepped its original theoretical and legal frameworks, as it 
intervened arbitrarily in the economy, breaking the rules of economic freedom.2 
The idea was to revive or adapt the liberal economic theses of economists like 
Rustow, Misses and Hayek and modify them to suit the final decades of the 20th 
century. In Chile, this materialized in the decisive influence of the “Chicago boys” 
based in the University of Chicago, and particularly that of Milton Friedman and 
Harold Harberger. 
The neoliberal Chicago School was opposed to governmental intervention, 
rejecting market regulations and Keynesianism and adopting monetarism, except 
for interventions to save the market and the banks (like in the Chilean financial 
crisis in the 1980s,3  which put the new economic model in jeopardy). The 
influence of this neoliberal school within the Chilean government and the 
particular role played by the “Chicago boys”, as well as the policies of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were decisive in bringing about 
                                            
2 Pablo Dávalos, ”Neoliberalismo político y Estado social de derecho”, 
http://www.puce.edu.ec.documentos/NeoliberalismoyEstadosocialdederecho.pdf at 5 
3 The crisis in Chile that began in 1981 and lasted until 1986 saw inflation rise to almost 30% and 
caused a currency devaluation of 40%, which created a serious debt problem, exacerbated by a 
significant drop in the price of copper, the principal source of foreign exchange.  
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this shift in the economic model. The new model imposed a new logic, and social 
consciousness around health issues became defused, making health concerns 
an individual problem and stimulating the atomization of society and the 
promotion of health care as business. 
On August 26, 1976, the US magazine The Nation published a long article 
by Orlando Letelier, Allende’s minister of defence and then ambassador to the 
United States, in which he presented his theory that the application of the new 
neoliberal model is only possible under a dictatorship: “The economic plan now 
being carried out in Chile realizes an historic aspiration of a group of Chilean 
economists, most of them trained at Chicago University by Milton Friedman and 
Arnold Harberger. Deeply involved in the preparation of the coup, the Chicago 
boys, as they are known in Chile, convinced the generals that they were 
prepared to supplement the brutality, which the military possessed, with the 
intellectual assets it lacked” 4 & 5. One month later, Letelier and his American 
secretary were assassinated in Washington by the Chilean secret police (DINA) 
when their car was blown up.6   
To sum up, the process of lawmaking in the absence of democratic 
institutions resulted in the forceful rupture of the welfare state, which would not 
                                            
4 Orlando Letelier, "The Chicago Boys in Chile: Economic Freedom's Awful Toll," The Nation, 
August 28, 1976.   
5 The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has disclosed that CIA collaborators helped 
plan the economic measures that Chile's junta enacted immediately after seizing power (“A 
Draconian Cure for Chile's Economic Ills”, Business Week, January 12). Id. 
6 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/globalfocus/pinochet112598.htm. After the return 
of democracy, in 1989, the chief of the secret police was sentenced to life in prison for this and 
several other crimes. 
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have been possible under other circumstances. This is why it is important and 
essential to analyze the context in which it was possible to “legislate”, by force, 
the profound transformation of the health system, enacting legislation that did not 
have to go through the legal and institutional process. 
This chapter analyzes the principles, doctrine, legislation and regulations 
that permitted and promoted the establishment of a market model for health care. 
The doctrinaire principles behind the model were that health care was a service 
to be acquired individually and that people had a personal responsibility in this 
process. This approach went in exactly the opposite direction from the public, 
solidarity-based system that Chile had been building for decades. The health 
system could not remain invulnerable to changes in its broader political 
landscape.  Health policies were adapted to the new political and economic 
reality and formed a part of this new process of economic liberalization. The 
development of the new health model and its policies had a clear and coherent 
rationality, based on a) the partial withdrawal of the state from the health sector; 
b) the creation of a market for private health care; and c) the growth of the 
structure and autonomy of the private health sector.   
To meet the objectives of restructuring the public sector and developing 
the private sector, the regime restructured public services to play a subsidiary 
role. This meant that only those activities that could not be exercised by the 
private sector or those in which the action of the state was justified as a 
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“substitute” for the private sector should be left in the hands of the public sector.7 
Economic freedom was seen as a guarantee of “real freedom”, while the military 
regime was simultaneously promoting a non-liberal but authoritarian state that 
suppressed political freedom. Liberalizing the market and giving the state a 
subsidiary role in socio-economic affairs and an authoritarian role in the political 
sphere modified the traditional role of the Chilean state. State involvement 
increased significantly in the political sphere in domestic affairs, defense, culture, 
communication, education and social organization, but was limited in the 
economic and social spheres.  
With respect to creating a market for the private sector in health care, 
legislation was introduced to privatize curative services and develop mechanisms 
for the population to allocate a portion of their wages to private health insurance. 
This increased the amount of circulating capital that could be capitalized by the 
private sector in the business of curative health. Finally, with respect to the 
growth of the structure and autonomy of the private health sector, legal 
provisions allowed the restructuring of public curative services by municipalizing 
and decentralizing them and transferring them to private corporations.  The 
legislation also privatized complementary services in public institutions and 
incentives for private clinics. 
 
 
                                            
7 Ministry of Health, Political Economy, financing Health, (Chile, 1979) at 8. 
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1. THE PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL CHANGES FOR A MARKET  
    MODEL OF HEALTH CARE  
 
There are eleven legal and theoretical documents produced by the military 
regime that can serve as a reference for an understanding and analysis of the 
principles, doctrine and reforms brought forward in the field of health between 
1973 and 1989. The first four documents outline the general ideological 
framework and political principles that influenced the different spheres of life after 
1973.  
They are: 
- “Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile” (March 1974)8 
- “National Objective of the Government of Chile” (December 1975)9 
- “The Constitutional Acts” (September 1976)10 
- “Constitution of Chile” (March 1981)11 
 
The other seven documents guided development strategies as well as health 
policy and regulations: 
- “Presidential Guidelines for the Ministry of Health” (December 1972)12 
- “Directive from the President of the Republic to the Minister of Health” 
(November 1975)13 
                                            
8 “Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile” (March 1974). 
9 “Objetivo Nacional del Gobierno de Chile” (December 1975). 
10  “Actas Constitucionales” (September 1976) / In particular: Decree-Law 1,319 
Constitutional Act No. 1 created the state Council as the supreme advisory body to the 
President on matters of Government and Civil Administration. It was composed of former 
Presidents of the Republic, in its own right, and by other individuals, appointed by the President. 
Decree-Law 1,551, Constitutional Act No. 2 expressed the essentials of Chilean Institutions. It 
affirmed that the Chilean state was a unitary entity, and that the country was divided into regions 
with a decentralized territorial administrative apparatus.  
11 Constitución de Chile (March 1981). 
12 Orientación Presidencial para el Ministerio de la Salud (December 1972). 
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- “Complementary Orientations from the President of the Republic to the 
Minister of Health” (December 1976 and July 1979) 
- “Decree-Law 1,552 Constitutional Act No. 3 (September 1976)14 
- “Health Policy” (January 1977)15 
- “Health Restructuring” (February 1979)16 
- “Political Economy and Financing of Health” (October, 1979)17 
 
The official discourses articulated by those with authority to implement 
health policies during the military regime recognized the definition of “health” put 
forward by the World Health Organization, which stated that, “Health is a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.”18 At the same time, the conceptual consideration on which 
                                                                                                                                  
13 Directiva del Presidente de la República al Ministro de la Salud (November 1975). 
14 This Constitutional Act guaranteed all people a long series of rights. The most relevant rights 
pertaining to the health of people were: 
 
• The Right to Life and personal integrity. 
• Equality before the Law. 
• The Right to personal freedom and individual security. 
• The Law respected and protected the privacy and honor of the individual, and his family. 
It guaranteed the inviolability of domestic and private communication.  
• The Right to Education.  Parents have the primary right to educate their children, and the 
ability to choose the educational establishment. Basic education was compulsory. 
• The Right to Live in an environment free of contamination. 
• The Right to Health was guaranteed. The state assumed responsibility for ensuring free 
and equal access to promotion, protection, and restoration of health and rehabilitation of 
the individual. 
• The freedom to work was protected by this Act. 
• The Right to Social Security was ensured so that the state could formulate national policy 
on Social Security, control the system’s operation and ensure the preferential right of 
members to make their choices. 
15 “The President of the Republic’s additional guidelines to the Health Minister” (December 1976 
and July 1979). 
16 “Health Restructuring” (February 1979). 
17 “Political Economy and Financing of Health” (October 1979). 
18 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International 
Health Conference (New York, 19-22 June 1946); signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives 
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the regime based its health policy was that illness was not the result of the action 
of a specific agent, but rather the convergence of innumerable elements in a 
complex ecological context. The military government thus proposed quite a 
global and interdisciplinary conception of health, which made it possible to 
imagine a progressive and modern vision for further reforms. 
The fundamental principles that were to govern its health policy were, in 
summary, the following: 
• Health is defined as the overall physical and psychological state of welfare 
of the people and of society, and not merely as the simple absence of 
illness. 
 
• Health as such is a value that human beings require for their own personal 
fulfillment, and it is both an element of and a means for societal 
development.  
 
• Health is a national heritage and, consequently, an irrefutable 
responsibility of the state. 
 
• Health is a human right as established in the political constitution. 
 
• The right to health is acquired from the moment of conception and must 
be guaranteed throughout life, independently of social status, age, religion 
or sex. 
  
• The right to health is exercised through free and egalitarian access to the 
services provided to this effect. 
 
• Health acts are defined as the activities of promotion, protection, healing 
and rehabilitation, which must be integrated, coordinated and provided in 
a timely, continuous, effective and manner. 
 
• All citizens must contribute financially to the system based on income. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
of 61 states and entered into force on 7 April 1948 (2 Official Records of the World Health 
Organization 100). 
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• Public, private and mixed sectors take part in health activities in a 
coordinated fashion. 
 
• The people must be free to choose which sector will provide them with the 
medical care they need. 
 
Health objectives focused on four elements: a) accessibility to services; b) 
social security; c) restructuring of the public sector and d) new incentives for the 
private sector. With respect to access to services, official governmental 
declarations underlined the need to extend the coverage of public services, with 
the aim of guaranteeing free and equal access to health services with a better 
and more efficient organization of resources. As for social security, the plan was 
to separate health services from social security benefits in such a way that would 
determine the type of curative services needed. Such services depended solely 
on the principle of necessity. It was only after this was guaranteed that the 
financial capacity to pay for health care was to be considered.19 Nevertheless, as 
we shall see below, it was not demonstrated in practice that the changes 
imposed by the military government privileged the needs of the people over their 
capacity to pay. A document issued by the Ministry of Health on health care 
funding declared “that the state assumed a subsidiary role, executing health acts 
through specialized institutions only when the person had no access, through any 
other means, to public, private or mixed health.20  
                                            
19Alejandro Medina-Lois, “Estrategias de Salud en Chile hasta el año 2000”, (1980) 18 Seguridad 
Nacional at 53. 
20 Ministry of Health, Political Economy, financing Health, supra note 7 at 7. 
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With respect to health policy, confining the state to a subsidiary role meant 
contradicting the regime’s own statement about the fundamental role of the state 
in ensuring the health of the whole population and not only in a subsidiary 
fashion, while it also failed to guarantee free and equal access to medical and 
health care services. In parallel with this restructuring, the regime gave the state 
a role that could be qualified as “negative intervention” (no intervention). In other 
words, it meant to limit its own capacity and jurisdiction as well as to stimulate the 
private sector. Thus, although the military regime’s declaration of principles and 
its health doctrine reflected a wide-ranging and commendable vision of what 
health policy should be, in practice it became clear that the implementation of 
reforms contradicted those same principles they were supposed to sustain.  
In response to constant criticism and accusations that the military regime 
was compromising basic and fundamental health principles, the government and 
supporters of the market model of health care fiercely denied that the policy was 
to privatize health care. Authorities argued instead that the purpose was to 
guarantee freedom of access to curative services and to promote efficiency. It 
was obviously difficult to understand this contradictory discourse, which masked 
the hidden agenda that was progressively transforming the health sector, 
reducing the role of the state and promoting a neoliberal conception of health 
more related to the principles of freedom of choice than to those of satisfying the 
needs of individuals. In effect, the regime considered that “access to medical acts 
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had to be the result of a free decision on the part of the person, freedom that 
included choosing where and by whom the service was to be provided.”21 
Within the broader context of the political and economic changes 
introduced by the military regime, the health care system clearly could not remain 
unaffected. It was necessary to adapt the health sector to the new conditions to 
include it in this process of capitalist liberalization. To achieve this integration, the 
regime moved to expand the market, stimulate the operational capacity of the 
private sector, dictate decrees and laws and legislate in favour of a rapid 
privatization process and the diminishing of the public sector, as will be 
discussed in the next sections of this chapter. These changes occurred in 
different phases. The last of these phases, as we shall see, was characterized by 
the resolution of conflicts of interest and different approaches within the regime, 
the neutralization of lobby groups and, finally, the fulfillment of several final 
prerequisites for the implementation of health reforms.  
We must look to the history of Chilean society and its profound inequalities 
to understand why the majority of the population was unable to exercise this 
“freedom option”. The government initially believed that the real freedom of 
individuals would be guaranteed by the subsidiary role of the state, as individual 
and personal relations with curative services would be strengthened. To privatize 
social security and to alter the responsibility of the state in the services sector 
meant to transform “social concern” into an “individual concern”. This change 
                                            
21 Sergio Molina, “La nueva política económica”, (1974) 266 Mensaje at 7. 
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was also politically interesting given the traditional strength of the health sector 
as a force of organization and popular cohesion.  
It is, in effect, with respect to health issues that people may develop a 
“social consciousness” about the problems that afflict individuals. This 
consciousness allows them to share similar claims and channel forms of social 
struggle. Castells22 defines these processes of politicization as a “socialization of 
claims” where collective consciousness focuses on collective action. In contrast, 
the neutralization of claims and the atomization of society stem precisely from the 
individualization of interests, when health issues become individual problems and 
not social concerns. This particular scenario also echoed the global health care 
crisis, characterized by fiscal limitations to expanding socialized medicine and 
the barriers to accessing care in increasingly expensive health care scenarios. In 
the face of the increasing cost of care and the significant financial impacts of 
chronic diseases that accompany an aging population, the high demand for 
pharmaceuticals and more demanding specialized technology, reforms and 
potential solutions focused mainly on organizational and financial measures to 
contain costs, improve efficiency and transfer the responsibility to patients. The 
crisis of modern, specialized medicine, accelerated by demographic and 
epidemiological transitions, was also revealing how the patient was becoming the 
                                            
22 David B .Clarke, Consumer Society and the Post-modern City, (New York, Routledge, 2003) at 
102 and  Manuel Castells, “Análisis marxista de la crisis del capitalismo”, in Hugo Mercer & José 
C. Escudero, Políticas de Salud en los Estados capitalistas de excepción: Argentina, Chile y 
Uruguay, (UAM-Xochimilco, México, Editorial Mimeo, 1979).   
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target to blame in the health-illness process23 and the source of revenue in the 
health care business.  
Doctors did not reach a full consensus on the health policies being 
implemented by the military regime. Some tried to de-dramatize the discourse, 
suggesting that health care could not be considered part of a social market 
economy since no goods were at stake. Others argued that to apply some 
elements of the market economy to the health sector was neither mercantilism 
nor merely a way of making profit, but rather a strategy for maximizing efficiency 
through honest and healthy competition.24 But the ideologues of Chile’s long 
tradition of public health and state responsibility argued that most technical 
needs and their alternatives are better solved through public services. This was 
even the model applied by the Armed Forces for their own medical care services, 
and it seemed inconsistent to replace their efficient public service with 
cooperatives offering private services.25 
As we shall see, the military regime finally established a new legal 
framework that redefined the public system, creating open competition between 
medical establishments. According to promoters of the model, this new “healthy 
and effective competition in health care services” was a correction to the state’s 
ineffectiveness as a provider of medical services and a solution for the “financial 
                                            
23 Robert Crawford, "You are dangerous to your health: the ideology and politics of victim 
blaming", (1977) 7 International Journal of Health Services at 663. 
24 Interview to Osvaldo Artaza, (1974) 2037 Revista Ercilla at 11.  
25 Ernesto Medina-Lois, “La Salud: necesidad social del mundo actual”, (1975) 103 Revista 
Médica de Chile at 461. 
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anarchy” of distributing resources and establishing costs.26 They reiterated that 
the reform process not only imposed regulations on the public sector to improve 
its effectiveness, but also brought renewed economic dynamism to the 
management of curative services, which would result in “increased income for 
health professionals”, “more new sources of employment”, “a new boost to the 
investment-deprived sector” and “reduced health costs.”27 
Behind these notions, there was a metamorphological vision of the 
meaning of freedom, in that it did not constitute an end per se, but rather a 
mechanism for achieving efficiency and a discourse for promoting the 
privatization of services. In addition, the hypothetical increase in users’ abilities to 
pay was not related to improved performance or to the extension of services, but 
rather to the economic need to create a market for the private sector. These 
changes in the dismantling of the public sector were a logical outcome of the 
excessively flexible new health care model, which was necessarily in tune with 
the economic model being imposed by the military government. 
However, despite the government’s principles and objectives, 
transformations in the health sector were not easy to implement and did not take 
place as quickly as expected. Although supporters of the model continued to try 
to implement a broad, market-driven approach, others within the same military 
regime were more cautious and preferred to keep the state as the principal actor 
                                            
26 El Mercurio, Editorials 2, 6, 10 & 22 May, 1981. 
27 El Mercurio, Editorials 8 & 29 May, 1981. 
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responsible for the health sector. The internal dissent and conflicts between 
health professionals slowed down the Ministry’s action plans and brought 
modifications to the proposed health model. The public sector had historically 
been considered to play a fundamental role in health care, with a role too 
critically important to be suddenly modified. Thus, the government was forced to 
continuously defend itself from its critics, indicating that it did not want to 
implement “either a cold market model or a state model”. Its polemical pragmatic 
discourse favoured a combination of market policies and policies based on the 
responsibility of the state. The regime labelled it a “social market economy”, 
probably following the liberal German model. The idea was that the private sector 
and the market would invigorate social development, while the subsidiary role of 
the state would protect fundamental social interests. 
Social policy reforms were outlined in a document called “El ladrillo”,28 
which outlined seven modernization principles as a general guide for action. 
These included decentralization as well as reforms in agriculture, education, 
health care, labour, social security and the judicial system. However, major 
changes did not occur until 1979, mainly because of resistance by the 
physicians’ lobby, as well as the Air Force, which had control over social policy 
and was not fully in favour of the market-oriented reforms. The doctors’ 
professional association, the Medical College, approved of the decentralization 
process but rejected the municipalization plan to download health care 
                                            
28 “El Ladrillo” (the brick), became the economic policy blueprint for the military Junta. It was 
published only in 1992, after the reestablishment of democracy in Chile.  
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responsibilities to the municipalities on the basis that it was being imposed from 
above without consulting the principal actors.  
To move the reform process forward, General Pinochet dismissed Air 
Force Commander General Leigh along with another 18 Air Force generals using 
a provision of a decree that allowed the military junta to remove a member “not 
able to fulfill his duty”. In this way, Pinochet consolidated his power and brought 
the technocratic “Chicago Boys” into the government. Later, in February 1981, 
the military regime lifted another main obstacle to lobbies with Decree-Law 
3,621 29 , which transformed professional associations into corporate 
associations 30  and eliminated mandatory affiliation. Physicians, like other 
professionals, were excluded from all policy development, breaking with the 
traditional system of professional participation in policy formation in place since 
the late 1940s.31  
The health care reforms introduced by the military regime after 1981 
created a dual public and private system, in which the private sector received 
considerable support and stimulation. The public component was composed of 
                                            
29  Decree-Law 3,621 (1981) regulated the professional associations into corporate 
associations. These corporate associations were regulated by Decree-Law 2,757 (1979).  The 
professional colleges became union associations and were subject to the norms dictated in 
Decree-Law 2,757 (1979), which sought to eliminate monopoly systems and did away with the 
obligation to belong to a professional college in order to exercise a profession or trade. The 
professional colleges’ power to resolve conflicts was abolished by decree, and the courts became 
the only bodies authorized to enforce the sanctions contemplated in the respective College’s 
Organic Law and to penalize any breaches of professional ethics. 
30 Asociaciones gremiales. 
31 Rosanna Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment: The Quandaries of Social Protection Under 
Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1990”, (2001) 43 Latin American Politics and Society at 55. 
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the National Health Fund (FONASA),32 the National Health Services System 
(SNSS)33  and local municipal services, mainly for primary health care. The 
Armed Forces and the Police 34  continued to have their own health care 
institutions. The private component consisted of private health insurance 
institutions (ISAPRES),35 funded by salary deductions and private contributions 
as well as co-payments by affiliates. The ISAPRES were legally established with 
Decree-Laws No. 3 (1981) and No. 3,626.36 They were created as a financial 
mechanism to draw private capital into the health sector and represented an 
alternative to the FONASA (National Health Fund), administering at first 4% of 
workers’ salaries, and later up to 7%.    
As indicated above, several of the health principles and objectives 
seemed to be aimed at bringing progress to the health sector, yet in practice, this 
was far from the case. The health field and the country underwent an ideological 
rupture in sharp contrast to the incremental reforms and changes that had 
contributed to the building of a welfare state in Chile. The re-conceptualization of 
the notions of freedom, need and common good and the introduction of “social 
                                            
32 Fondo Nacional de Salud, FONASA. 
33 Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud, SNSS. 
34 Carabineros. 
35 Institutos de Salud Previsional, ISAPRES, created by Law 18,933 (1990) which also derogated 
DFL no 3 (1981) 
36  Decree-Law 3,626 (1981) introduced amendments to Decree-Law 3,500 (1980) and 
Decree-Law 824 (1974). In particular, there were amendments related to employers’ and 
independent workers’ contributions to the AFPs, contributions not made in a timely manner and 
the auditing role of Labour Inspection and the AFP Superintendence. It established procedures 
for calculating the capital in contracts between the AFP and its affiliates, and it regulated 
contractual disengagement, instances of the death of a worker and the sanctions brought against 
the AFPs for infringement of the law. 
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market economy” principles resulted in an overall dominance of the “market” over 
the “social”. An analysis of the economic rationality of this model will allow us to 
better understand these policies. 
 
 
 
2. THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL RATIONALITY OF THE 
MARKET MODEL  
 
Health is one of the most difficult cases to insert into the social market economy 
as planned by government, but it will not be able to escape.37 
 
Free initiative and competition will offer better services to users...38 
Decentralization, freedom of choice and the actual development of private 
initiatives... reflect the true aspiration of the Chilean people...39   
 
The development of the new health model and its policies had a clear and 
coherent rationality, based on a) the partial withdrawal of the state from the 
health sector; b) the creation of a market for private health care; and c) the 
stimulation of the autonomy of a vigorous private health care system. Within this 
same rationale, however, there were disputes and contradictions between 
different perspectives and ideological approaches. In particular, the militarists, 
mostly from the Armed Forces, concerned with internal security; the right wing 
“gremialistas”, mainly old student leaders from the Catholic University with 
traditional values; and finally the neoliberal “Chicago Boys” trained in the 
neoliberal Department of Economics at the University of Chicago.  
                                            
37 Francisco Herrera Latoja, Health Minister, in El Mercurio, 13 October 1974. 
38 Dr. Arriagada, Director of the S.N.S., in El Mercurio, 8 November 1973. 
39 El Mercurio, 12 November 1973 at 25.  
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A. Partial withdrawal of the state from the health sector 
According to Milton Friedman—ideologist of the Chicago school of economic 
thought and source of inspiration for the Chilean neoliberal model—there were 
only two ways to coordinate the economic activity of the state. The first was 
centralization, which required coercion, and the second was the free market, 
which could be achieved with voluntary cooperation.40 Friedman maintained that 
authoritarian decisions can only come from an entity with the power to dictate 
them; that is, the state. In other words, power resided in those who control the 
state. Contrary to expectations, the larger the field for authoritarian decisions, the 
higher the risk of losing control of power. Thus, Friedman’s neoliberal reasoning 
was also that state intervention in social life did not improve the social welfare of 
the population at large. Economic freedom in an authoritarian political system 
and a liberal market economy with the state as subsidiary modified the traditional 
role of the Chilean welfare state. Interventionism increased significantly in the 
political sphere in domestic affairs, defence, culture, communication, education 
and social organization, while the state presence was limited in the economic 
and social spheres.  
                                            
 
40 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1962) 
at 13. 
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This conception of the role of the state, while consistent with the goal of a 
capitalist reorganization of the economy, did not respond to the needs of those 
who depended upon state support—the vast majority of the population.  
Despite all this, the military regime was, although not without difficulty, 
headed towards the dismantling of this system and the withdrawal of the state 
from the health sector. The arguments invoked to carry this out were linked to 
criticisms that the public sector was excessively centralized, with an inefficient 
and exaggerated bureaucracy and a disorganized planning structure. The military 
regime focused its initial actions on denouncing the problems caused historically 
by strong state intervention in health matters. In addition to this discourse, the 
regime made clear its perception of the particular shortcomings that were 
preventing a satisfactory distribution of health services among different groups of 
the population, such as bureaucracy, lack of initiative, low levels of innovation, 
lack of accountability, etc. 41  
Although these criticisms of the shortcomings of the public health system 
were valid, the level of social and economic development of the country 
precluded the possibility that free, open and business-like market laws would be 
able to care for the well-being of the population. The debate about the 
advantages of a liberalized health system compared to those of preserving the 
social responsibilities of the state may have been relevant in a society where 
                                            
41 It is interesting to note the ongoing claims by the media to damage the image of the public 
health sector—their reporting on the ill treatment, unjustified waiting time, inadequate care, intra-
hospital infections, poor emergency services, etc.  
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resources were abundant and where the population had real options for 
exercising their freedom of choice. In a country like Chile, though, this debate 
was irrelevant, as for the vast majority of the population, the satisfaction of health 
needs was only possible through the public sector, including the middle class. 
This situation was even more critical in the area of preventive medicine.  
The most acute cases were found in the rural sector and among the self-
employed. Waged workers were much better protected than the self-employed, 
as they had free access to public health care. Such access, however, was 
available to less than 25% of the population, and more than half of the population 
was not having its health care needs met.42 A shrinking state presence in the 
area of health services even further aggravated this situation.  
The decline in public health expenditures by the military government was 
reflected in reduced capital investment in public health personnel such as 
decreased wages, less spending on training, fewer hirings, etc. While in 1969, 
capital investment represented 12.8% of public health expenditures, it amounted 
to only 2.8% ten years later, in 1979.43 By the early 1970s, there was already 
great disparity in the distribution of qualified health care workers in the health 
system. The later cuts to financial and human resources in the public sector 
made it even harder for the population to access medical and health care. In 
addition, the stimulus provided to the private health care sector further skewed 
                                            
42 Cortázar, “Necesidades básicas y extrema pobreza”, (1977) 17 Estudios CIEPLAN at 59. 
43Jorge Marshall, Nota Técnica sobre “Gasto Público en Chile, 1969-1979, Metodología y 
Resultados”, (1981) 33 CIEPLAN, in Ana María Viveros-Long, “Changes in the Health Financing: 
The Chilean Experience”, (1986) 22 Social Science & Medicine at 384. 
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the already uneven distribution of services and the concentration of medical 
personnel in large cities and the richer municipalities, where the middle and 
upper classes resided. According to Ortiz, the number of personnel in the public 
health care sector dropped from 75,694 to 66,969 employees in 1978 alone, 
accompanied by a decrease in the real value of wages throughout the entire 
public sector.44  
Four basic aspects of the public health care system—policy, service 
provision, financial management and primary care—were reorganized. Decree-
Law 2,76345  (August 1979) re-organized the Ministry of Health and created the 
National Health Service System,46 the National Health Fund,47 the Public Health 
Institute of Chile 48  and the Central Supply Centre of the National Health 
                                            
44 Francisco Ortiz, “El sector salud y sus recursos financieros: Análisis de la Década” in Hugo 
Lavados Montes (ed.), Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile,  (Santiago, Corporación de Promoción 
Universitaria, 1981) in Viveros-Long, Id. at 394. 
45 Decree Law 2,763 (1979). Regulations for the Ministry of Health, National Health Service 
System, National Health Fund, Public Health Institute of Chile and Central Supply Centre of 
the National Health Service. In addition, it established the foundations for a deregionalized 
National Health Care System. It established a Ministerial Health Secretariat for each of the 
country’s regions and created Health Services authorized to delegate tasks to the universities, 
unions, employers’ associations and other bodies with technical capacities for the activities 
assigned to the Health Services. The funding would come from the National Health Fund, which 
was the legal successor to SERMENA and the SNS. 
46 Each Service was under the charge of a director, responsible for the supervision, coordination, 
and control of the facilities and services of the system.  
47 The National Health Fund was a functionally de-centralized public service, with a legal capacity 
and financial resources of its own. Legally, it was a continuation of the National Health Service for 
Employees and the National Health Service, for the purpose of carrying out administrative and 
financial actions.  
48 The Public Health Institute of Chile was created as a functionally de-centralized public service, 
also with a legal capacity and financial resources of its own. It contributed to the national 
laboratory, and was a referential source for s the fields of Microbiology, Immunology, 
Pharmacology, Clinical Laboratory, Environmental Pollution and Occupational Health. It was the 
legal continuation of the National Health Service with respect to its relation with the 
Bacteriological Institute of Chile and the National Institute of Occupational Health.  
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Service. 49  According to Decree-Law 2,763, health service agencies were 
functionally de-centralized, with independent legal capacities and their own 
resources for fulfilling their duties. They were charged with the implementation of 
integrated development, protection and restoration of health and the 
rehabilitation of sick people. Policy-making power was transferred from the SNS 
back to the Ministry of Health, and the executive power to implement curative 
and preventive services was decentralized in the new National Heath Services 
System. Thirteen regions and twenty-seven semi-autonomous local health 
systems were created across the country, which finally became the legal 
successors to the National Health Service and the National Health Service for 
Employees (SERMENA).  The health service agencies, the National Health 
Fund, the National Council for Food and Nutrition, the Public Health Institute of 
Chile, the Central Supply and the National Health Service were also brought 
under the ambit of the Ministry of Health.50  
This was a major change from the historically centralized structure of the 
SNS. Furthermore, financial management was unified in a single agency, the 
                                            
49 The Supply Center of the National Health Service came into being as a functionally de-
centralized public service, again, with a legal capacity and financial resources of its own. It 
provided the medicines, instruments and other supplies that may be required by the agencies, 
organizations, institutions and persons affiliated to the Health System, for the implementation of 
incentive measures, protection or restoration of health, and the rehabilitation of sick people. The 
Supply Central was the legal successor of the National Health Service. 
50 The Ministry of Health was responsible for formulating and implementing the health policies. It 
had to perform the following functions: direct and guide all government activities relating to the 
health system; lay out the internal technical, administrative and financial regulations to be 
followed by the agencies, and institutions of the health system; and supervise, monitor and 
evaluate the implementation of policies and health plans. 
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FONASA,51 and the regime began transferring primary care responsibilities to the 
municipalities. However, because of the severe economic crisis that followed the 
“second oil shock” in 1979, by 1982 only 20% of the centres had been 
transferred and the process was not complete until 1987.52 The partial withdrawal 
of the state from curative services and the limitations suffered by the public 
sector in general constituted a loss of decades of progress and experience.  
What would happen to this vast sector of the population as a result of 
privatizations? As the great majority of the population used the public sector, the 
new policies needed to determine how to satisfy this demand in a shrinking 
public sector with declining resources. The response lay precisely in the other 
axes of the market model; namely, the formation of a market for the private 
sector and the growth of the structure and autonomy of the private health sector, 
which I analyze below. 
 
B. The creation of a market for the private sector  
Social policy was guided by market-oriented principles, including the 
reduction of state intervention, the strengthening of the private sector, the 
adoption of free-market and stabilization policies and the privatization of public 
corporations and state companies and industries. Social policy had to be 
                                            
51 Viveros-Long, “Changes in the Health Financing”, supra note 43 at 382. 
52 Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment”, supra note 31 at 41. 
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consistent with economic rationality.53 Promoting private medicine and making it 
profitable necessarily implied extending its market potential by increasing the 
consumption of private medical services. The disbursement of financial 
resources was redirected from subsidizing the supply of health care services to 
subsidizing the demand for such services. The previous system of direct budget 
allocations distributed by the SNS was replaced with production criteria.54 Thus, 
the direct allocation of public funds to health care institutions via an annual 
budget was reduced in order to increase the allocation of funds as 
reimbursement for actual services rendered, creating competition between 
institutions. Until the sanction of Law 2,575 in 1979, only 16% of the budget was 
allocated according to production criteria and 63.7% by direct budget allocation, 
with another 20% coming from direct income and donations. 55  Decree-Law 
2,57556 (1979) extended the benefits of Law 16,781 to the beneficiaries of the 
National Health Service. 
This policy of subsidizing demand even further weakened the capacity and 
the image of the entire public sector and stimulated the growth and legitimization 
of the private sector. Need-based access to services was replaced with access 
                                            
53 Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment”, supra note 31 at 55. 
54 Viveros-Long, “Changes in the Health Financing”, supra note 43 at 382. 
55 Ricardo Bize, “Asignación de Recursos Financieros a las regiones de Salud y Sistema de 
Costos Hospitalarios”, in Lavados, Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile, supra note 41 at 382. 
56 Decree-Law 2,575 extended the medical and dental benefits of Law 16,781 (1968) to the 
beneficiaries of the National Health Service. The legal beneficiaries of the National Health 
Service were eligible for the health care system under Law 16,781, without prejudice to the care 
that they were entitled to of that service in accordance with Law 10,383 and its amendments. The 
National Health Service had to pay the amount equal to the percentage paid by the Medical 
Assistance Fund, as established by Law 16,781. Any difference between the amount funded by 
the National Health Service and the total value of the benefit was charged to the beneficiary. 
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based on an individual’s capacity to pay prices that depended on real demand as 
determined in a market economy, 57  in which health care was just another 
commodity.  The “demand” for health care was not actually the result of an 
individual’s decision to use medical services based on his or her medical needs; 
rather, it was the result of several other factors, such as the capacity to pay and 
the accessibility of services.58  Additional factors taken into consideration by 
patients included the subsequent cost of follow-up treatments and drugs59 as well 
as the loss of income during recovery. Given these constraints, which were not 
insignificant, increasing the capacity of patients and users to pay became one of 
the financial challenges of the new liberal health care model. This situation was 
further exacerbated when the principles of cooperation and coordination between 
different services and institutions were replaced with inter-institutional 
competition. There was also a tendency to reorganize the availability of services 
to target the most profitable types of medical specializations.  
Since the only way to guarantee the freedom of choice for health services 
                                            
57 Alfredo Bravo, “Principios básicos para la organización de un sistema de servicios de salud: el 
caso chileno” in Lavados, Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile, supra note 44 at 394. 
58 Emanuel de Kadt, “Las desigualdades en el campo de la salud” in Livingstone & Raczynski 
(eds.), Salud Pública y Bienestar Social, (Santiago, CIEPLAN, 1976) at 31-32. 
59 In developed countries, drug expenses represented between 9% and 10% of the budget 
destined for health services. These figures more than doubled in underdeveloped countries. 
These numbers were even more eloquent in Chile, as it was reported that pharmaceutical 
expenses comprised of almost a third of all expenses recorded in the health sector. Ernesto 
Medina & Ana María, Kaempfer, “Análisis crítico de la metodología de planificación de salud”, 
(1968) Revista Médica de Chile 455. The concentration of the pharmaceutical industry in Chile 
demonstrated that in 1977, out of 57 active companies, 24 were foreign and the 5 largest of these 
already controlled 32% of the market. The leading 25 companies controlled 80.5% of the total 
market and 18 were foreign multinationals. Also, since foreign pharmaceutical companies hold 
patents rights the possibility of transfer of technologies was very limited. At the same time, this 
allowed artificially high pricing, sales linked to the purchase of other products and finally 
restrictions in domestic exportation. See Constantine Vaitsos in Meredeth Turshen, “An analysis 
of the medical supply industries”, (1976) 6 International Journal of Health Services at 275. 
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was to extend users’ capacity to pay, the government established mechanisms 
that would permit users to exercise this freedom, including subsidizing the 
demand for services and privatizing social security. The goal was to facilitate the 
transfer of savings to private insurance institutions, thus increasing the users’ 
capacity to choose services and simultaneously stimulating the private practice of 
medicine and the development of private clinics and, eventually, hospitals. The 
new market approach to resource allocation was clearly reflected in the type, 
efficiency and variety of services offered, which now had to incorporate time as a 
variable to maximize profit. Furthermore, artificial demand was created with the 
introduction of more screening appointments, excess consumption of non-
essential medical services and the promotion of greater drug use, all part of, as 
described by the regime, a sophisticated approach to medical care.  
The creation of this private sector would supposedly guarantee freedom of 
choice. The ISAPRES could contract out their health care services or run their 
own health care institutions.60  The purpose was to provide the people with a free 
choice as to whether to make their mandatory contributions into either the public 
fund or the private sector. Each ISAPRE had several predetermined health plans 
that affiliates could choose from according to their health care needs, the benefits 
offered and the monthly premiums. Both parties signed the contract, but the 
ISAPRE had the right to reject the affiliate or to deny the renewal of the contract, 
                                            
60 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity”, (2008) 147 
International Labour Review at 379.  
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allowing clients to be selected according to the level of risk they presented.61 
While the FONASA and the former SERMENA covered up to 85% of the 
population, the private ISAPRES started with a modest 2% coverage, but 
climbed to 26% before later falling to 16% of the population. Coverage by the 
FONASA decreased to 59% of the population as ISAPRE coverage increased. 
By 2006, FONASA had recovered to about 70% of the population.62,63 
The military government increased the share of the health care on 
individuals and eliminated the employer contribution. The mandatory contribution 
started at 4% of taxable income, which was raised to 6% in 1983 and then to 7% 
in 1986. The same year a reform introduced co-payments to the public sector. In 
1985, Law 18,46964 created the General Benefits Regime,65 which defined the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens in the public sector and established the 
grounds for the relationship between the ISAPRES and the public sector 
(FONASA and SNSS).66  This law governed the exercise of constitutional rights 
to health protection and created a regime of health benefits. The constitutional 
right to health protection included the free and equal access to the promotion, 
                                            
61 Annick Manuel, “The Chilean Health System: 20 years of Reforms”, (2002) 44 Salud Pública de 
México at 65-66. 
62 Mesa-Lago, “Social protection in Chile”, supra note 60 at 379.  
63 Viveros-Long, “Changes in the Health Financing”, supra note 40 at 382. 
64 Law 18,469 (1985) defined and regulated the constitutional right to health coverage and 
created a general health benefits regime. It also established the freedom to choose either the 
public or private health care system. The Health Services could not deny care to those who 
requested it nor make care conditional upon the prior payment of fees. Affiliates and dependent 
and independent workers would become beneficiaries in accordance with certain requirements, 
and pregnant women, children up to 6 years of age and the indigent would be covered even if 
they were not beneficiaries or affiliates. The law outlined the types of financial services available 
for those dependent and independent workers that required them. 
65 Régimen General de Prestaciones. 
66 Annick, “The Chilean Health System: 20 years of Reforms”, supra note 61. 
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protection and restoration of health, as well as to actions related to the 
rehabilitation of the individual. It guaranteed the freedom to choose between a 
private and public health system. The agencies in the National Health Service 
were responsible for the implementation of these health actions. The Health 
Benefits Regime’s affiliated members included public and private workers, those 
who received family allowances from dependent workers,67 independent workers 
included in any legal pension plan, volunteers in any legal pension plan and 
individuals entitled to social security pensions, disability allowance or severance. 
This law also recognized pregnant women and children up to six years of age. 
Lastly, all those who lacked resources and received welfare pensions and family 
subsidies were also beneficiaries of the regime. Incorporation into the regime 
occurred automatically upon fulfilling any of the criteria listed above. Members 
had to make contributions to the National Health Fund, which was used to fund 
the health benefits.68 However, the law classified those insured by FONASA 
according to their income levels. This is why all FONASA affiliates (except for 
low-income beneficiaries) had to make additional co-payments based on their 
income,69 unlike ISAPRE beneficiaries who could make additional payments 
according to their subscription plan. 
                                            
67 Dependents of workers listed on any independent legal pension fund system, and complying 
with the same qualifications and requirements as prescribed by the Law to receive family 
allowance of a dependent worker, were eligible for benefits under this regime. 
68  The beneficiaries were entitled to medical examinations, tests, preventive medicine, and 
curative medical and dental care. In addition, all pregnant women had the right to good medical 
care, also the right to birth control. Newborns and children up to six years of age had the right to 
health protection and public health controls. In general, the Law guaranteed the beneficiaries with 
the right to choose the place for their treatment and the health professional.  The Law also 
ensured cash benefits for non-professional diseases, and maternity leave for working women. 
69 Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment”, supra note 31 at 42. 
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Later, in 1989, Law 18,56670 required an additional contribution to the 
ISAPRES, this time by employers. This tax-deductible contribution was fixed at 
2% of the taxable income of each affiliate subscribed to a health plan and was to 
be paid by the employer, supposedly as a means to allow the middle class to 
gain access to the private health care sector.71 However, everybody had the right 
to opt not to contribute to any ISAPRE and to select instead the public system 
fund (FONASA), a choice often made by low-income earners in order to obtain 
access to free health care across the full range of services. Those with higher 
incomes could also use the public system, but were charged by FONASA for a 
portion of their hospital costs. Alternatively, they could use the private system 
and pay the difference between the basic amounts that FONASA covered and 
the amount being charged for the private service.72 
Lastly, Law 18,933,73 passed in March 1990, created the Superintendence 
of Health, which had a legal capacity and financial resources of its own. Its main 
function was to supervise and regulate the health institutions (ISAPRES), 
                                            
70 Law 18,566 (1986) made permanent the transitional article No. 3 of Decree Law-3,501 
(1908), which increased salaries and health contributions. It established pension taxes and 
determined a pay scale for staff and contract civil servants. It defined the upper limit for additional 
employer ISAPRE contributions, and it determined that independent affiliated workers had to 
make (continuous or discontinuous) payments for at least 6 months within the last 12 months in 
order to have access to the rights offered by the system. 
71 Annick, “The Chilean Health System: 20 years of Reforms”, supra note 61. 
72 Colin Gillion & Alejandro Bonilla, “Analysis of a national private pension scheme: the case of 
Chile”, (1992) 131 International Labour Review at 171. 
73 Law 18,933 replaced Decree-Law 3 (1981). It created the Superintendency of Health 
Insurance Institutions for the legal and financial oversight of the ISAPRES and to resolve 
conflicts with affiliates, notwithstanding legal action. The ISAPRES would provide health services 
and benefits—at the cost of legally-mandated health contributions or a higher, agreed-upon 
amount—for those people indicated in article 5 of Law 18,469. It also established the procedures 
for medical contracts and licenses. 
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replacing FONASA in this role, and to determine the minimum coverage to be 
offered by the ISAPRE health plans. The Superintendence was charged with the 
registration of the ISAPRES and was also responsible for providing general 
instructions 74  that would clarify health contracts and agreements. 75  All the 
supervision of the legal and financial matters of the ISAPRES came under the 
purview of the Superintendence of Health. If any disputes arose between the 
ISAPRES and its affiliates or beneficiaries, it was the Superintendence that could 
intervene to resolve the crisis. This law also replaced the yearly ISAPRES 
contracts with life-long contracts, eliminating the possibility that the renewal of 
the policy would be denied unless the affiliate defaulted on payments. However, 
the ISAPRES could re-establish the benefits and the cost of the policies on an 
annual basis, provided that the new conditions applied to the affiliates did not 
lead to discrimination or involve unacceptably high costs for members.76 In 1990, 
16% of citizens were beneficiaries of an ISAPRE, climbing to 25% by 1995. 
These transformations in the privatization of the health sector cannot be 
analyzed separately from what was a similar privatization process in the pension 
and social security sector. From a health perspective, it may seem to be a 
                                            
74 It had to provide guidelines and commands of general application, and issue orders for their 
implementation. 
75 People who chose to make their contribution to the ISAPRES had to sign a health contract or 
agreement, which the institution had to report to the Superintendent, and also the entity 
responsible for payment of the pension or the employer. In this contract, the parties could freely 
agree on the granting, the modalities, and conditions of the health services and benefits. The 
ISAPRES were not allowed to establish exclusive health plans for certain age and the 
contributions of those affiliated to an institution providing health insurance had to be declared and 
paid at this institution by the employer, the entity responsible for payment of pensions, or the self-
employed.  
76 Annick, “The Chilean Health System: 20 years of Reforms”, supra note 61. 
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different and not necessarily related issue, and this may indeed be the case in 
the context of a welfare state, but not in the context of the formation of a market 
for the private sector. The logic of individual contributions to private health 
insurance was also applied to pensions. A private pension system opened the 
way for an immense capitalization mechanism for private business. Politically, 
this approach allowed the transformation of social concerns (including forms of 
social struggle) into separate, individual problems creating a personal and private 
pension fund, which contributed to the atomization of society’s concerns  
(Castells’77 anti anti-thesis). Thus, the main reforms included opening up the 
market to the new private health insurance companies (ISAPRES) and privatizing 
the pension systems (AFP),78 which should also be taken into account in this 
discussion. 
In this process of privatizing pensions, the opposition was much more 
disperse than it was for other policies, because Chile had no national 
organization capable of lobbying against the transformation of the pension 
system. Although there was no labour or professional resistance to the social 
security reforms, some military officers opposed privatization, especially of the 
Armed Forces fund. The first important regulation was implemented in 1979 with 
Decree-Law 2,448,79 which created a standard minimum retirement age of 65 for 
                                            
77 Clarke, Consumer Society and the Post-modern City, supra note 22.   
78 The Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP), were created by Decree-Law 3,500 
(1980) establishing a private pension system, carried by individual capitalization, obtained 
through salary deductions. 
79 Decree-Law 2,448 (1979) amended the pension criteria. In all the pension schemes and for 
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men and 60 for women, eliminating pensions based on the number of years of 
service. Another social security reform was implemented in November 1980 with 
Decree-Law 3,500.80 This law created a system in which old-age pensions and 
disability and survivorship benefits were derived from individual savings. The 
capitalization was carried out through the Pension Fund Administrators (AFP). 
These private institutions administered the Pension Fund, providing benefits for 
those covered under this law. The Fund was independent and separate from the 
other assets of the AFP, which had no rights over the individual pension funds 
(the principle of separation of assets). On the other hand, all affiliated members 
of the AFP could transfer the value of their shares to another AFP by giving 
notice to their employer for the transfer of funds, when applicable (the principle of 
the personal freedom of pension savings).  
Each AFP was authorized to administer only one fund and to collect 
contributions to be deposited in capital accounts for the purpose of making 
investments. The AFPs were entitled to remuneration based on a commission for 
                                                                                                                                  
all legal purposes, all pensions were to be regarded as age-related pensions, excluding only 
Disability, which prescribed an age requirement, and the Survival pensions. The age criterion for 
the Disability pensions was sixty-five years for men and sixty for women. 
80 Decree-Law 3,500 (1980) regulated old-age pensions and disability and survivorship 
benefits. It created a system of old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions based on individual 
capitalization through the AFPs, and corporations would administer the Pension Fund and 
provide the services. They had to ensure a minimum rate of return for the funds collected. The 
state guaranteed minimum pensions for those affiliated, adding to the supplementary state 
contribution if the accrued pension was less than the established minimum pension. All workers 
who began working had to start to contribute to an AFP, which could not reject membership 
applications. All workers could deposit an additional amount in their individual capitalization 
accounts. For independent workers, it was established that affiliation to an AFP would take effect 
as of the first payment. The fund’s resources could be invested in General Treasury of the 
Republic securities, the Central Bank and letters of credit issued by financial institutions, among 
other entities. The AFP Superintendency was created to regulate the AFPs and tasked with their 
oversight and control. 
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the fees paid by affiliates, which were deducted from their individual accounts. 
The state guaranteed a minimum old-age pension and disability and survivorship 
benefits to all members of the health system who fulfilled the criteria mentioned 
under the law. Without prejudice to the rules for independent workers, employed 
workers were automatically affiliated and had to choose which AFP they wanted 
to contribute to in order to build their pension.81 With this, these workers acquired 
membership status with a legal relationship between the worker and the pension 
system, which led to rights and obligations; namely, the right to benefits and the 
obligation to contribute. Membership was unique, permanent, and persisted 
throughout the life of the member.  
Decree-Law 3,500, which brought an end to the pay-as-you-go system, 
went through several amendments.82 Further revisions were introduced by new 
                                            
81 Affiliated men who turned sixty-five years of age, and women who turned sixty years of age, 
were entitled to Old-Age pension, notwithstanding the possibility of them retiring prematurely, and 
failing to meet certain requirements.  Members who did not fulfill the criteria for eligibility to the 
Disability Pension could still avail of its benefits on the basis of sickness, intellectual or physical 
weakness, or if they had lost at least two-thirds of their working capacity. Also, this Law helped 
create a Survivors’ pension for the members of the family.  Workers affiliated to the system were 
required to contribute ten per cent of their wages or taxable income to their individual 
capitalization account. . In addition, workers were required to make an additional contribution, 
expressed as a percentage of their monthly wages or taxable income, to fund the Disability and 
Survival pension system. The Administrator fixed the value of this contribution. Apart from this, 
each worker could make voluntary contributions.  Finally, the Law guaranteed that the 
Administrator could not underperform the average pension fund, regulated by articles 38 to 40 of 
the Law. 
82 Most relevant amendments to Decree-Law 3,500 include:  
 
• During periods of incapacity to work, members must make mandatory contributions (10% 
of his salary or taxable income), which were withheld owing to the payment of subsidies. 
• The monthly rent was paid to the member under Insurance or Annuity withdrawals as per 
Article 62 (pension age), and that were subject to income taxes levied on pensions, 
salaries and wages. 
• The Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) could not carry any advertising prior to the date 
that started up to the public. 
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legislation. Decree-Law 3,50183 established a new Social Security Contribution 
System, whereby all existing welfare institutions required a legislative provision to 
establish new benefits or to make transfers of funds that would reassign the 
affiliates’ contributions and their indexation. Decree-Law 3,50284  created the 
Institute of Pension Normalization (INP)85 as an autonomous body with a legal 
capacity and funding of its own. It was linked to the government through the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.  Its purpose was to study and propose 
policies and measures to the government that would ensure the timely 
implementation of pension commitments that the state or the institutions dealing 
with pensions had incurred prior to the enactment of this law or were going to 
incur in the future. This law also created the Pension Trust Fund.86 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                                  
• The Administrator must send notifications to the homes of each of its members regarding 
their individual accounts, indicating the number of registered shares, their value and the 
date of investment. 
• In case of bankruptcy or dissolution of the Administrator, the obligation to pay fell on the 
insurance company in which the Administrator was hired, and the Disability Insurance at 
the time the pensions originated. 
 
83 Decree-Law 3,501 of 1980 established that a tax be paid by employers on the taxable 
wages of all workers, regardless of the pension system which was in effect. The tax rate was 
3% until 31st December 1981, 2% until 31st December 1982 and 1% until 31st December 1983. 
This Law established that as of 30th October 1986, a permanent tax would be charged at the rate 
of 2%. Later the Law 18,566 declared the former transitory article No 3 of the Decree-Law 3,501, 
to be permanent. 
84 Decree Law 3,502 (1980) created the Pension Normalization Institute (INP). Its principal 
functions included studying and proposing policies and measures to guarantee compliance with 
the pension commitments that the state or pension institutions had made prior to this law taking 
effect or would make in the future, in addition to administering the Pension Finance Fund. The 
Fund had to finance the recognition bonds referred to in Decree-Law 3,500 (1980), the retirement 
payments that were part of the pension institutions’ significant liabilities and the pensions of those 
opting to remain in the  pension institutions affected or that would be affected by Decree-Law 
1,263 (1975).  
85 Instituto de Normalización Previsional. 
86 Pension Trust Fund, had to fund: a) the credit bonds (Decree-Law 3,500 of 1980); b) the 
retirement benefits of passive affiliates to pension institutions; and c) the pensions of people who 
choose to stay in the pension institutions affected by Decree-Law 1,263, of 1975. 
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Law was fully amended by Decree 3,626 87  and Decree-Law 101. 88  This 
legislation created the new pension model that remains in place today.89   
These regulations changed the pension system’s financial mechanisms, 
moving from an inclusive system to a system based on individual savings, 
administered by the AFPs, which are private, profit-oriented funds. This new 
pension system was not implemented for the Armed Forces and the Police, 
which continued with the old, not-for-profit system. The AFPs were created to 
institutionalize a private pension system, with workers contributing 10% of their 
insured wages, up to an upper limit, to any of the private AFPs on the market. 
After deducting their commission, the AFPs invest the remaining money on 
behalf of the workers and collect the proceeds in a separate account for each 
affiliate. Upon retirement, the accumulated sum can be used to purchase an 
indexed annuity or to provide a pension. Neither the state nor the employer 
contribute to the plan, and the worker cannot borrow or draw from the personal 
pension account until retirement.90 The private pension system is regulated by 
the state and audited by the AFP Superintendency.91 Regulations are strict in 
order to protect the workers and to provide transparency in terms of the 
investment portfolio. There are no restrictions in terms of AFP ownership, and in 
fact the largest ones are still owned by foreign multinationals. However, the law 
                                            
87 Decree-Law 3,626 (1981) introduced amendments to Decree-Law 3,500 (1980) and Decree 
824 (1974).  See supra note 29. 
88 Decree-Law 101 (1980) established the statute for the Pension Fund Administrators 
(AFP).  
89 Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment”, supra note 31 at 40. 
90 Gillion & Bonilla, “Analysis of a national private pension scheme”, supra note 72 at 172. 
91 Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones. 
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does impose restrictions on the composition of the portfolio, and the distribution 
of investments is regulated to avoid speculation and excessive risk. Most of the 
funds are invested in Central Bank bonds, and the proportion of funds invested in 
equities is limited. At first, funds were not allowed to be invested overseas, but 
this restriction was later lifted.92 Overall, coverage for health care and pension 
investments represent between 19.5 and 20.7% of personal earnings. 
This economic rationale for the formation of a market for the private 
sector, when implemented, immediately stood in stark juxtaposition to the noble 
objective of health for all, reinforcing the two-tier system in which a large 
proportion of the population with little capacity to pay for private health care 
services was excluded from a public system that became more and more limited. 
Not surprisingly, during the implementation of the market model of health, health 
workers, doctors and even ministry officials began to dispute the characteristics 
of such a peculiar restructuring of the health system.93  Much criticism was 
focused on negative externalities, such as the growth of specialization, the 
concentration of medical professionals in wealthier urban areas, the 
reinforcement of competition and the reduction of resources. Most importantly, 
                                            
92 Gillion & Bonilla, “Analysis of a national private pension scheme”, supra note 72 at 177. 
93 The NHS should end up being a national embarrassment. A modern country like Chile should 
not have a public organization that provides very poor services, and one that is largely 
responsible for the public deficit (Emilio Sanfuentes, Revista Qué Pasa, February 1, 1975). “The 
new system must satisfy at any price the sensitive vast majority of physicians in order to ensure 
the possibilities of constant professional development. It should also ensure that this new system 
will be more efficient, cheaper, more human, and will provide medical benefits to the whole 
population regardless of their income” (...) “The NHS (SNS) is not a national disgrace. Like all 
institutions in Chile, there are shortcomings, but also virtues”. (Doctors Artaza & Salvestrini, 
leaders of the Medical College, El Mercurio, February 26 1975). 
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critics believed that the majority of the population would eventually have limited 
access to curative services. 
In 1974, in an attempt to minimize or eliminate the negative externalities, 
the Medical College presented an alternate restructuring program. This program 
clearly responded to the early concerns and interests of doctors who were 
worried about the proposed modifications to the health system. The proposal 
consisted of maintaining and centralizing public planning while decentralizing the 
public sector’s operations. It also aimed to maintain the same level of health 
spending in the budget, as doctors thought it unlikely that private infrastructure 
could be established that would be capable of replacing the state infrastructure.94 
 
C. The growth of the structure and autonomy of the private health sector  
Beginning in 1974, different visions of health care in the country resulted 
in numerous controversies and conflicts, and two opposing tendencies divided 
the government and medical sectors. While one vision called for the rapid and 
drastic privatization of the sector, the other preferred a transition process that 
would support an important state presence until there were optimal conditions for 
a transfer to the private sector. In December 1973, the military regime dictated 
Decree-Law 212, which created the National Commission of Administrative 
                                            
94 El Mercurio, August 5-6 1974 at 2 & La Patria, August 5 1974, at 3. 
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Reform (CONARA).95 Its duty was to study and propose the necessary provisions 
and legal and administrative regulations for bringing about administrative 
regionalization in the country. Regionalized services were operationally 
decentralized, becoming legal entities in their own right, with an independent 
structure. The CONARA depended directly on the Military Junta. All public 
services, autonomous or self-governed state enterprises, public legal institutions 
and public enterprises had to provide reports and information as well as the 
technical and administrative cooperation requested by the CONARA. The 
Commission closely supervised the entire country and enforced its presence and 
action nationwide.96  
One of the first measures to improve the structure, functioning and 
autonomy of the private sector was a series of regulations that decentralized and 
“municipalized” public health services. Even though in theory the decentralization 
of curative services to the municipalities could have been interpreted as a 
positive measure to streamline and reduce the bureaucracy of services, in 
practice this was not the case at either the organizational or the financial level, 
especially for those municipalities with scarce resources. The municipalization of 
primary health care facilities had major drawbacks, including a lack of 
                                            
95 Decree-Law 212 (1973). Created the National Commission of Administrative Reform 
(CONARA). Comisión Nacional de Reforma Administrativa.   
96 Since the Constitution of 1925, Chilean territory was divided into provinces, which came under 
the charge of appointed Governors. The Provinces were then divided into municipalities under the 
charge of elected mayors and council members. Regional Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMI), 
Planning Secretariats, represented the central government and other departments that 
coordinated with the different managerial levels, provided supervision, and were in charge of the 
budgetary control and management of the Regional Development Fund.  
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coordination with other health care institutions and the Ministry of Health and the 
deterioration of working conditions and wages, as workers were now covered by 
the Labour Code as employees of private institutions and no longer as public 
servants. Furthermore, the fee-for-service method of payment, 97  which was 
supposed to cover all of the municipalities’ health care costs, did not reflect the 
real cost of services. As a result, municipalities were under-reimbursed, while 
expenditures increased and not all prevention services were compensated.98  
At the national level, this reorganization was critical, as the historic 
National Health Service (SNS) and the SERMENA were replaced with the 
National Health Services System (SNSS). The new structure integrated twenty-
six regional services, which were each dependent upon their respective Regional 
Ministerial Secretariat (SEREMI).99 The country’s new administrative structure 
was instrumental in the process of decentralizing and privatizing health care 
services, both directly and indirectly, by transferring the administration of public 
institutions to private or semi-private jurisdictions. Municipalities became legal 
entities with independent structures, authorized to contract services with not-for-
profit private corporations, and they occupied a dominant role in rationalizing 
public expenditures100 as well as in the deepening of the privatization process. 
Thus, the responsibilities and traditional functions of the municipalities expanded 
                                            
97 Payment for Rendered Services per Municipality System, FAPEM. 
98 Annick, “The Chilean Health System: 20 years of Reforms”, supra note 61. 
99 Secretaría Regional Ministerial (SEREMI). 
100Julio Ruiz, “Municipios y servicios sociales. La experiencia chilena (1980-1993)”, in ILPES-
OMS/OPS-Ministry of Health, La Municipalización de Servicios Sociales en Chile (Santiago, 
1995). See also Mario Parada, (2004) Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en 
Chile: un análisis sociológico (Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) at  238. 
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to include specific domains in the area of social policy, including the 
administration of primary and secondary education and primary health care 
services.101 
The SNS also transferred financial resources to the National Private 
Social Development Corporation (CNPDS)102 to cover the operating costs of the 
clinics, buildings, facilities and equipment so that this private corporation could 
manage and provide the medical and health care services required by the 
population.103 Financial surpluses were to be re-invested to enhance services 
and/or to be handed over to the SNS. At the same time, efforts were made to 
increase professional efficiency, with a higher level of administrative support 
available to improve the quality of services.104 However, although the private 
sector could offer “more comfortable” and “more personal” services, these were 
not necessarily of better quality. Private hospital management was not less 
costly, and experience showed that transferring hospital management to the 
private sector led to some duplication of hospital and technological resources, 
thus significantly increasing the country’s overall health expenditures.105 
                                            
101 The transferred services included staff that was contracted at market salaries. As a result, they 
lost all rights and benefits as civil servants, and suffered significant decrease in wages. As for 
assistance programs, the municipalities identified potential beneficiaries and distributed aid 
according to their needs. They were monitored by the “CAS Card” that provided a database of 
extreme poverty in the country. 
102 Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Social.  
103 The 1975 transfer of three public health-care clinics belonging to the SNS (Maipú, Chucunco 
and Cerrillos) to the CNPDS was the first measure to implement this new conception of the 
municipality. 
104 Ministerio de Salud, El Mercurio, December 25, 1975. 
105  Alejandro Goic, “Fundamentos médicos de una organización social de la medicina” in 
Lavados, Desarrollo Social y Salud en Chile, supra note 44 at 70. 
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Beginning in July 1980, the intention was to transfer medical and sanitary 
establishments to the municipalities in a loan-type agreement for a period of five 
years. The target was to transfer 30% of the country’s consultation offices and 
clinics to the municipalities, granting them both direct and indirect responsibility 
for providing curative services. Decree with force of law (DFL) 36 (1980)106 
established and regulated the agreements between the Health Service and other 
entities. The provisions of the decree applied to all agreements between the 
Health Service, universities, organizations, unions, employers or workers in 
general and any natural or legal person on health actions to be executed on 
behalf of the Health Service. This decree thus governed those agreements under 
which a body, entity or person replaced the Health Service in the execution of 
one or more actions for the promotion, protection and restoration of health or 
rehabilitation of patients, without prejudice to the care that could be provided to 
others under the agreement. Health actions subject to the agreement had to be 
identified and detailed, and the obligations under the agreement could not be 
transferred or entrusted to third parties without prior approval from the Health 
Service and the Ministry. No agreement could include those actions that by their 
very nature had to be exercised directly by Health Service authorities. As a 
general rule, agreements were drawn up for a period of one year.  
                                            
106 DFL 36 (1980) established and regulated the agreements between the Health Service 
and other entities. 
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However, to consolidate the private sector as the neuralgic axis of the 
neoliberal model in a health system that was still considered not fully organized 
under the market model, it was necessary to invigorate the health infrastructure 
in order to be able to respond to the new demand. This, as already discussed, 
was stimulated by legislation that granted new financial resources to the 
ISAPRES through income deductions and voluntary contributions. The private 
sector’s ability and legal capacity to operate thus became a necessary condition 
for its further development and incremental expansion. State non-intervention 
encouraged the normal growth of private structures and facilitated the partial 
withdrawal of public involvement in health activities. Legislation with these ends 
was present from the very beginning of the military regime, permitting the 
outsourcing of ambulance services, maintenance operations, laundry, hotel-
related services and the manufacture of certain products, creating financial 
incentives to open and operate more private clinics and liberalizing imports for 
the medical industry. In addition to these measures, agreements were signed 
between the Health Ministry and private entities to transfer health care services 
out of the public sector. This normative deregulation process, instrumental to the 
growth of the private sector, was euphemistically termed the “alternative system”.  
Eventually, privatization advocates within the regime, who initially 
controlled the decision-making process, lost their initiative, ultimately becoming 
more predisposed to a transitional and gradual process. The Health Minister 
acknowledged that it was the state’s responsibility to guarantee free access to 
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health care by taking on full leadership and control, adding that the state could 
not neglect any part of the health sector in the hope that private ventures would 
eventually fully develop and take control. However, he further indicated that the 
state should or could pull out of those areas appropriately covered by the private 
sector, though it had the obligation to maintain its responsibility and authority 
when essential health needs were not met.107 Although these ministry proposals 
did somewhat moderate the wave of privatizations, contradictions between the 
principles and the practice were evident. It was no coincidence that public health 
expenditures, whose growth had outpaced that of the population at first, began to 
decrease substantially from 1979 on, while the participation of the private sector 
in services (housing, health care and education) was constantly stimulated. By 
March 1981, thirteen health care institutions had been transferred to the private 
sector. The CNPDS received these establishments and their assets under a 
long-term borrowing agreement. According to legislation, they were charged with 
providing the same services as the former SNS and SERMENA had offered to 
their affiliates.108 In 1977, the minister of health explained that the rationale for 
stimulating such activity was to: 
a) Reduce pressure on the public system; 
 
b) Complement the resources of the national health plans with agreements 
with both private and public entities; 
                                            
107 Fernando Matthei, “Política de Salud”, Ministry of Health document in (1977) Revista de la 
FACH 22. 
108 Resolution No. 803 of the Directorate of Central Health Service, Ministry of Health 
(March 3, 1981) and Decree-Law 36 (1 July, 1980) about the rules that apply to the contracts 
approved by the health services.  
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c) Ensure state curative health care services for patients, either individually 
or collectively;  
 
d) Purchase, sell and exchange services at cost between the public system 
and the alternative (transferred) system.  
 
 
Making health a part of the municipal agenda was rationalized as a 
decision to prioritize the provision of medical care in health clinics instead of 
hospitals. This was in line with a program to expand primary health care, initiated 
in 1977 and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO). The objectives were to make 
services more accessible, to gain greater efficiency, to improve control by 
management, to promote social participation and to facilitate privatization.109 It 
was expected that municipalities would also seek meaningful social participation 
in the area of health management in order to reduce governmental intervention 
and the management apparatus, thus allowing for an efficiently regulated, better-
adapted investment, with more resources and an overall better service for the 
community. The regionalization and municipalization model was one of central 
control, though it was territorially de-concentrated.110 In fact, this was part of a 
process of decentralization, sustained by the central government with support for 
                                            
109 The Health Deputy Health Minister, Hernán Buchi, said that by decentralizing the health 
services management, it was more likely to facilitate the gradual transfer of public actions to the 
private health sector in the future. See Beatriz Heyermann, “Municipio, Descentralización y 
Salud” in ILPES-OMS/OPS-Ministry of Health, La municipalización de los servicios sociales en 
Chile, (Santiago, 1995) at 158. See also Parada, Evolución del sistema de protección social de la 
salud en Chile, supra note 96 at  250. 
110 Ruiz, “Municipios y servicios sociales. La experiencia chilena (1980-1993)”, supra note 97. 
See Mario Parada, Id. at 238. 
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local development and the transfer of new financial resources and flexible 
management mechanisms to the municipalities.  
A dual control structure was created, as municipalities took over the 
funding and administration of health services (locally incorporating personnel 
under the Labour Code instead of according to administrative regulations), while 
the services—the health programs themselves—remained under the technical 
supervision of the Ministry of Health. It was a matter of providing the municipality 
with a new role based on its close ties to the population. The municipality was 
thus granted a power that converted it into a springboard to state concessions, to 
the benefit of the private sector.111 As the mayor of Valparaiso defined it in 1981, 
“The municipalities are skilled and effective institutions designed to transfer 
municipal goods and services to the private sector.” 112  & 113  By 1988, the 
municipalization process of the health system was considered complete. 
Excluded from the process were the hospitals, their related medical services, 
specialized and emergency services and large medical clinics that covered more 
than fifty thousand inhabitants. These institutions and services all remained 
                                            
111 The DFL 1-3063 (1980) regulated the application of paragraph 2 of Article 38, DL N° 
3,063 (1979). This regulation contained the general rules which governed the investments of the 
Municipal Common Fund, with respect to the following: a) temporary or permanent transfer of 
public sector services, and its resulting transfer of assets, financial and human resources, and 
financial management rules; b) control of the allocation of the Fund's resources; and c) temporary 
suspension of the allocation of the Fund’s resources. The municipalities responsible for these 
funds were subjected to technical supervision and control as indicated by the Law.   
112 Francisco Bartolucci, Alcalde de la ciudad de Valparaíso, en El Mercurio, 15 May 1981. 
113 The situation is the same with regard to the "municipalization” of schools. The mayor of 
Chillán, Luciano Cruz, informed the press in March 1981 that he was convinced that the 
municipalities will transfer the management of these schools to private Law corporations who 
requested it… (Hernán Pozo, “La situación actual del municipio chileno y el problema de la 
municipalización”, Working paper 7, (Santiago, FLACSO, 1981) at 54. 
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within the SNSS.114 The pursuit of economic profitability and the creation of 
favourable economic conditions for the development of the private sector 
stimulated outpatient medical centers, clinics, diagnostic centres, laboratories 
and the private practice of medicine in order to capture the demand traditionally 
met by the public sector.  
The transfer of responsibilities previously held by the state over to the 
private sector115 was creating increasingly unequal access to curative services, 
according to social class, the capacity to pay, the patients’ source of income, and 
their capacity to make co-payments via income deductions for private health 
care. This inequality deepened, partly because of the reduced allocation of public 
resources, and partly because of the private sector boom in new health care 
offerings targeted at the middle- and high-income strata in the major cities. This 
meant more effective services for a minority of the population, to the detriment of 
                                            
114 The type, number and percentage of transfer of facilities were as follows: 178 urban clinics 
(92%); 117 rural clinics (100%), 993 rural health posts (100%), 74 school dental clinics (100%); 
491 rural medical stations (38%), which were functioning as health teams where the population 
was scattered and provided services to schools or community centers, etc.  
115 By the end of 1981, the private sector had made a series of agreements with public and 
private institutions such as the San Bernardo Hospital, the Missionary Hospital of Panguipulli, the 
San José Hospital of Puerto Varas, the University of Chile Hospital, the Catholic University, the 
German Clinic, the National Copper Corporation, the Bethlehem Iron Company, the Red Cross, 
the National Petroleum Company (Empresa Nacional de Petróleo, ENAP), Customs, the “Colonia 
Dignidad”, the Military Hospital, the Pucón Hospital and the psychiatric clinics and seniors’ 
residences.  Ministerio de Salud y Oficina de Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN). 
Colonia Dignidad, today Villa Villa Baviera, was situated in the town of Parral in the Maule 
Region.  It was founded by a group of fundamentalist Germans emigrants led by ex-Nazi Paul 
Schafer in 1961. At its greatest extent, Colonia Dignidad had around three hundred German and 
Chilean residents. The main economic activity of the colony was agriculture but it also contained 
a school, a free hospital, two airstrips, a restaurant, and a power station. The colony was 
secretive, surrounded by barbed wire fences and searchlights and a watchtower and also 
contained secret weapon. It was described alternately as a cult of  “eccentrics", but it was later 
revealed that Colonia Dignidad was also used to indoctrinate people, commit sexual abuses to 
children and served as a torture camp during the Pinochet dictatorship. See: 
http://www.archivochile.com/Chile_actual/16_hue_dict/chact_huedict0024.pdf 
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the majority that depended upon imperilled public services. However, the 
government repeatedly avowed that its intention was not to privatize the health 
sector, but rather to increase its effectiveness. The opinion of the health workers 
(regrouped in the National Federation of Health Workers (FENATS) 116  was 
substantially different. They considered health to be a part of the national 
heritage, and hence, they believed that the role of the state should be reinforced, 
as the state’s subsidiary role was clearly insufficient. Health workers did not 
believe that normative and regulatory actions exercised by the state could protect 
the public interest without having negative effects on its support of the private 
sector.117 
These changes implied a revolution in the health field, where traditionally 
90% of the Chilean hospital infrastructure had been owned by the state, 5% 
belonged to university institutions and to the Armed Forces, and the other 5% 
was private. Along with these transfers and the privatization of services, other 
factors also contributed to the growth of the private sector. First, doctors’ low 
remunerations in public hospitals and staff layoffs drove doctors to regroup in 
private medical centres or to find managerial or salaried work in private clinics. 
Many physicians also welcomed this opportunity to practice in private medical 
centres or clinics, as it allowed them to share the costs of a private practice and 
enjoy the benefits of a more sophisticated technical infrastructure.  
                                            
116 Federación Nacional de los Trabajadores de la salud  (FENATS). 
117 FENATS, (1979) Revista de la Federación nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud. 
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It is interesting to note that the process of privatizing the public health care 
sector did not affect the staff of the armed forces and the police in the same way. 
The type of privatization developed in the ISAPRES system, which was based on 
each contributor’s individual capitalization, the private administration of medical 
and health care services, and free choice by the patient, was not applied for the 
armed forces and the police. Health care funding had three sub-systems: the 
public system, the private system and the system for the armed forces and the 
police. Like health care services for all other workers, the latter system was 
funded with contributions equivalent to 7% of monthly wages as well as direct 
state funding. The funds allocated to the armed forces and the police covered the 
operation of the ten military hospitals and health care coverage for their 
personnel and their families, which made up close to 13% of the population.118 
 As discussed above, this system concentrated people according to their 
income, such that those with lower incomes and greater health risks went to the 
public sector, while those with high incomes and low health risks went to the 
private sector, which was less crowded and much faster.119 However, the case of 
the hospitals for military and police staff was quite distinct, as while their 
coverage came from public funding, they were considered autonomous 
                                            
118 Camilo Cid Pedraza, “Inequidad y segmentación del financiamiento del sistema de salud en 
Chile,” 
http://www.medicosaps.cl/Portals/15/files/congresos/conferencias_4to/seminario_aps_ccp.pdf 
119 O. Larrañaga,  “Eficiencia y equidad en el sistema de salud chileno,” Revista de la Cepal No. 
49, 11-12.  
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institutions, with privileges that the public sector did not enjoy but the private 
sector did. First, access to this system was restricted to military and police staff 
and their families. Second, these entities could enter into agreements with public 
health services to reduce costs and use their infrastructure.  
The privatization process was based on a very clear economic rationale 
for why and how to impose and implement the new liberal market model in the 
health sector, which, as indicated above, included an articulated process to 
reduce the public sector, stimulate the growth of the private sector and lastly, 
expand the market for the private sector. This was precisely in line with neoliberal 
political and economic principles, according to which private sector interests and 
market laws become the impulse for development. In summary, these political-
economic policies in the health field were no guarantee of better health care; 
rather, they were tools to increase the profitability of the “business” of medicine 
and the medical-industrial complex.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Ideas, discourses and practices that dominate or subvert relations of 
power are not free-floating, health reforms and health legislation need to be 
analyzed in relation to ideological determinants mediated by the diversity of these 
actors, wherein health legislation is an outcome of the articulation of political 
practices and negotiations.  Once created and enacted, the law adapts to the 
political context in which it resides, it employs its own particular normative 
discourse, and it promotes its “exchange value” as being “equal”, “neutral” and 
“blind”, hence becoming its own agent. Therein lies its fetishism,1 which ensures 
that legal rationality supplants those who have created the law and acquires the 
capacity to transform them into objects of its own creation. 
Law can be circular, and only the law can create law. This interpretation, 
put forward by Luhmann in his autopoietic theory and closely connected to 
biology and the functioning of ecosystems, has the limitation of not capturing the 
law in terms of its own movements, capturing it only in its formalization. However, 
it is important to understand the law as a function of its own dynamics. Law is 
circular in its formalization, but not in its creation or prior to having a life of its 
own. In this sense, it is probably closer to physics, relativity, chaos theory and 
indeterminacy. This is perhaps why legal systems function in an unpredictable 
way but require predictability. They appear to be stable because they function in 
                                            
1 Term linked to 19th-century anti-formalism, used to describe an excessive attachment to the 
letter of the law in contradiction with logic, convenience, and justice. Relates law to politics, and 
the gap between formal legality and its application. See Julieta Lemaitre, “Legal Fetishism Law, 
Violence, and Social Movements in Colombia”, (2007) Paper, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota. 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/JulietaLemaitre__English_.pdf  at 2-3 
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the realm of positive law, but law has its own dynamics, and the system works 
precisely because it does not necessarily work, even though it must: the rule of 
law. This is why we must understand the law in its synchronic and diachronic 
moments. 
Peters indicates that the formalization of the law – that is, its legalization – 
makes explicit what was implicit, and, in the legalization process, social relations, 
interests and objectives are conceived or re-conceived. In this sense, the author 
suggests that legalization contributes to the transparency of social reality and to 
the rationality of social action.2  That is, the law in its own dynamics is directly 
related to the exercise of power and dresses in the clothes of legality. 
Legalisation pretends the impartiality of the law and neutrality in its genesis and 
simulates a process of mediation among equals who are not equal. Accepting 
legalization as an instrumental ex post facto conflict-resultion mechanism is 
different from interpreting it as an element of transparency in social reality.  
It is with this identity, now recognized as formal, that law is legitimized. 
When the exercise of the conflict-consensus dialectic is guaranteed, this 
legitimation, and even more importantly the acceptance of this legitimacy, is 
expressed in the collective acceptance of the legalization of the law. Its ex post 
facto recognition facilitates the symbiosis between lex law and jus law. Here, the 
                                            
2 Peters, Law as a Critical Discussion, in Gunther Teubner, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare 
State, (ed.) (1986) (Berlin & New York, Walter de Gruyter) at 253. 
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Western Kantian notion of “being” (Sein) and “should-be” (Sollen) as the 
fundamental quandary in the construction of Kelsen’s pure theory of law and 
development of positivism is not irrelevant to the problems of the legitimization of 
legal rationality. In this case, the formal validity of the legal text depends on the 
rationale that validity is the result of a procedure that takes place in an 
appropriate body. So, we may argue or question who or how we can validate the 
procedure, so the law becomes legitimate within its own legal rationality.   
With respect to the law’s economic and political interrelations in Marxist 
theory, 3  the law is simultaneously a means for exercising power and for 
promoting ideas or ideological values.4 Law and the power of law are thus largely 
ideological, transforming power relations into seemingly fair and legitimate 
relations by making them seem beyond power:5 “the ideas of the ruling class are 
in every epoch the ruling ideas.”6 In this sense, the law loses its dynamic role and 
becomes the merely formal result of the exercise of power, which is able to 
adulterate itself, presenting itself as something it is not. Legislative decisions are 
validated as a result of procedures that are then legitimated because all interest 
groups can be represented and can compete for influence or, even more, 
                                            
3 Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford & Cambridge, Blackwell,1993) at 
11&35. 
4 Max Travers, Travers, Understanding Law and Society, (Oxon, Routledge, 2010) at 75. 
5 Alan Thomson, “Foreword: Critical Approaches to Law. Who Needs Legal Theory?”, in Ian 
Grigg-Spall & Paddy Ireland (eds.), The Critical Lawyers´ Handbook, (London, Pluto Press, 1992) 
at 4 & 5. 
6 Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, “Ideology, State and Law”, in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckham & 
Francis Snyder (eds.), The Political Economy of Law. A Third World Reader, (Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 1987) at 183. 
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because citizens are made equal by choosing the laws that will govern them.7 
The population must be persuaded that the existing order is just and that it is 
they who want it to be as it is.8 
Legal processes are embedded in political transitions, and law evolves 
and is transformed. When we speak about political dynamics and their 
implications for the law, we understood law as praxis. That is, “law-making as 
praxis,” (and not necessarily in its abstract notion), tied to a structure in which the 
community participates in bringing the law to life.9 This means recognizing “the 
role played by all social actors, including even oppressed individuals and groups, 
in the constitution of the legal order.”10  
I have discussed legislation as an “ongoing process” that entails an 
understanding not only of the nature of the legal system, but also of how the law 
is processed, dictated and legitimized. This reading of the law as a process in 
which actors intervene in the pursuit of a consensus on interests in order to 
transform them into legal texts (lex) is part of the very dynamics of the legal 
system should not necessarily be understood in the “tradition of consensus” in 
legal theory. 
As already indicated this dissertation argues that law has a dual rationality 
or role. It preserves the social order, or, in Durkheim’s language, it provides 
                                            
7 Unger, “The critical legal studies movement”, supra note 15 at 565. 
8 Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, “Building power and breaking images: critical legal theory and the 
practice of Law”, (1982-1983) 11 Review of Law and Social Change at 372. 
9 Steven Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, (1983) 9 Annu. Rev. Sociol. by 
York University 103-124 at 108. 
10 A. Fraser, “The legal theory we need now”, Socialist Review 40-41 at 147-187 in Spitzer, Id. 
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“cohesion and integrity”, while on the other hand, it contributes to social change. 
From a critical perspective, the law is also clearly an element of authority that 
supports the power concentrated in the government, in the family, in the market 
and in the workplace,11 and, as vehicle for the reproduction and legitimation of 
the dominant elites.12  However law can also assume this dual role, as it can 
respond or react to a situation of social and political change or even generate 
and promote change.  In this case the Rule of law, which has become essential 
in Western democratic and legal theories, was associated with the procedures 
characteristic of citizen participation,13 yet this citizen participation is incomplete, 
not necessarily representative or inclusive, and furthermore, often an instrument 
for the political legitimation of the established order. Nonetheless, within its 
process and dynamics, the Rule of law has also permitted and facilitated 
important changes in the evolution of the state, and in particular the welfare 
state, such as social benefits, struggles for equity, the awarding of civil liberties 
and protection against (arbitrary or authoritarian) state intervention.14 Therefore, 
                                            
11 Unger, Law in Modern Society, supra note 22 at 179. 
12 Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, “Chile: Law and the Legitimation of Transitions: From the 
patrimonial State to the international neo-liberal State”, (1998) American Bar Foundation 9709 at 
1. 
13 D. Grimm, “Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Zukufunt der Verfassung” in D. Grimm 
(ed.) Wachsende Staatsaufgaben-Sikende Steurungsfahigkeit des Rechts, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1991), at 291-306 in Peer Zumbansen, “Governance: an Interdisciplinary Perspective”, in 
David Levi-Faur (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 
at 86. 
14 D.Grimm, “Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Zukufunt der Verfassung” in D. Grimm 
(ed.) Staatsaufgaben, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996), at 613-646 and E.-W. Bockenforde, “The rise 
of the state as a process of secularisation”, in E.-W. Bockenforde (ed.), State, Society and Liberty 
Studies in Political Theory and Constitucional Law, (New York and Oxford, Trans. J.A. 
Underwood, Berg, 1991), at 26-46 in Zumbansen, Id. 
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by analyzing the law in its different dimensions and in its contradictory nature, we 
can understand it as an agent of control or as an instrument for change. 
The analysis here has captured law as a process of transformation, 
focusing on actors, norms and movements in relation to the legal transformations 
of the health sector in Chile. 
Latin America, including Chile, has created highly fragmented health 
systems.15 According to Frenk, a health system can be understood as “a set of 
relationships among major groups of actors: health care providers, the 
population, the state as a collective mediator, organizations that generate 
resources, and other sectors that produce services with health effects.”16 From a 
comparative perspective, all countries have similar concerns, but the economic, 
political, ideological and epidemiological reasons behind them differ.  
It is difficult to classify them as purely public or private, due to the complex 
arrangements and negotiations that are the result of political choices.17 Systems 
of social protection, different in each country, have been formed through diverse 
historical processes, resulting from a combination of economic, political and 
cultural forces. These forces, along with unique sets of social values shared by 
the local population, form a complex web of institutions “responsible for financing, 
organizing and providing social service delivery”, defining “who is entitled to 
                                            
15 Eldabi Tillal, Irani Zahir & J. Paul Ray, ”A proposed approach for modeling health care systems 
for understanding” in Conrado Adolfo Gómez, “Influencia de los grupos de interés”, (2005) 9 
Revista Gerencia y Políticas de Salud. CIESS, “Conferencia Interamericana de Seguridad Social, 
2004. Informe anual sobre la seguridad social en las Américas 2005. Fragmentación y alternativas 
para aumentar la cobertura del seguro en salud” in Conrado Adolfo Gómez, Id. at 62. 
16 Julio Frenk, “Dimensions of Health System reform”, (1974) 27 Health Policy 19.  
17 Arnold Heidenheimer et al., Comparative Public Policy (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1990). 
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benefits and services”.18  There are four pressure groups that have had an 
influence on social security policies in Latin America. In order of political 
significance, Mesa Lago identifies: 1) the military, 2) political administrative 
groups, 3) economic and market groups and 4) unions. These groups have had 
different sources of power at different times in their history. They are certainly not 
homogeneous; they can be subdivided into subgroups, and their power has 
varied over time. We must also, as we shall see below, add the role played by 
the state and the action of the political parties.  
My analysis of health care legislation is situated within its relationship to 
the economic structure and political variables, wherein the negotiation process in 
lawmaking is the result of political and economic choices, motivated by 
contrasting ideologies and mediated by a diversity of political actors and civil 
stakeholders. Changes in health legislation have taken place where and when 
political parties, stakeholders and organized civil society have prompted 
transformations and applied strength and pressure to legislate. 
 
1.HEALTH LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF THE ACTORS IN CHILE 
 The development of a positivist liberal legal system in Chile gradually led 
to progress in social legislation and, following its own dynamics, gave shape to 
the different health models in the country. This certainly leads us to ask about the 
                                            
18 Sonia Fleury, “Reforming Health Care in Latin America: Challenges and Options” in Sonia 
Fleury, S. Belmartino & E. Baris (eds.), Reshaping Health Care in Latin America, (Ottawa, IDRC, 
2000) Chap. 1 at 1. 
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possibility of interpreting or considering the law as a mere instrument of the 
status quo for maintaining and reproducing the progressive system or as a factor 
of change or, perhaps, as both. The health reforms implemented in Chile have 
therefore been the result of political and economic choices, motivated by various 
ideologies and negotiated by a variety of actors. 
 Their legitimation was not the result of the imposition of one group over 
the rest, but rather the articulation of interests through the development of a 
consensus, or, more specifically, what I have called “hegemonic consensus”. In 
essence, this scenario has allowed for an understanding of the interplay of 
interests that has led to major changes in health reforms as well as permitting an 
understanding of the negotiation process between a web of economic, political 
and social forces that contributed to the health laws in Chile during the 20th 
century. 
The conflict-consensus dialectic is part of the process of law creation and 
is not only embedded in the dynamics of law itself, but also gives it life and 
makes it real. It is not that consensus is positive and conflict negative, nor is it 
true the other way around. We may judge the results, we can have opinions 
about conflict and consensus based on our values and ideologies, but neither 
conflict nor consensus can exist without the other, as suggested by the 
Hobbesian thesis, according to which society is in constant flux and made up of 
contradictory elements.  
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In the specific case of the health sector, we can see that reforms in Chile 
specifically and Latin America generally –– have been strongly determined by the 
influence and capability of mobilizing interest groups through the articulation of 
conflicting interests in the political arena, which has been mediated by the 
political strength and the mobilization capacity of political actors and organized 
civil society, as well as the church and the armed forces. Governments have 
bargained separately with labour factions, urban workers, employees, the police 
and the armed forces, ultimately resulting in a very heterogeneous structure, in 
which the rights and benefits of the different factions have come to depend on 
the negotiation power of the different groups.19 This means, as mentioned above, 
that health legislation is the result of a negotiation process in which the strength 
and interests of actors are confronted.20 This is why changes to health legislation 
have been neither easy nor linear, but rather the outcome of political struggles 
and the action of social movements, currents of opinion and ideological 
confrontations in a given economic and political context. Most of these changes 
are rooted in legislative reforms, achieved through negotiations 21 and consensus 
within the prevailing political dynamic.   
                                            
19 C. J. Murdock, "Physicians, the State and Public Health in Chile, 1881-1891", (1995) 27 
Journal of Latin American Studies 551. See also R. Trumper & L. Phillips, "Give Me Discipline 
and Give Me Death: Neoliberalism and Health in Chile", (1996) 37 Race and Class 19. 
20 W. Ratliff, "Development and Civil Society in Latin America and Asia", (1999) 565 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 91. 
21 Rony Lenz, “Proceso político de la reforma AUGE de la salud en Chile: algunas lecciones para 
América Latina. Una mirada desde la Economía Política”, (2007) Serie Estudios 
Socio/Económicos CIEPLAN 38 at 8-11. 
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It is particularly interesting to note that although organized civil society and 
political parties usually promote change, the state too can be involved in the 
negotiating process to articulate and frame transitions. An examination of the 
policy actors (individuals, social groups and power relationships), the policy 
process (forms of interaction and policy outcomes) and policy content (content 
issues related to health policy reforms and agenda) 22 is essential for an analysis 
of the dynamics of health reforms and health legislation. The complexity of 
political equilibrium, the historical outlook, social needs and external 
intermediaries are thus relevant for an analysis of social legislation.23 
Roemer24 was perhaps the first to identify these pressure groups (that he 
called “social classes”) in Latin America with respect to the type of health system 
that covered them.25 In the case of Chile, using Roemer’s typology, the groups 
are made up of four sectors, extensively reflected in the different health-care 
subsystems that covered them: 1) the military and the police; 2) civil servants, 
including journalists as well as municipal, railroad and bank employees as 
important subgroups; 3) white-collar workers and 4) blue-collar workers. 
Pressure groups like pensioners, unions, professionals and especially the groups 
                                            
22 Kent Buse, Nick Drager, Suzanne Fustukian & Kelley Lee, “Globalization and health policy 
trends and opportunities”, in Kelley Lee et al. eds. Health Politics in a Globalizing World, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 252. 
23 Alberto Febrajo, “The rules of the Game in the Welfare State”, in Gunther Teubner (ed.), 
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, (Berlin & New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986) at 132. 
24 Milton Roemer, “Medical Care and Social Class in Latin America”, 1964 The Milbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly, 54-64 in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America. Pressure Groups, 
Stratification, and Inequality, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978) at 9. 
25 1) The elite of landowners, large merchants, industrialists, and upper-level professionals; 2) 
military men, policemen and civil servants; 3) white-collar workers and small entrepreneurs; 4) 
manual industrial workers; 5) peasants, peons and urban underemployed and 6) the Indians. 
Roemer, “Medical Care and Social Class in Latin America”, in Mesa-Lago, Id. 
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tied or linked to the state apparatus, such as service providers, bureaucrats and 
technocrats are important stakeholders in processes of change. Institutional 
reforms and the implementation of legal changes require the collaboration – or at 
least a lack of active opposition – from mid-level bureaucrats and health 
authorities. These actors may have only limited or very circumscribed influence 
when legislating, but they can be facilitators of or obstacles to the implementation 
of reforms.26 
The rest of society not incorporated into these groups and subgroups 
relied on the public systems, charities or privately assumed the cost of their 
health care expenses.27 Every group had ad-hoc legislation with specific benefits, 
as well as particular mechanisms for financing these benefits. The proliferation 
and multiplicity of institutions, regulations and procedures created a legislative 
maze, with enormous difficulties to control and supervise them as well as high 
administrative costs for those covered.28 
This very stratified health care system granted social security benefits to 
workers in the formal labour sector, while the rest of the population received 
services provided by the state, thereby creating differences and inequities. Latin 
America’s fragmented systems had their origins in the profound economic, 
political and cultural changes that accompanied the process of industrialization 
and urbanization in the mid 20th Century. This pattern of structured social 
                                            
26  Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman, Development, Democracy and Welfare States, 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008) at 197. 
27 Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America, supra note 12 at 30. 
28 Mesa-Lago, Id. at 14. 
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interactions also led to several other characteristics, such as the stratification 
and/or exclusion of certain population groups, the disintegration of institutions, a 
narrow and fragile financial basis and strong actors with vested interests 
represented in the political arena.29 Health reforms and health legislation were 
clearly “process-oriented”, including the organizational structure for reorganizing 
relations between the public and private sectors, managers, policymakers, 
providers and consumers.30  
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE AND HEALTH 
    LEGISLATION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
 
By the mid-19th century, Chile had already witnessed the implementation 
of social legislation, thus leaving behind the Spanish colonial regime and 
embracing the consolidation of a liberal republic. Later, and inspired by the 
German system pioneered by Otto von Bismarck, first Chancellor of the German 
Empire (1871-90),31 Chile began to transform its social protection system in a 
process marked by vigorous political turmoil, social disputes and military 
interventions alongside substantial legislative changes. As early as 1890, the 
                                            
29 Fleury, “Reforming Health Care in Latin America”, supra note 18. 
30 T. Horev & Y. Babad, “Healthcare reform implementation: stakeholders and their roles – the 
Israeli experience”, (2005) 71 Health Policy 1. 
31 The compulsory German Bismarckian social insurance model was a prototype; it was the first 
to be devised and implemented in a Western country. It was established in 1883 as an integral 
part of a broader welfare system that included unemployment, accident, disability and maternity 
coverage, as well as social security laws. Guido Giarelli, “Convergence or Divergence?  A 
Multidimensional Approach to Health Care Reforms”, (2004) 14 International Review of Sociology 
171 at 176  
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creation of an agency in charge of public hygiene and sanitation initiated state 
involvement in public health.  
Workers were able to access social rights, basic benefits and public health 
care services from a variety of sources, financed by salary deductions, 
employers’ contributions and public state funds.  However, the funding for these 
social and health benefits was associated with specific segments of the labour 
market and different occupational organizations, thus the benefits perceived by 
individual workers varied according to their occupations and occupational 
affiliations.32 This diversity did not contribute to greater equality, but only served 
to reinforce inequalities based on occupational status. There was no clear 
consensus amongst the different sectors involved: the business elite was 
opposed to state intervention and new additional tax policies; the workers wanted 
to entrust the administration of the newly created social institutions to the labour 
unions; and physicians demanded the creation of a strong corporatist entity to 
lobby for and protect their interests. 
During the late 19th century and the early 20th century, the expansion of 
capitalism in Chile profoundly transformed labour relations. A proletariat linked to 
mining activity emerged, along with the incipient process of industrialization and 
greater urban activity related to the extension of cities and ports and increased 
economic development. A number of laws, decrees and policies intended to 
regulate capital and labour relations were promulgated.  At the same time, the 
                                            
32  Fernando Lolas, “Beyond the Anglophone World. On the goals of medicine: a Chilean 
perspective”, (1966) 43 Social Science and Medicine 125. 
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growth of the state apparatus and the process of industrialization led to an 
increase in both blue- and white-collar workers. These changes in the 
composition of the work force were marked by conflicts that led to new social 
movements and, ultimately, social reforms, as the workers struggled to 
consolidate new, comprehensive legislation that would clearly regulate contracts 
and protect workers in the case of illness or work-related accidents, tolerate 
unions and legal strikes, and create mechanisms for conflict resolution.33  
The modernization of public institutions originated in the late second and 
third decades of the 20th century, with President Arturo Alessandri Palma. During 
his first and second mandates, Chile promulgated a new constitution and a new 
Labour Code, Tax Law, Sanitary Law and Social Security Law, all in anticipation 
of several aspects of global trends having their origins in the treaty of Versailles 
and the International Labour Organization. The government provided health 
services to workers and their families,34 and the state assumed an active role 
with universal health care and the consolidation of state responsibility in public 
health. Social security was extended in a program that benefitted railway 
employees, and the mid-1920s witnessed the creation of organizations like the 
National Public Employees Fund (CANAEMPU) 35  and the Fund for Private 
Employees (EMPART). 
                                            
33 Memoria Chilena, online: DIBAM 
<http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/index.asp?id_ut=origenes 
delalegislacionlaboralenchile:1924-1931> (data accessed: November 23, 2011).  
34 Jorge Jiménez de la Jara & T. Bossert, “Chile’s Health Sector Reform: Lessons from Four 
Reform Periods”, (1995) 32 Health Policy at 155 - 157 
35 CANAEMPU, Caja nacional de empleados públicos. 
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The year 1924 (the year of a military intervention) marked a new stage in 
the history of social legislation in Chile, because it was from this date that the first 
social laws began to be enacted. Employers, workers and physicians welcomed 
them. Health legislation and the reforms that followed were not intended to 
reduce the activities of private aid, but rather were aimed at consolidating a 
centralized body for social and health policies. The creation of Workers’ 
Compulsory Insurance, or Social Security, in 1924 became a central piece in the 
history of public health in Chile. These events suddenly transformed the medical 
profession into a privileged actor in the construction of the state and radically 
changed the morphology of its labour market.36 Finally, the new constitution 
(1925) reflected global trends as it increased individual rights and the obligation 
of the state in ensuring social rights, subjected the right of ownership to what was 
considered the “rule of social progress”, protected labour and industry and 
enforced social welfare and legal protection for workers. It also proclaimed that 
public health services were a state obligation. The most important of these social 
laws was the creation of the Workers’ Insurance Fund, which later became 
known as the Social Security Service (SSS). 
In this context, the state has always been of enormous importance in the 
structure and administration of Chilean society and has assumed a leading role, 
becoming the most important agent of the production and reproduction of society 
                                            
36 Mario Parada, (2004) Evolución del sistema de protección social de la salud en Chile: un 
análisis sociológico, (Ph.D.  Thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) at 154. 
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and legislation. Health care services became fragmented and developed in 
dissimilar ways as fractions of the middle class, the working class, private 
interests, the church, physicians and health workers, the armed forces and 
organized civil society succeeded to varying degrees in pressuring the state to 
extend coverage.  
After the world economic crisis of the 1930s, the state began to penetrate 
the full range of social and economic sectors in Chile. The crisis was a stimulus 
for the state to allocate important resources to the industrial sector, to the 
construction of infrastructure and to the legal protection of labour benefits. 
Accelerating the industrialization process was crucial, resulting in economic 
growth and remarkable social improvement actions. This gave the state the role 
of welfare provider, thus enabling it to assume a clear function in legitimating the 
process of growth and accumulation.  Also, we cannot ignore the influence of the 
bureaucracy, which in some countries has also played a decisive role, acting as 
a significant pressure group to justify the stratification of social security.37 This 
can also be applied to health systems and especially their diversification in 
different subsystems, which is what occurred in Chile throughout the 20th century. 
Later, in 1938, the Popular Front government (led by Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda), which looked favourably upon democratic socialist ideas, implemented 
the Law of Preventive Medicine, which allowed all blue- and white-collar workers 
to be screened for contagious and chronic diseases. In 1939, Dr. Salvador 
                                            
37 Mesa-Lago, Social Security in Latin America, supra note 23 at 9. 
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Allende, then the Minister of Health (who would later become president in 1970), 
wrote a book that furthered Virchow’s research as he advocated that social rather 
than medical solutions were necessary in order to combat current health 
problems. The Chilean Socio-Medical Reality, “conceptualized illness as a 
disturbance of the individual fostered by deprived social conditions” 38  and 
focused on specific health problems that were generated by the poor living 
conditions of the working class: maternal and infant mortality, tuberculosis and 
sexually transmitted diseases. At that time, these suggestions were considered 
not only innovative, but also absolutely revolutionary.  
The period between 1917 and 1939 established the state’s responsibility 
in matters of health and welfare. However, the multiplicity of institutions that were 
created resulted in costly health care service. An integrationist and centralized 
movement began to develop a new reform process at the end of the 1930s, 
which reached its peak in 1952. In 1940, the Popular Front government 
presented a bill that clearly indicated that a more comprehensive form of 
coverage was needed to reduce health care inequities and centralize the 
management of all hospitals under a single government agency.  
It was a process that was developed through negotiations between 
governments, unions, health workers and the medical profession, each 
representing their own political, economic and corporate interests.39 The outcome 
                                            
38 H. Waitzkin, C. Iriart, A. Estrada & S. Lamadrid, “Social medicine then and now: lessons from 
Latin America”, (2001) 91 American Journal of Public Health 1592. 
39 Roberto Belmar et al., “Enseñanzas de la salud pública y de la medicina social”, (1977) Revista 
Médica de Chile. 
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was the establishment of the National Health Service (SNS)40 in 1952, which was 
the major health provider in Chile for four decades. The National Health Service, 
created in 1952 by Law 10,383 and established as an independent legal and 
administrative entity, was not only created as a direct and mechanical response 
to class interests, but also as a result and probably the synthesis of specific, 
articulated interests as well as social and political contradictions and disparities.41 
At the same time, the different insurance regimes and the dispersion of funds 
were maintained. The SNS provided curative care to 70% of the population and 
took on responsibilities related to disease prevention and social protection.  
Greater state involvement in satisfying health care needs became part of public 
policy independently of the government in power, and the SNS continued to 
developed and consolidate its position over time. 
Like in Western Europe, full employment provided the ideological cement 
for hegemonic order throughout social democracy. In the case of Chile, the 
welfare state provided the legal framework for social and health reforms, 
including labour protection, social stability and a more Keynesian state 
involvement in economic development. Although capitalist development in 
industrialized countries was characterized by the progressive establishment of a 
welfare state within a political context of so-called liberal democracies with 
protectionist social policies, the historical reality of “Third World” economies was 
                                            
40 Servicio Nacional de Salud. 
41  Carolina Tetelboin, (1980) La práctica médica en Chile (Thesis, Sociology, Universidad 
Autónoma Metropolitana-Xochimiloho, México) at 49. 
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and has been considerably different. In developed capitalist societies, the social 
policies of the welfare state, such as public education, wide-ranging public health 
actions, public health care services, social security and unemployment insurance 
contributed to the formation and development of human capital by improving the 
overall well-being of the population. In doing so, these social policies helped 
activate the economic process of circulation, thus stimulating consumption and 
economic growth. The Chilean welfare health system developed through 
negotiations between different social, political and economic forces, political 
parties, labour unions and social organizations played a redistributive role, 
reducing inequalities and protecting the low-income population and those 
residing on the margins of society.  
These processes of political negotiations in the 20th century facilitated the 
formation of a state based on compromises. It is through these negotiations that 
the Chilean state managed to progressively resolve its conflicts while preserving 
relative autonomy and permitting significant institutional development. The state 
exercised its power to act as an agent of transformation, intervening directly in all 
social, economic and political spheres. The state assumed the role of benefactor 
for the most disadvantaged social sectors and took leadership in the overall 
orientation of social and economic policy. 
Beginning in the 1960s, however, Chilean society came to be affected by 
two basic phenomena: a structural stagnation of the capitalist economic model, 
which was incapable of promoting and stimulating development, and a socio-
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political context of increasing democratization, due to the actions of social 
movements and very active political parties. As Chilean development was 
characterized by the failure of industrial and financial capital to promote 
economic and social development, the industrialization process began to lose its 
initial dynamism. Added to this was a limited market, a deficit in the balance of 
payments and recurrent inflationary spirals getting increasingly out of control. In 
1964, the Christian Democratic Party led by President Eduardo Frei Montalva 
proposed the “Revolution in Freedom” program, which blended capitalist growth 
with social development and the reinforcement of popular participation. The 
government’s intention was to improve, extend and improve the efficiency of the 
national health system following six years of a conservative regime. The 
government expected to implement vast reforms to create a more unified health 
care service.   
In response to pressure from the growing middle class, the centrist 
Christian Democracy government (1964-1970) took the initiative to develop a 
new program for white-collar employees (SERMENA). It permitted users to select 
their physicians, stimulated a semi-public insurance system and created primary 
and preventive care clinics and laboratories for the middle class that were no 
longer fully covered by the public system. These so-called “harmony ideology” 
reforms were the culmination of an incremental process rather than a rupture 
with the past, and the government was the dominant group, able to dictate reform 
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policy despite the objections of opposing interest groups in civil society.42 As 
analyzed by Fleury, “the social policies that have developed in most Latin 
American countries are rooted in a similar development model. They are 
responsible for some of the most significant features of the relationship between 
the State and society, as well for the incorporation of a particular power structure 
into an institutionalized system.”43  
The Medical College manifested its desire to preserve a totally 
professional approach to health care, independent of political interference. The 
government lost control of social crescendos, while physicians faced unexpected 
changes to their profession, such as the greater autonomy of non-medical health 
care professionals. The SNS thus began to incorporate the free-choice system, 
while at the same time popular awareness of health rights became more 
widespread. The economic policies of President Eduardo Frei Montalva’s 
Christian Democrat government (1964-1970) were greatly insufficient, and by 
1967, plummeting economic indices, unresolved inequalities, unsatisfied social 
demands and unmet salary demands for labour and the lower middle class 
stimulated significant political agitation. President Frei concluded his final year 
amidst great political, ideological and social turmoil.  
This complex economic, social and political context constituted the 
prelude to the victory of the popular forces, headed by Salvador Allende as 
leader of the Popular Unity coalition in 1970. Between 1970 and 1973, the 
                                            
42 Jiménez de la Jara & Bossert, “Chile’s Health Sector Reform”, supra note 22 at 160-161. 
43 Fleury, “Reforming Health Care in Latin America”, supra note 18 at 1. 
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“Unidad Popular” (Popular Unity) government introduced reforms to democratize 
and centralize the organizational structure of the National Health Service.44 
Hoping to resolve gaps in health benefits, the Popular Unity government aimed to 
restructure health services, streamline medical care, increase access, coordinate 
activities, and, in turn, repackage them within a dynamic and effective national 
plan. This task was entrusted to the Single Health Service. 45  The new 
organizational structure was called upon to incorporate public institutions and to 
absorb the health institutions responsible for providing health care services to the 
different segments of the middle class.  
This major policy change resulted in a radicalization of the social 
significance of health and a more visible state presence. Despite its promise, the 
program’s numerous efforts to support democratization ultimately attained more 
modest results than projected, particularly at the management level. 
Nonetheless, several policies enhanced health conditions, such as those related 
to contagious diseases, maternal health, childhood diarrhea, nutrition and 
preventive health measures. 
Between November 1970 and October 1972, the tension between 
physicians and the government increased substantially. In the end, the Chilean 
road to socialism came up against the traditional conservative elite and the 
middle class. The health sector went through the same political turbulence, with 
                                            
44 Jorge Jiménez de la Jara (ed.), Medicina Social en Chile, (Santiago, Ediciones Aconcagua, 
1977). S. K. Tedeschi, T. M. Brown, et al., "Salvador Allende: Physician, Socialist, Populist, and 
President", (2003) 93 Journal of Public Health 2014 in Fleury, “Reforming Health Care in Latin 
America”, supra note 18 
45 Servicio Único de Salud. 
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the mounting inability of the political class to negotiate the interests of several 
stakeholders in order to reach a consensus. The outcome of this turmoil and 
uncertainty was the military coup of September 11, 1973, bringing a brutal end to 
the government elected in 1970. The military dictatorship (1973-1989) replaced 
the public-oriented system with a market-oriented approach, transferring 
important responsibilities to the private sector, curtailing benefits and reducing 
state involvement in the funding of public policies and their administration.46   
 
3. HEALTH LEGISLATION, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND  
    INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
 
Over the time period explored in this dissertation, Chile went through 
several different stages in its development and responded to different economic 
models, which corresponded to historical processes and international influences. 
The country participated in global and regional economic traditions, first linked to 
the models typical of Third World countries as mono-exporters of raw materials 
and natural resources, and then to the contemporary market models of the 1980s 
based on the neoliberal theses tied to the Washington Consensus.47 Between 
these two extremes, the developmentalist models linked to processes of 
domestic industrialization and import substitution rose to popularity, such as the 
                                            
 46 R. Castiglioni, “The politics of Retrenchment: The Quandaries of Social Protection under 
Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1990”, (2001) 43 Latin American Politics and Society at 37. 
47 The term Washington Consensus, describes the economic policy prescriptions that constituted 
a reform package promoted for the economic crisis facing the developing countries in the late 
80´s. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury Department, in 
Washington, supported the plan.  It touched economic areas like as macroeconomic stabilization, 
economic opening to trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within the 
domestic economy. 
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more CEPALian models, 48  with a large emphasis on Keynesian economic 
policies and states closely based on welfare models.  
Among these models was the dependency school in the 1960s and 1970s, 
which had a large impact on the Third World and Latin America. 49  The 
dependency thesis described the structural dependency between the economies 
of the Third World and the capitalist countries, requiring the former to adapt and 
respond to the interests of the metropolis, jeopardizing their domestic economic 
growth and playing a very decisive role in the international division of labour, 
where the Third World and especially Latin America was assigned the role of 
exporting raw material with no value added and consuming manufactured goods 
and technology from the economically developed world. The CEPALian 
proposals also sought to improve financial management, and their 
developmentalist models advocated the necessity of foreign exchange controls, 
which entailed intervening in the exchange market, applying protectionist 
measures through high tariffs and introducing forced savings policies.50 They 
sought inward development and political initiatives aimed at reducing or 
minimizing domestic weaknesses and eliminating the obstacles that made these 
economies tightly controlled from abroad. 
                                            
48 Proposed by the CEPAL, (Economic Commision for Latin America) from de United Nations.  
49 Ex.: Theotonio Dos Santos, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Osvaldo Sunkel, Raúl Prebisch, 
Fernando H. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran and laterly Immanuel Wallerstein. 
50 Colin Lewis, “Estado, mercado y sociedad: políticas e instituciones de acción económica y 
social en América Latina desde 1900”, in Alicia Puyana & Guillermo Farfán (coords.), Desarrollo, 
Equidad y Ciudadanía. Las políticas sociales en América Latina, (México, FLACSO, Plaza y 
Valdés, 2003) at 48. 
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Haggard and Kaufman’s analysis of development, democracy and welfare 
statism during the 20th Century indicates that, “These structuralist ideas 
emphasized the stimulative effects of generous wage settlements, social 
entitlements, and labour protections. Welfare protections and job security were 
sustained not only because of the pressure of national-populist political 
coalitions, but also because the ISI strategy (Import Substitution Industrialization) 
made them tolerable to dominant segments of the business elite as well.”51 This 
model, which emerged slowly but surely following the global economic crisis in 
the 1920s, was implemented throughout Latin America. It was a protectionist 
economic policy that increased the price of foreign products in order to stimulate 
national production, with the aim of increasing demand, stimulating job creation, 
reducing unemployment and promoting economic growth.52 
From a social perspective, dependency theorists maintained the need to 
promote inward development, invest in public works, regulate the economy and 
expand rights and social benefits. There were also important currents of 
“dependentista” structural thought that were much more critical or radical, which 
advocated the need to mobilize anti-capitalist or socialist revolutionary 
processes. In synthesis, these “developmentalist” proposals were closely 
associated with the construction of the state, right from the 1930s and with the 
social policies following the Second World War. 
                                            
51 Haggard & Kaufman, Development, Democracy and Welfare States, supra note 26 at 64. 
52 Mohsen Al Attar, “Third world approaches to international law and the rethinking of international 
legal education in the 21st century”, (Toronto, Dissertation, Faculty of Graduate Studies, York 
University, 2012) at 3. 
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This occurred in various countries in Latin America. In Argentina, for 
example, during Irigoyen’s first presidency (1916-1922), and in Mexico during the 
Cárdenas government (1934-1940), national policies were implemented to 
encourage economic productivity, increase public spending on infrastructure and 
improve social services such as education, social security and retirement. These 
actions could be called populist today, but ultimately they constituted an 
important economic response for economic and social development.53  
In the Chilean case, this model had ups and downs, but it did generate a 
broad consensus. It was further strengthened during the popular governments, 
such as that of the Frente Popular (Popular Front) between 1938 and 1941, as 
well as later on. These Keynesian policies also enabled significant public 
investment in the economy and the creation of important public corporations such 
as the production development corporation CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de 
la Producción)54 in 1939 and companies like the national electricty company 
(ENDESA, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad), the national oil company (ENAP, 
Empresa Nacional del Petróleo), the Pacific steel company (CAP, Compañía de 
Acero del Pacífico), the national telecommunications company (ENTEL, Empresa 
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones) and the national sugar industry (IANSA, 
Industria Azucarera Nacional). All these companies were later privatized in the 
1980s with the implementation of neoliberal policies. 
                                            
53 Lewis, “Estado, mercado y sociedad”, supra note 50 at 37-38. 
54 The CORFO (Corporation for the promotion of economic development) created in 1939.   
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International influence on development policies and health legislation was 
no less significant. Developmentalist, populist and socialist policies were 
criticized and in many cases did not solve the economic and social crises, 
sometimes even exacerbating them, as in the 1960s and 1970s. In Chile, mixed 
social policies were not only aimed at protecting the workers, promoting the 
market and ensuring jobs, but also at responding to the economic and social 
demands of a growing middle class. This was all made possible by social 
organizations and union demands.55 Important social benefits were also secured, 
as it was in 1952 with the creation of the National Health Service, the 
cornerstone of public health, analyzed in detail in chapter two of this dissertation. 
It is interesting to note the role that international academic institutions like 
the German Friedrich Ebert foundation and the U.S. Ford Foundation and 
Rockefeller Foundation played in these policies. The latter, for example, funded 
many economics programs at the two main Chilean universities (the University of 
Chile and the Catholic University), and the number of economists in Chile grew 
from 120 in the early 1960s to more than 700 one decade later.56 The same thing 
happened in the field of sociology, also with the Ford Foundation, as well as with 
German and Belgian institutions. International research centres were established 
in Chile, including most prominently the Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences (FLACSO, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales).  
                                            
55 Al Attar, “Third world approaches to international law”, supra note 52 at 3. 
56 Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, “Chile: Law and the Legitimation of Transitions.. supra note 12 at 
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The move to neoliberalism in the 1980s was also highly influenced from 
abroad, even though Chile was the first to apply it, even before the Washington 
Consensus and the neoliberal policies of the Thatcher government in the United 
Kingdom and the Reagan government in the United States. The strong influence 
and pressure of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank57 was 
decisive in this respect, as was the role played by universities in the United 
States, particularly the University of Chicago,58 which was instrumental in the 
implementation of neoliberal policies in Chile. Morgan, for example, in her 
analysis of transnational law and universalizing neoliberalism, discusses “how 
the processes of state regulation are increasingly guided by supranational norms 
‘such that a particular form of economic rationality becomes part of the taken-for-
granted ways of policy making’ ”.59 
Along similar lines, the support and close ties between the United States 
and the armed forces of countries in Latin America, including Chile, paved the 
way for the coups d’état that disrupted the democracies in the region, imposing 
authoritarian and dictatorial regimes that allows these models to be advanced. 
The effects on social and health policies were powerful, shrinking the public 
sector and stimulating market models for social and public policy, all with the 
resulting impact and effect on economic policies of accumulation that were 
                                            
57 Lewis, “Estado, mercado y sociedad”, supra note 50 at 55. 
58 In particular the role played by the “Chicago boys”, technocrats inspired by the neoliberal 
doctrines of Milton Friedman and Harold Harberger, Haggard & Kaufman, Development, 
Democracy and Welfare States, supra note 26 at 108. 
59 Bronwen Morgan, “The Economization of Politics: Meta Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial 
Legality” (2003) 12 Social and Legal Studies 4 at 489-490 [Morgan, “The Economization of 
Politics”] in Al Attar, “Third world approaches to international law”, supra note 52 at 89. 
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consistent with and instrumental to the neoliberal model, as it was analyzed in 
detail in chapter three. 
 
4. HEALTH LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN CHILE 
Neo-Gramscian analysis examines hegemony as a territory of struggle in 
which dominant social thought must be constantly articulated and rearticulated at 
various levels of the social structure.60 But ultimately, the concept of hegemony is 
a concept that expresses a form of domination, which is exercised in different 
ways, originates lawfully, and is invariably linked to power relations and the 
power structure in a society. For this reason, it is also essential to discuss how 
the state acts and reacts in this process in which hegemony is exercised. This is 
why transitions in health legislation, health reforms and changes to the health 
care system must be considered in light of broader social, economic and political 
factors.  
Analyzing the evolution of health legislation necessarily involves 
understanding how legislation is embedded in development processes and social 
policies. As already discussed social and health policies in Latin America have 
generally reinforced different mechanisms of redistribution and social 
                                            
60 See Stephen Gill, “Epistemology, Ontology and the ‘Italian School”, in Stephen Gill (ed.), 
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1993). Mark Rupert, “Alienation, Capitalism and the Inter-State System: Towards a 
Marxian/Gramscian Critique” in Stephen Gill, Id. in P. Barrios, Liberal Environmental Law and the 
International Law of Hazardous Chemicals, (Thesis, Ph.D. Philosophy, University of British 
Columbia, 2007) at 21. Enrico Augelli & Craig Murphy, “America’s Quest for Supremacy and the 
Third World: A Gramscian Analysis”, in Mark Rupert, Id. in Gill, Id. in Barrios, Id. at 32. 
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stratification, with effects on political and social stability and the reinforcement of 
public and/or private health care, as well as the direct stimulation of capital 
accumulation, which in the case of the neoliberal approaches, includes primarily 
private pension and health insurance systems. Social and health policies have 
thus been rooted in a relationship between the state and society with social, 
economic and political characteristics that both influence and determine health 
legislation.  
In fact, social reforms are often ambiguous. In the process of deepening 
social reforms, we are confronted with a plurality of objectives that correspond to 
different interests. This process has also a paradoxical, but probably necessary, 
dialectical nature: it facilitates equity, promotes protection and democratizes 
society, while also legitimizing the state and a system of power that has created 
its own inequality and lack of protection. As indicated by Fitzpatrick in relation to 
the development of the welfare state: “since a welfare democracy would require a 
more egalitarian distribution of power and resources than exists at present, we 
need an account of those from whom power and resources would need to be 
redistributed.”61 
In Chile, like in other countries in Latin America during the 20th century, a 
state took shape based on the Rule of law (Rechtsstaat), that is, a legal state or 
a state of rights, where the exercise of power is constrained by the law, also 
emphasizing the concepts of just or what is legally right and in conformity with 
                                            
61 T. Fitzpatrick, “In Search of a Welfare Democracy”, (2002) 1 Social Policy & Society 1. 
 
 
235 
that which is lawful or fair. The power of the state was thus limited to protecting 
citizens from the arbitrary use of authority and guaranteeing the exercise of civil 
liberties and political rights. Chile, along with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, are 
the countries in the region that gave the state the role of “national project”, and 
Chile, like Mexico, adopted the practices of an interventionist state with extensive 
programs of educational reform and the extension of social security and labour 
legislation. National institutions were therefore created to promote and foster 
economic development, and programs for social benefits were stregnthened.62 In 
Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, this political vision of creating a national state was 
completed in the 1930s. 
The models and transitions of the state in Chile are characteristic of the 
evolution of a patrimonial state, as a legacy of colonialism. After the depression 
of the 1930s and the Second World War, the state became gradually 
consolidated as a strong and interventionist state, enabling the consolidation of a 
solid Rule of law (Rechtsstaat) and thereby promoting economic and social 
development.63 Given the characteristics of Chilean society, especially its class 
composition, its past as a patrimonial state and its large social differences, the 
development of the Rule of law – despite its limitations, ambiguities and 
injustices – constituted a real possibility for extending rights and gradually 
promoting greater social justice, neutralizing arbitrariousness and limiting the 
                                            
62 See Jan M. Broekman, “Legal Subjetivity as a Precondition for the Intertwinement of Law and 
the Welfare State”, in Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, supra note 2 at 40.  
63 Dezalay & Garth, “Chile: Law and the Legitimation of Transitions”, supra note 12 at 1. 
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indiscriminate exercise of political, economic and religious power. In a formal, 
legal and more stable system, power relations are expressed with less intensity 
than they are under a system with diffuse, unclear or ambiguous legislation.64 
In the case of health legislation and as discussed above, although health 
reforms were determined by the dynamics of the power struggle between the 
classes and social actors and their ability to mobilize their goals and forge 
alliances to create temporary social consensus, 65  the state became more 
interventionist in order to secure emerging social rights.66 Consequently, it is the 
implementation of policies from above (the state) that generated a period of 
unprecedented economic growth and ensured a standard of living that provided 
employment and basic social services (health, education, retirement) for the 
people of the countries that adopted such a pathway. For Fleury, “The concept of 
social protection in Latin America rested on social and institutional mechanisms 
of differentiation. Nevertheless, this political give-and-take constituted the first 
instance in which the demands of the working class were considered in the 
political arena and incorporated in the government agenda. Social protection was 
rooted in a political system wherein the state played a key role in the 
                                            
64 See for the account of American Welfare state in relation to the New Deal-era reforms Bill 
Scheuerman, “The Rule of Law and the Welfare State: Toward a New Synthesis”, (1994) 22 
Politics & Society 2 195-213 at 207.  
65 Fleury, “Reforming Health Care in Latin America”, supra note 18. Tedeschi, Brown, et al., 
"Salvador Allende: Physician, Socialist, Populist, and President", supra note 44. 
66 Fleury, Id. 
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industrialization process by combining industrial protectionism with a controlled 
political incorporation of urban workers’ demands.”67  
 
5. THE PARADOXES OF THE LAW BETWEEN LEGALISATION AND 
    LEGITIMATION AND THE CHILEAN CASE 
 
The theories of legal realism, which marked the beginning of the 
emergence of social scientific legal study,68  have demonstrated the political 
nature of the legal process69 and recognize, despite their regret, the possibility of 
the indeterminacy of law. This regret disappears in critical theories such as 
critical legal studies, in which the indeterminacy of law is not only recognized but 
accepted: “The rules do not determine results and cannot explain whatever ability 
legal practitioners have to predicts results.”70 This is not insignificant, as it is 
precisely this indeterminacy that gives the law its nature as a political practice, 
and it is for this reason that for critical legal studies, it is essential to be able to 
uncover the political implications of the indeterminacy of the law.71 This is why 
the law assumes this ambivalent and contradictory identity.  
                                            
67 Id. at 2. 
68 See J. H. Schlegel, “American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale 
Experience”, (1979) Buffalo Law Review 28 459-588. 
69 See Morton J. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The crisis of legal 
ortodhoxy, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992) in Neil Duxbury, Patterns on American 
Jurisprudence, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997) at 103, 263, 307.  Jules L. Coleman & 
Brian Leiter, “Legal Positivism”, in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law 
and Legal Theory, (Cambridge, Blackwell, 2010) at 291. 
70  D. Kennedy, “A semiotics of legal argument”, Law Review, 1991, 42:75. J.Balkin, “The 
crystalline structure of legal thought”,  (1986) 39 Rutgers Law Review 1 in Guyora Binder, “Critical 
Legal Studies”, in Coleman & Leiter, Id. at 281. 
71 See Duxbury, Patterns on American Jurisprudence, supra note 69. 
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This indeterminacy of law became clear in the ongoing political and legal 
conflict faced by the Popular Unity government. Formally, the law was the same, 
as it had been enacted by previous governments. Yet in this new and 
revolutionary historical and political context, it acquired not only different 
functions, but also conflicting ones. This is why those that had never questioned 
the legitimacy of the law did so now. It was not feasible to declare the laws 
illegal, but it was possible to challenge their legitimacy. This situation became 
critical in the final years of the Allende government, which as we know did not 
complete its constitutional term of office. 
The socialist government declared its commitment to bringing about 
revolutionary transformations to confront old-fashioned policies that were 
obstructing the construction of a more equitable, efficient and suitable health 
system. The government also implemented reforms to increase public 
involvement in health care, to control the pharmaceutical industry, to encourage 
citizen participation in health care management and to achieve health care equity 
by creating a Unified National Health Care Service (SUS).  
During the Allende administration, the democratization process deepened, 
allowing an increasingly stronger presence of popular forces in economic, 
political and social life. Not only were these popular forces involved in a broad 
range of claims and political and social issues, but their agenda also consisted of 
a concrete political program based on transforming the economic system in order 
to promote social development. The principal objective of Salvador Allende’s 
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government was to implement radical economic and social changes to the 
capitalist economic model and to establish the foundation for a future socialist 
society, through the “Chilean way to socialism”. The economic mechanisms for 
the implementation of this alternative were principally the nationalization of 
natural resources, the extension of the so-called “social property” sector in the 
economy—including all state owned companies and corporations—and the 
acceleration of agrarian reform.  
As expected, the new revolutionary program further accentuated the 
incompatibility between the capitalist economic model and the democratization of 
the Chilean political system. In short, the coming to power of a coalition of parties 
and popular movements, including two Marxist parties (the Communist Party and 
the Socialist Party), combined with the increasing democratization of the political 
system, further deepened the crisis of capital accumulation. The legal economic 
measures of the Allende government—such as the nationalization of foreign 
companies, the nationalization of the entire mining industry, the expropriation or 
intervention of monopolistic companies, the extension of agrarian reform, the 
regulation of foreign trade, intervention in banking and distribution networks and 
substantial wage increases—were redirecting economic surpluses normally 
collected by capital. Furthermore, the rifts between industrial and financial capital 
and between national small- and medium-sized companies and national and 
foreign multinational corporations became even more acute and politically critical. 
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Due to its minority position in Parliament, the popular government 
executed its socialist economic and social program within the confines of the 
1925 Constitution and under the existing legal system. Some of the most radical 
reforms were legally legitimized through the unabridged legal texts from the 
hundred-day “Socialist Republic” in 1932 and the legal faculties associated with 
the jurisdiction of a presidential regime. This is why Allende’s government was 
labelled “the revolution in legality”. The same legal system that had legitimized 
the political control of conservative forces in the past was now instrumental in 
allowing legal reforms against their economic interests.  
In Gramscian terms, for the dominant class that controlled the 
corporations, the media and strongly influenced the judicial system, the country 
was witnessing a rupture of the historic bloc.72 It was in this context that Allende 
declared that what hurt the dominant class the most was that the government 
was fighting the grand bourgeoisie with their own laws. In these circumstances, 
the role played by the state was extremely critical, as it faced challenges in a 
struggle for power and control.73 In this sense, the Chilean state had been co-
opted by different groups with opposing or conflicting agendas.74  
For example, this phenomenon was particularly interesting in Chile in the 
1970s due to the explicit relationship between the law, the legal system, political 
factors and the political dynamics themselves. This made the interesting 
                                            
72 Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, supra note 60 at 56. 
73 Jonathan Joseph, “A realist Theory of Hegemony”, (2000) 30 Journal of the Theory Social 
Behaviour 183. 
74 Jonathan Barton, “State Continuismo and Pinochetismo: The Keys to Chilean transition”, 
(2002) 21 Bulletin of Latin American Research 358.  
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relationship and contradictions between formality and substance deeper and 
more transparent in the process of “the law becoming law”. During this historical 
period, there was an atypical but revealing change in the content and meaning of 
the law, which led to or made even clearer the contradictions within legal rule 
itself. 75  During the three years of Allende’s government, the “ revolution in 
legality” (called also the Chilean way to socialism) had at its very core the 
contradictions between the different dimensions of law and their interpretation 
and/or use. 
The formality of law was legitimated no longer as an instrument of the 
status quo but as an agent of change, while resistance to this made no allusion 
to the essence of the change itself, but rather to its supposed illegality. 
Furthermore, the legal formalism of drawing on legal provisions from the 1930s 
(laid down in another era with different realities) that were instrumental for 
strategic economic transformations became a tool for change. I refer here to the 
decree-laws, dictated in 1931 and reused in the 1970s that allowed the state to 
intervene in private companies and put them temporarily under its control. In 
other words, forty years later, the content or essence of the legal provision 
(dictated in a different economic and political context) changed without modifying 
its form (positive formalism), as it was applied in a different context.76 
                                            
75 Joan Garcés, El Estado y los problemas tácticos en el Gobierno de Allende, (Madrid, Siglo XXI 
Editores, 1974) at 233. 
76 Id. at 230-233. 
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In the case of Chile, as indicated above, the notion of respect for legality 
was valued as an important part of the political tradition, and this legality was the 
result of historical commitments, both unspoken and formal, to channel economic 
and social transformations within the Rule of law. In this sense, while the legal 
system reproduced itself, the origin of this reproduction (or self-reference) was 
not in the essence of legal formality but in the political agreements that upheld it. 
As discussed above, in the 1970s, the government of President Allende, which 
called itself a “revolution in legality,” is undoubtedly the clearest example of the 
country’s legalist political tradition, even though there was not much in the 
existing law that could be used within the confines of existing legal legitimacy and 
tradition.77 It is therefore not surprising that the legal revolution led by President 
Allende was unable to find much legal “inspiration”, despite the long tradition of 
respect for the Rule of law. 
The Rule of law, once instrumental in the exercise of power and its 
legitimization, was now playing a counter-hegemonic role. Political debate could 
no longer take refuge in the “neutrality” of the law. The Allende government’s 
economic and social reforms and the political conjuncture limited the possibilities 
for social and ideological reproduction, restricted the process of capital 
accumulation and interfered in the process of legitimation that reinforced the 
status quo and the capitalist model of development. 
                                            
77 Dezalay & Garth, “Chile: Law and the Legitimation of Transitions”, supra note 12 at 39. 
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If the Rule of law is seen as an ideology that legitimizes and conceals 
power relations,78 it is interesting to see how in the case of Chile, the Rule of law 
was also instrumental for changing power relations. This created a major legal 
debate, as the Allende government was implementing revolutionary changes 
within the same legal order that it had inherited. As it was very difficult and 
practically unsustainable to oppose the transformations by a government that 
had been elected fairly and democratically to lead such changes, the opposition 
addressed the government in legal terms, arguing and debating that it was 
violating or circumventing the legal system and the Rule of law. 79  This 
phenomenon, which in Gramsci’s terms can be called counter-hegemonic,80 was 
particularly interesting from the point of view of law and politics. Throughout all 
the years of the Allende government, the debate about the legality of the 
government’s acts and respect for the Rule of law persisted. The government 
                                            
78 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1986) in John J. A. Burke, “The Political Foundation on Law and the Need for 
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Francisco, Thesis, Faculty on Law, University of Fribourg, 1992) at 5-14. 
79 This political phenomenon was criticized on the grounds that it demonstrated that the law was 
considered “legal” when it served the interests of the dominant sectors and illegal when it went 
against them. 
80 [Counter-hegemony is organized social challenge that eventually replaces the former political 
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Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism”, (2002) 16 Global Society 3 at 300. [Neo Gramscian 
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repeatedly expressed that the Rule of law was a tangible reality and that legal 
norms were scrupulously observed and respected. The opposition pointed out 
that constitutional norms had been breached and that legal norms were 
circumvented or legal loopholes were used astutely, such as, according to the 
opposition, had occurred with the nationalization of companies. 
The law can thus serve different purposes in different economic, political 
and historical contexts and has many dimensions that are not unequivocally 
perceptible, given its synchronic and diachronic aspects. There are laws that 
have had one purpose and, in a different context, serve different purposes, such 
as Roman civil law during slavery, for example, which later served the modern 
ideological purposes of capitalist economic organization.81 In the case of Chile in 
particular, these laws from the 1930s82 were instrumental for initiating processes 
of socialist transformation during the Allende government between 1970 and 
1973. We can see, then, that the functions of the law are historically contingent; 
that is, they can fulfill different functions and serve different masters over the 
course of time.83 
Hence, breaking the Rule of law once it was no longer instrumental was, 
for the opposition, only a matter of time. Put in Gramscian terms, once the crisis 
becomes extremely delicate and dangerous, radical solutions and “unknown 
                                            
81 Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, supra note 9 at 118. 
82The Salvador Allende government divided the economy into three areas: social, mixed and 
private. The transfer of large companies to the state was rejected by Parliament, thus the 
government issued a decree authorizing the expropiation of any industry considered fundamental 
for the economy. This method was criticized by the dominant economic sectors as a legal 
loophole.  
83 Spitzer, “Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology on Law”, supra note 9 at 118. 
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forces, represented by charismatic ‘men of destiny,’”84 become visible. Gramsci’s 
“men of destiny”, or Engels’ “heroes”, 85  were the Armed Forces, while the 
unknown forces were no other than the conservative right-wing political parties 
along with multinational companies and the United States government, 
represented by the Secretary of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.86   
 
6. THE FALL OF THE WELFARE STATE IN CHILE 
In Chile, the breakdown of democracy in 1973 appeared as a precondition 
for the restoration of the factors that would allow the reinstatement of the liberal 
economic model, earlier threatened by economic changes undertaken during the 
government of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity). Incremental health reforms 
were disrupted by the military dictatorship, and the implementation of a new 
health model that altered the previous reforms and plans challenged the welfare 
state and opened the way for a neoliberal market model.87  
                                            
84  Enrique Peruzzotti & Martin Plot, eds., Critical Theory and Democracy:  Civil Society, 
Dictatorship, and Constitutionalism in Andrew Arato's Democratic Theory, (Routledge, 2012) at 
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85 See Frederick Engels, Introducción de “Las luchas de clases en Francia de 1848 a 1850”, in K. 
Marx & F. Engels, Obras Escogidas, (Moscú, Editorial Progreso, 1973). 
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87 M. Chossudovsky, "Human Rights, Health and Capital Accumulation en the Third World", 
(1979) 9 International Journal of Health Services 61. See also M. Taylor, "The Reformulation of 
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Until 1973, Chile had been a pioneer in Latin America in terms of social 
policy, developing one of the most universalistic systems on the continent. This 
rupture of democracy, by means of a military coup, was more significant than a 
mere tactical action or transitory military solution to restore the “ancient regime”. 
A true neoliberal economic revolution was in the making, which, given the long-
standing and broad societal consensus on maintaining the welfare state, could 
only be carried out under dictatorial rule. Legality was politicized in the 
discourses of those who had always predicated the contrary. As Engels had 
already written in 1895: “...if we are not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven to 
street fighting in order to please them, then in the end there is nothing left for 
them to do but themselves break through this dire legality.”88   
After the coup, the end of civil liberties, the limitation of democratic rights, 
the end of trade unions and professional associations like the Medical College, 
the closure of political and partisan activities, the control of the mass media, 
interventions in university affairs and the burning of critical books—all put in 
place to prevent any possibility of resistance or opposition—were legitimized with 
legal and political mechanisms and validated with dictatorial norms, regulations 
and laws. This way, it was now possible to impose legislation on labour relations, 
wages, disputes and strikes without the need for a system of negotiations or a 
consensus between different social actors. The use of violence and political 
                                                                                                                                  
Social Policy in Chile, 1973-2001. Questioning a Neoliberal Model", (2003) 3 Global Social Policy 
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repression facilitated the imposition of new regulations intended to stimulate and 
sustain the accumulation process.89  
Legislation included lifting all price controls, allowing the free movement of 
foreign capital, privatizing most public corporations and companies, liberalizing 
foreign trade and wage controls and introducing new labour laws. The neoliberal 
economic revolution that immediately followed the 1973 coup demonstrated how 
the Chilean Armed Forces took on the “political representation” of monopolistic 
capital, directly linked to transnational companies. It also revitalized the political 
interests of conservative forces, which had been neutralized for a decade (since 
the end of the Alessandri administration in 1964). 
In terms of social and health policy, the consequences were dramatic and 
put an end to Chile’s welfare system. Chile had been considered a pioneer in 
Latin America in terms of social policy, developing a large universal and inclusive 
system of social welfare.90 The military dictatorship fundamentally transformed 
the economic, social and political processes, giving rise to radical changes to the 
social welfare system and eventually the dismantling of the National Health 
System.  
The increased and progressive involvement of the state in public and 
health-related activities was now replaced with a neoliberal, market-oriented form 
                                            
89 Chossudovsky,“Human Rights, Health and Capital Accumulation in the Third World”, supra 
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90 Carlos Mesa-Lago, Changing Social Security in Latin America: towards the Alleviation of Social 
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of economic development, with all the social implications that such a shift 
entails.91 Under the new model, health care was understood as a commodity or 
service to be bought. The financial responsibility for health care was left to 
individuals, who contributed a proportion of their income, leaving the state to 
support the poor and the blue-collar workers covered by social security.92 This 
innovative version of the “social market economy”, in which the “social” was only 
in the branding, imposed freedom by denying it to civil society and the political 
sphere. 
As is extensively discussed in chapter three, health legislation was altered 
in three significant ways: first, in terms of reduction of the public health care 
funding; second, the creation of private pre-paid health institutions (ISAPRES), 
mainly for the middle, upper-middle and upper class; and third, the transfer of 
public health clinics to county (municipal) management, to reduce state 
bureaucracy and state-financed care.93 These changes minimized the state’s 
responsibilities and stimulated the development of private health care, health 
insurance and the pharmaceutical industry. This was a logical step for 
incorporating health into a liberal economic framework.94  
                                            
91 Ana María Viveros-Long, “Changes in the Health Financing: The Chilean Experience”, (1986) 
22 Social Science & Medicine 379. 
92 Id. at 382 
 93 See also J. L. Scarpaci & D. D. Bradham, “A three-tiered Health System and its inherent cost 
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These neoliberal reforms changed the relationship between state and 
society, either by replacing a political logic with market principles or by creating 
new forms of control and participation.95 International financial institutions have 
played, and continue to play, a significant role in the formation of social policy, 
particularly in health and pension programs.  Social security reforms have been 
promoted by World Bank loans within a neoliberal framework, in which the 
market has become responsible for providing health and pensions. Neoliberalism 
was able to initiate the dismantling of the welfare state and its underlying 
historical bloc.96 
Although these reforms were presented as an appropriate strategy for the 
rationalization and modernization of the health care system (as they were 
believed to improve efficiency and effectiveness, while reducing cost and 
bureaucracy), they were criticized for both their inequities and their prioritization 
of market expansion.97 There is little evidence that these reforms have reduced 
inequities and inefficiencies. It has fragmented health care among social classes, 
and co-payments represent a heavy economic burden for those with lower 
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Development 70. S. J. Kay, "The Perils of Private Pensions", (2000) 118 Foreign Policy 21. 
Taylor, "The Reformulation of Social Policy in Chile, supra note 87. Sapelli, "Risk Segmentation 
and Equity”, supra note 94.  
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incomes.98 The model has also reformed social security and private health care 
insurance in order to stimulate capital accumulation99 as a necessary instrument 
for the development of the private health care sector.100   The reforms and health 
legislation introduced since the return of democracy in 1989 have focused on 
reducing inequalities and establishing a new balance between the private and 
public health care sectors. 
To sum up, the consequences of the end of the welfare health system 
following the 1973 coup were dramatic, especially in a country considered a 
pioneer in Latin America in terms of social policy. This restructuring of the welfare 
state in Chile, as further discussed in chapter three, went through different 
stages. This first stage, in the 1970s, was to minimize the presence and 
participation of the state in the health sector and reduce public spending and the 
second stage, in the 1980s, was to reorganize the state in line with the principles 
and objectives of a market model, which was advanced with deregulation and 
privatization policies. This model, like the previous one with respect to social 
policies, became an international reference point, but this time for its neoliberal 
and privatizing changes to health and social security.101  
Although the objective of this research is not to analyze the post-
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dictatorship periods, especially the final years of the 20th century, I wish to outline 
a few aspects that deserve attention and that lasted for many years. The 
privatization process, as pointed out above, affected the health care system and 
continued to economically constrain the public system, reducing its efficiency, 
efficacy and performance. The boost to the private system did not undergo 
significant changes and continued to develop. In some cases, the state ended up 
discriminating against its own public hospitals in benefit of the private sector, 
which received better prices for the same services. This created a vicious circle 
in which fewer resources were given to the public system and then it was made 
to compete against a private system that received more revenue. 
Nonetheless, reforms were implemented to expand public sector services 
and correct the inequities created by the processes of privatization. The AUGE 
and GES (Garantías Explícitas [Explicit Guarantee]) plans were not intended to 
modify the system, but they improved it. New pathologies were covered by public 
services or covered in private institutions with public funding in an effort to 
establish a new balance between private and public health care providers and 
revitalize welfare state policies. While it is true that the private sector continued to 
grow, the Concertación governments’ plans advanced very slowly towards the 
option of a mixed public-private system. Actually the “Chile’s health care system 
was dualistic in its design, with a minority group using the private sector and the 
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majority of the population relying on public care”. 102 The return of democracy, 
then, in 1989, allowed new legislation to progressively increase support for the 
public sector and increase the state’s involvement in the health sector. The first 
the Concertación governement (1990-1994) and the second one (1994-2000) 
significatevely increased funding for public health care services also initiated 
adjustments for regulating the priovate care services as well as the private 
insurance market.103  
Paradoxically, what happened in Chile was historically analogous to the 
destruction of the welfare state in the Weimar Republic in Germany. From the 
point of view of legal doctrine, it is interesting to note how the state intervenes in 
order not to intervene and how economic liberalism or neoliberalism re-
ideologizes the legal system and dismantles the very foundations of legal 
liberalism, the foundations of positivism and the Rule of law, essential to the legal 
and political regime they historically constructed.  
                                            
102   Jennifer Pribble, Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America, (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) at 43  
103 Id. at 46 
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CONCLUSION 
 
" Art is politics. Everything is politics" 
Ali Weiwei 
 
 
It was only as I finished this research, and really only as I wrote the last 
lines, thanks to my supervisors’ valuable criticisms to clarify my arguments and 
ideas and refine this dissertation, that I began to close the gap between what I 
was saying and what I wanted to say. This process of analysis and—why not say 
so, introspection—brought me into the past. 
It was in January 1973 when, as a fresh graduate from the University of 
Chile’s Law School and now a researcher at the Centre for Studies of the 
National Reality (CEREN), affiliated with the Catholic University in Chile, I was 
asked to participate in the Executive Committee for the International Seminar on 
State and Law in a Period of Transformation.1 More than forty law professors, 
judges, lawyers, intellectuals, members of parliament, ministers and academic 
researchers from 10 countries were invited to deliver talks and papers to a large 
audience of participants in the Seminar. Chile was going through a unique 
political period and was engaged in an important debate on the roles of the state 
and of law. Salvador Allende’s elected socialist government and the coalition of 
parties that sustained it, Popular Unity, was trying to carry out a social and 
economic revolution within the parameters of liberal democracy, current 
legislation and a constitution that went back to 1925. This process was 
                                            
1http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/osal/osal22/APC22Seminario.pdf  
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internationally known as “the Chilean road to socialism”, which was essentially a 
“legal revolution”. 
 In this context, those of us who were intellectually associated with law and 
politically involved in social and economic change could no longer only theorize 
about law and the state. We were obligated, by the country’s historical 
circumstances, to address the fundamental problems of the legal and institutional 
structure. Questions about the law as a guarantor of the status quo and about the 
state as a reflection of material conditions were not enough. There was a 
theoretical and legal gap to be addressed, with no historical precedents for our 
experience. We were learning how to understand, or perhaps to invent, the 
institutional order as a process and synthesis of modern society.2 Our theoretical 
relationship with law was challenged by politics and by the interaction between 
politics and law. We learned that these dynamics were essential for 
understanding law in terms of its creation, its role and its representation. 
 Months after the International Seminar, the government was overthrown in 
the military coup, which in addition to the known atrocities committed in violation 
of human rights, was not only illegitimate but illegal. In a matter of mere days it 
wiped out five decades of legal institutions, repealing the constitution and taking 
constitutional power away from the citizens to submit it to a junta of three 
                                            
2 International Seminar on “Estado y Derecho en un período de transformación” (Buenos Aires: 
CLACSO, 2007) Year VIII, Nº 22, September. 
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generals and an admiral. As Cicerón had said, without a constitution, not only are 
there bad governments, but also law and the state disappear.3  
I have provided explanation of how economic and political variables have 
shaped different legal changes in the Chilean health system, one that has 
experienced substantial transformations in health legislation. I have explored how 
the law and the legal system are embedded in the transformations of the health 
sphere and analyzed legislation as the outcome of the interface between different 
stakeholders in the political, ideological and economic process of lawmaking. To 
sum up, through this case study, I have studied how lawmaking as an expression 
of politics and as the outcome of processes of negotiation can both maintain the 
social and political order and be instrumental in promoting social change. In 
doing this study, I have learned once again that law cannot be invented, nor 
theorized, nor applied, in abstraction from politics.  
This dissertation allowed me to deepen the interdisciplinarity of my 
research activities. My initial training in law, which continued in sociology and 
then the political economics of health care, has thus returned to law. It has 
allowed me to branch out into socio-legal studies and make a contribution to 
knowledge from this perspective, according to which not only can the law not 
disregard the society in which it is embedded, but it must be understood as 
closely related both to society and to its history. 
                                            
3 José Antonio Vieragallo, Tiranía y derecho, Revista Chile-América, Roma, 1974, No 3, at 15, in 
Jorge  Witker, “Chile: Constitución y Dictadura”, Retrieved f 
http:/biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/2/847/13.pdf at 253. 
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 Interdisciplinary research presents difficulties characteristic of 
contemporary scientific research and its growing specialization, which can limit 
the understanding of social phenomena. This research, which builds on my 
interest in interdisciplinary analyses in the social sciences, also allows me to 
reflect on the importance of investigating the theoretical and epistemological 
needs of this interdisciplinarity. This undoubtedly entails difficulties, especially 
since, unlike in the exact sciences, which develop out of dominant or hegemonic 
paradigms, various paradigms coexist in the social sciences. 
This is why further epistemological reflection seems to be increasingly 
important for developing and legitimating theoretical discourse and developing 
interdisciplinary syntheses. This interpretation is especially interesting in terms of 
health care, in a context in which health care systems worldwide are 
experiencing confounding dilemmas that critically impact both private and public 
health sectors, making them unsustainable in the face of the significant financial 
impacts of chronic diseases that accompany an aging population, high demand 
for pharmaceuticals, and the lack of affordable specialized technology. 
Attempting to contribute to research from a kaleidoscopic perspective – 
analyzing and trying to understand reality in a comprehensive way and at the 
same time understand its movement and see it from different perspectives – is a 
significant epistemological challenge. Personally, in the legal field I am interested 
in further exploring the epistemology of law and globalization, law and politics in 
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21st-century society and legal pluralism. In the field of health, I wish to pursue 
research on health care systems and the paradigmatic crises for envisioning the 
future, requiring us to build knowledge from an interdisciplinary perspective 
develop a comprehensive analysis of the relationships between health, political 
economy and epistemology and how they impact the design of health policies, 
and identify alternative options for emerging health paradigm.  
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